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Abstract
My thesis contributes to the firms and trade literature, both theoretically and
empirically, focusing on the export participation strategy by firms in one particular
market, introducing products sequentially. I illustrate differences in export dynamics
between firms according to their experience in that destination, and move further in
my analysis by exploring how fast that experimentation is. I am particularly interested
in the influence of trade liberalisation, as well as differences between products in terms
of production efficiency.
Chapters 3 and 4 present a two-period analysis on firms’ sequential exporting
strategy to a single destination. Chapter 3 shows theoretically, inspired by Albornoz
et al. (2012), that new exporters in a market tend to grow faster in that destination
than expert exporters, both at the intensive and extensive margin, across products; but
those newcomers are also more prone to exit that business, while trade liberalisation,
as well as the focus on “core competence” products, helps new exporters to remain
in the market and continue experimenting. With a rich dataset of Peruvian export
transactions to the USA market, Chapter 4 backs most predictions from the theory
empirically. In Chapter 5, I go deeper into the sequential exporting strategy with a
theoretical framework, based on Nguyen (2012), to explain how quickly exporters in
one market move from one product to another. I find, supported by empirical evidence,
that trade liberalisation accelerates firms’ experimentation in that destination.
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21 Introduction
My thesis contributes to the literature by exploring the export entry strategy undertaken
by firms in one particular market, by introducing new products sequentially, and the
influence of trade liberalisation in these dynamics. My work also takes into consideration
differences between products in terms of how efficient firms are in their production, as well
as firms’ experience selling goods in the market of interest.
My main motivation to address this issue is that there has recently been a growing
literature exploring the dynamics of exports at the firm level, usually highlighting the
continuous entry and exit flow of firms into the export market, despite having borne entry
costs. Recent literature, e.g. Albornoz et al. (2012) and Nguyen (2012), has stressed that
surviving exporters tend to experiment sequentially in the foreign market. However, to my
knowledge, there has been little, if any, exploration on how these dynamics work within
one destination, experimenting across products. Besides, my desire to focus on Peruvian
firms in the USA market lies on the fact that the trade liberalisation process undertaken by
both countries, which concluded with the enactment of a Free Trade Agreement in 2009,
constitutes a recent event which has not been sufficiently addressed by the literature.
Moreover, I count on a unique wide dataset of Peruvian exports at the firm-transaction
level to all destinations, covering a long time period, and from which several research
questions can be investigated.
In my first chapter, Sequential Exporting Across Products, A Theory, I develop a the-
oretical model, inspired by Albornoz et al. (2012), illustrating a sequential exporting
strategy by firms across products in one destination in a two-period analysis, incorpor-
ating a scenario of trade liberalisation expressed as an unanticipated tariff elimination in
period 2, and considering the role of production costs. My approach relies on the as-
sumption that once the firm introduces a product into the market of interest, it gleans
information about the market as a whole, and thus of export profitability of other products
to that market. Three predictions emerge from this framework, establishing differences
between firms with one-year experience in the market of interest, henceforth “new export-
ers”, and more established firms. New exporters tend to grow more than experts both at
the intensive margin (export growth in one product) and extensive margin (introduction
of a new product) in the market of interest. However, new exporters are also more likely
to stop exporting a product to that market right after de´but. Trade liberalisation boosts
even more those intensive and extensive margin growths and reduces the probability of exit
3from the export business in that destination. The extensive margin growth and exit pre-
vention are stronger for core competence products; whereas the intensive margin growth
is larger for non-core competence products.
Those three predictions are empirically tested in my second chapter, Sequential Ex-
porting Across Products, Evidence from Peru, using a rich dataset of Peruvian firms that
exported to the United States between 2006 and 2013, analysing whether new Peruvian
exporters to USA are more likely to intensify their participation in that market than more
expert firms. In parallel, I analyse whether the tariff elimination from the USA-Peru Free
Trade Agreement (FTA) in 2009 exacerbates this phenomenon; and whether these dynam-
ics are more evident for core competence products. My empirical approach mostly lends
support to my theory in the previous chapter, showing that Peruvian firms with one-year
experience exporting a given product to USA grow more at the intensive and extensive
margin than more experienced firms. However, they are also more prone to stop exporting
a product to that market. Trade liberalisation is associated with a reduction of the exit
probability for new exporters, as well as with an increase in the entry likelihood with a new
product to USA for experienced exporters. The intensive margin growth of new exporters
is even larger with a non-core competence product; but their extensive margin growth
and exit prevention are larger with a core product; those effects being more evident for
the smallest firms. One important issue to bear in mind when analysing the Peru-USA
liberalisation process is that the financial crisis led to a sharp drop of Peruvian exports
to USA in 2009, exactly when the FTA became effective. Indeed, Behrens et al. (2013)
document the effects of that crisis for Belgian exports and imports, finding that negative
changes at the firm-product-country level mostly occurred at the intensive margin. In this
chapter, I disentangle both crisis and liberalisation effects by controlling for year fixed
effects and the tariff change at the product level from 2008 to 2009.
In my last chapter, Experimentation Speed Across Products, Evidence from Peru in
the USA market, I develop a theoretical model, based on Nguyen (2009) to explain how
quickly exporters move on from one product to the other in a particular destination,
in a setting where product demands follow a joint bivariate distribution. By exporting
shipments of a first product A to market d and observing realised demand, the exporter
gradually updates his perceived demand for product B. Expected profitability of product
B, and thus the decision to export, is shown to be a function of the number of shipments
of A, the correlation coefficient between the two demands, as well as the mean export
value of A. Sequential exporting is predicted to take place faster (after fewer shipments
4of product A) if (i) trade costs of product B are lower, (ii) the mean value of A exports is
larger, and (iii) the higher is the correlation between the two product demands in market
d. This prediction is tested by a survival analysis, with the dataset described earlier, which
contains daily data. The enactment of the USA-Peru FTA in 2009 is associated with an
acceleration of the introduction of new products into the USA, expressed as either fewer
shipments of previous products or a shorter time spell between the first shipments of the
old and the new product. Such acceleration tends to be larger for products with higher
pre-FTA tariffs that were not included in pre-FTA unilateral trade preferences by USA.
Additionally, trade liberalisation tends to facilitate the introduction of new products by
pre-FTA firms after having sent smaller values of previous products.
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows. Firstly, Section 2 discusses the
related literature. Then, subsequent sections each present a chapter. Section 3 presents
Sequential Exporting Across Products, A Theory. Section 4 displays the empirical ap-
proach at Sequential Exporting Across Products, Evidence from Peru. Section 5 presents
Experimentation Speed Across Products, Evidence from Peru in the USA market. Section
6 concludes.
52 Related Literature
Three large strands of the previous literature clearly nourish my research: (i) firm export
dynamics, (ii) multi-product firms and (iii) experimentation.
2.1 Firm Export Dynamics
The growing literature on firm export dynamics has mainly focused on firm entry
and exit, as well as the evolution of the intensive (within one market) and extensive
margin (across markets). One of the first contributions is Roberts and Tybout (1997)
who quantified the effect of prior exporting experience on manufacturing plants’ decision to
enter into foreign markets. They find that after a two-year absence, due to the depreciation
of the export experience, re-entry costs are as similar as those of a new exporter. Moreover,
larger and older plants are all more likely to export. Eaton et al. (2008) also for the
Colombian case, observe that, while many firms start and stop exporting, export sales are
dominated by a small number of very large and stable exporters.
Some studies address the Peruvian case, such as Freund and Pierola (2010), which
shows considerable entry and exit flows of Peruvian exporters each year. However, in
contrast to other studies, they argue that smaller firms can discover their entry costs
through a very cheap trial, while firm size is positively associated with large export sales.
In contrast, developing new products requires a much larger entry cost. Focusing on
Peruvian agriculture, Malca and Rubio (2012) analyse the relation between tenure in
export markets and export performance, finding that for one additional year a firm exports,
there is a considerable rise in the probability of remaining as an exporter (survival).1 In
that line, working with Argentinean firms, Albornoz et al. (2016) investigate their survival
in export markets, emphasising the role of market-specific sunk and fixed costs firms need
to pay to operate abroad. They find that survival in an export market increases with
firms’ experience, theoretically represented by a rise in the ratio of sunk to fixed costs in
a market.
The latter observation motivates me to refer to a growing tendency to the use of
duration models to measure firms’ probability to remain or exit from the export activity.
Besedesˇ and Prusa (2006a), for instance, address the duration of USA imports from up to
1They classify firms by their mean annual exports, employing two categories: small (below US$ 50,000)
and large (above or equal to US$ 50,000).
6180 countries, finding a short median duration of about 2 or 4 years. They also obtain a
negative duration dependence; that is, if a country can survive exporting for the first few
years, its failure probability falls, maintaining its trade relation.
Other studies like Besedesˇ and Prusa (2006b) use more conventional survival analysis
methods like the Kaplan-Meier estimator and the Cox proportional hazard models. These
authors find that USA import trade relationships involving differentiated products, start-
ing with considerably smaller initial purchases, have over twice as long a median duration
as other product types. The larger these initial purchases, the longer the duration, and
the larger the differences across product types. For the Peruvian case, Volpe Martin-
cus and Carballo (2008) use both methods considering only new exporters, finding that
both product and, especially, geographical diversification raise the chances of remaining
an exporter. Larger firms, measured by number of employees, are more likely to survive
in foreign markets. 2
Despite the valuable findings from these studies, there is limited consideration of trade
liberalisation into the analysis of export dynamics – Brenton et al. (2010), for instance,
only introduces a dummy for countries signing a Regional Trade Agreement–, leaving room
for further research.3 Moreover, the cited papers on the Peruvian case have not addressed
the recent enactment of the USA-Peru Free Trade agreement and other treaties. In that
sense, this research represents an opportunity to bridge that gap, addressing the dynamics
of exports in Peru, in a context of trade liberalisation.
Additionally, all studies on duration listed herein took the conventional process of
considering the event of firms leaving the export market as the “failure” of interest. What
about, instead, addressing a positive event of interest, for instance, how long it takes for
firms to decide to enter into the export activity? In this thesis, I undertake a theoretical
2Many other studies analyse export survival by the aforementioned approaches, such as Besedes and
Blyde (2010) for Latin America and Carre`re and Strauss-Kahn (2014) for non-OECD countries. Others
explore alternative methods like discrete-time models ( Hess and Persson (2012)), or the Prentice and
Gloeckler (1978) model ( Brenton et al. (2010)).
3On the other hand, most of the recent works addressing trade liberalisation with firm-level data have
been predominantly focused on its relation with firms’ productivity. The common idea tested is that most
productive firms will enter the export market and/or exporting makes firms more productive, and trade
liberalisation plays the role of facilitating market access, especially for those more productive. Researches
like Bustos (2011) on Argentina; Schor (2004) on Brazil; Pavcnik (2002) on Chile; Fernandes (2007) on
Colombia; Amiti and Konings (2007) on Indonesia; Bernard and Jensen (1999) and Bernard and Jensen
(2004) on the United States; De Loecker (2007) on Slovenia; Van Biesebroeck (2005) on Sub-Saharan
African countries; and Lileeva and Trefler (2007) on Canada, go on that line.
7approach and survival analysis to estimate how fast firms introduce a product into a
market of interest, i.e. their experimentation speed.
Within the firm export dynamics strand of the literature, my research is closely related
to the recently explored issue of sequential exporting . In fact, the theoretical models
in Chapters 3 and 5 and the empirical approach proposed in Chapter 4 are inspired
in a previous research by Albornoz et al. (2012) for the Argentinean industry. These
authors emphasise that many new exporters exit that business very shortly after entering,
despite the existence of substantial entry costs; while others raise sales and expand to new
destinations.
Their basic assumption is that a firm’s export profitability is initially uncertain, and
it will only be known once the firm enters the export market, paying a fixed entry cost.
Such export profitability is perfectly correlated over time (persistent but ex-ante unknown
demand patterns) and across destinations (similarities in either demand or supply condi-
tions). The discovery of this profitability leads to a sequential exporting process, whereby
firms use their initial export experience to infer information on their future success in a
market and others.
Albornoz et al. (2012) derive three predictions on the export behaviour of new ex-
porters as opposed to more experienced firms in the foreign market. After testing these
predictions, the authors find that, despite entry sunk costs, many firms that start export-
ing drop out of the export business very shortly, while the successful ones grow at both
intensive and extensive margin. Since breaking into a new market entails unrecoverable
costs, and the information on export profitability has a global scope, these new exporters
have an incentive to enter foreign destinations sequentially.
Their sequential exporting analysis is undertaken across markets; but I rather tackle
the issue of how these firm export dynamics operate across products within one particular
destination. Furthermore, the issue of trade liberalisation is not considered in this analysis.
Indeed, Albornoz et al., 2012, (p. 30) argue that there is a gap in the literature to link
sequential exporting with trade liberalisation processes:
“Another area where understanding firms’ sequential exporting strategies can be
far-reaching is trade policy. (. . . ) the impact of trade agreements, at both the regional
and the multilateral levels, could be much richer than what existing studies indicate.
(. . . ) this is an area that surely calls for further research”.
8In light of this, the Peruvian case –with recent reforms in trade policy, especially
the approval of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States in 2009, which effects
on Peruvian firms’ performance have not been sufficiently researched yet– represents an
interesting scenario in which the aforementioned gaps can be bridged. Besides, Albornoz
et al. (2012) obtains that, by realising their export profitability in one market, firms may
sequentially decide to sell to further destinations in the next period. However, that is not
a real time estimation, i.e. length of time elapsed between experimentation stages, either
across markets and products within one destination. How fast do firms introduce a new
product to a particular market? What factors determine the acceleration or delay of that
decision? Does trade liberalisation play a role in this process?
2.2 Multi-Product Firms
Since the firm export dynamics analysis I develop in this thesis is across products in
one destination, the existence of multi-product firms and the difference within firms
between core and non-core competence products is an issue to be addressed.
Focusing on four African countries, Cadot et al. (2011) concludes that more diversified
firms in terms of products, as well as in terms of markets, are more likely to succeed and
survive in the export business beyond the first year.
But some other works give special emphasis to the issue of “core competence” products
and its link with trade liberalisation, like Eckel and Neary (2010) who show that glob-
alisation affects the scale and scope of multi-product firms through a competition and a
demand effect. They assert that firms face a pressure to become “leaner and meaner”,
thereby raising their productivity and total output to serve foreign markets. Thus, firms
are encouraged to focus on their “core competence” products, dismissing more marginal
costly varieties. In that same line, Eckel et al. (2009) test the predictions of a theoretical
model for the Mexican industry, arguing that there is a “cannibalisation effect”, whereby
an increase in the output of a “core competence” variety will reduce the sales of the others.
The authors argue that this pattern takes place in response to trade liberalisation under
the NAFTA treaty with Canada and USA, caused by an “intra-firm extensive margin”
adjustment. Similar findings were obtained by Mayer et al. (2011) in the case of French
exporters reacting to tougher competition.
Despite the links found between product specialisation and trade liberalisation, most of
these works are limited to a single-year analysis at a firm level, rather than at a finer firm-
9product level. The rich dataset obtained for Peruvian firms, products exported and tariff
rates over time provide a good chance to incorporate in Chapter 4 the difference between
core and non-core competence products into an analysis on firm export dynamics across
products, also accounting for the role of trade liberalisation. In Chapter 3, I strengthen
my theory by exploring the difference between types of products.
There are other studies following the performance of multi-product firms in a longer
period, such as Lacovone and Smarzynska Javorcik (2008), which presents stylised facts
of firm-product dynamics in Mexican industry during an export boom. The authors find,
among other facts, that new exporters tend to “start small” in value and number of
products, and the introduction of new products is preceded by a surge in investment.
Equally important, the intensive and extensive margin across products are positively cor-
related.
A valuable theoretical contribution is provided by Bernard et al. (2010), on the fre-
quency, pervasiveness and determinants of product switching. The authors predict that
the duration of a product in a firm’s product mix is longer the greater the sale volume and
the longer the tenure of the product; that the exit probability of a firm-product combina-
tion is decreasing in productivity and quality; and that the product adding and dropping
rates are positively correlated. Motivated by that framework, Go¨rg et al. (2012) analyses
the determinants of products’ survival in Hungarian firms’ export mixes. Building on the
idea that product choices are endogenous, they find that both firm and product charac-
teristics matter in export dynamics. In fact, firm productivity, as well as product scale
and tenure, is associated with higher export survival rates.
Another notable theoretical approach is found at Bernard et al. (2006), which in-
corporates the role of trade liberalisation. Here, firm productivity is a combination of
firm-level “ability” and firm-product-level “expertise”, both unknown until the firm pays
a sunk cost of entry. The authors conclude that higher “ability” raises a firm’s productiv-
ity across all products, inducing a positive correlation between intensive and extensive
margins. Trade liberalisation fosters productivity growth within and across firms and in
aggregate, because firms drop marginally productive products and the least productive
firms exit. However, surviving firms increase their share of products sold abroad, as well
as their exports per product. Arkolakis and Muendler (2010) conducts an empirical test
with cross sectional Brazilian data, obtaining results akin to the predictions from Bernard
et al. (2006). In an update from their previous work, Arkolakis et al. (2015) present a
general-equilibrium model of multi-product firms, also tested with Brazilian data, which
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most relevant characteristic is that additional products further from a firm’s core com-
petency incur higher costs, but face lower market access costs, unlike other multi-product
firms models where market access costs are fixed or constant for additional products.
These works, more focused on the firm-product level, offer a valuable contribution on
the determinants of products’ survival in firms’ export mix and their export scope in a
market. However, in Chapter 5 I evaluate a different phenomenon. What determines
firms’ decision to introduce a product or set of products into one particular destination,
and how long does it take for this event to occur? In other words, I am interested in
measuring firms’ experimentation speed in a market. And one departure point to consider
comes from a literature survey by Bernard et al. (2011), highlighting studies which find
that firms update their priors about profitability in export markets, based upon sales,
deciding to exit or expand their penetration of export markets over time.
2.3 Experimentation
The point raised earlier leads me to refer to the literature on experimentation , dating
back to a first model by Wald (1945b), illustrating sequential tests of statistical hypo-
theses. In this process, one can decide either to fail to reject a null hypothesis, reject it,
or continue the experiment by making an additional observation. That process terminates
when one of the first two decisions is made; but will continue if we opt for the third. Thus,
a sequential test is undertaken, where the number of observations is a random variable,
unlike other tests where that number is predetermined. The author argues this test is
more efficient as the expected number of observations required is lower.4 Moscarini et al.
(1998) extend this approach, aiming to find an optimal experimentation level, assuming
the decision maker is impatient, making variable-size experiments each period, at some
increasing and strictly convex cost before making a final decision. That optimal level is
increasing in the confidence about the project outcome and for more impatient agents.
These basic ideas were further deployed in contexts like the decision to adopt new
agricultural technologies in Ghana ( Conley and Udry (2001)) and India ( Foster and
Rosenzweig (1995)) or the modelling of entrepreneurial learning ( Minniti and Bygrave
(2001)). The first two focus on belief updates depending on neighbours’ performance.5
Other studies, like Kelly and Kolstad (1999) on growth and pollution, emphasise that
4 Wald (1945a) provides more practical examples of this test.
5 Bolton and Harris (1999) provides a theoretical approach in which N decision makers learn from each
other’s experimentations, deciding between a “safe” and a “risky” action.
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decision makers do a Bayesian learning process. This theoretical approach addresses the
relation between greenhouse gas levels and global mean temperature changes. Policy
makers learn depending on stochastic shocks to the realised temperature, and the expected
learning time is related to the variance of that shock and the emissions policy, implying a
tradeoff between emissions control and learning speed.
Closer to my focus are Rauch and Watson (2003) and Watson (1999) on “starting
small” in a trade partnership. The former, theoretically portraying the relation between
a developed country buyer and a developing country supplier, states that matched firms
“start small” to assess the supplier’s ability to successfully fulfil a large order. That
propensity rises with the cost of seeking a new supplier, and falls with the probability
of fulfilling a large order after training. The latter incorporates renegotiation into the
analysis, making both agents decide with incomplete information whether to cooperate
or betray each other. They find an equilibrium where partners “start small”, uniquely
selected under a strong renegotiation condition.
A recent contribution in that sense is provided by Araujo et al. (2016), with a theoret-
ical approach whereby a producer searches for a distributor in a foreign market to sell its
products abroad, in an environment with incomplete information. Some distributors are
prompted to default a contract; whereas others are incentivised to abide by their contrac-
tual obligations, thereby building private reputations. As a result, their model, expirically
tested for Belgian exporters, predicts that exporters start with higher volumes and sell
for longer periods in countries with better contracting institutions, and when they have
prior foreign experience. However, that institutional quality is found to deter the export
growth of firms, conditional on survival.
Also into the exports matter is Fernandes and Tang (2014) on how learning from
neighbouring firms affects new exporters’ performance, updating their prior belief on a
foreign market demand, based on the number of exporting neighbours, export hetero-
geneity and the firm’s own belief. A positive signal from neighbours increases the firm’s
probability to enter a market and its initial sales, and that effect is stronger the more
exporting neighbours and the less familiar to the market the firm is.
Another approach is in terms of number of destinations explored. Akhmetova and
Mitaritonna (2012) propose an experimentation model whereby a firm can postpone full
entry into a market and learn more about its products’ demand by accessing a few con-
sumers. The firm chooses an optimal experimentation intensity (number of consumers
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accessed) and an entry/exit policy. That intensity will be larger if the firm is more pro-
ductive, even if its beliefs are low. Empirically, these predictions are proven in a context
of testing destinations before fully entering into a region.
But the closest work to my interest is Nguyen (2012), explaining why firms wait
to export and why many fail. Its key assumption is imperfect correlation of demand
across destinations, so that firms can use previously realised demands from other markets
to forecast demands from untested destinations. This gives firms the chance to delay
exporting to one market, by gathering information from already explored destinations.
Thus, firms opt for a sequential strategy, entering and exiting destinations after realising
their demands. A similar rationale I propose to apply in Chapter 5 to explain firms’
experimentation strategy within one market, by introducing new products sequentially.
I theoretically measure how long it takes for a firm, after selling one new product to
the market of interest, to sell another one, expressed as the number of shipments of the
first product prior to the first shipment of the next one. Thus, I aim to measure firms’
experimentation speed in a market and its determinants, highlighting the role of trade
liberalisation. Nguyen (2012) does not consider the influence of other firms. I follow
this feature in my approach, as I am more interested in the transition from the first to
subsequent new products, rather than the decision to export for the first time.
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3 Sequential Exporting Across Products: A Theory
3.1 Introduction
A growing literature has recently contributed to gain theoretical insights on the firms’
decisions to enter and exit from the export activity, along with the determinants of those
decisions. Melitz (2003) was one of the first contributions, theoretically showing that
exposure to trade makes the most productive firms enter the export market after paying
an entry cost, while the least productive opt for exiting and focusing on the domestic
market. Another study by Roberts and Tybout (1997) proposes that, apart from sunk
entry costs, firms’ prior export experience is determinant in their current export status.
Nevertheless, export entry costs and/or productivity cutoffs might differ across destin-
ations and products. Hence, firms might be persuaded to experiment in the export activity
sequentially, realising their demand and profitability. In that line, Albornoz et al. (2012)
presents a valuable theoretical approach illustrating how firms learn about their export
profitability, initially uncertain, by sequentially entering different markets, after paying a
sunk entry cost. Such export profitability is assumed to be perfectly correlated over time
and across destinations, implying that firms, by using their first export experience in a
market, can infer their future success in other markets. Albornoz et al. (2012) derive
three predictions from that framework on firms’ export behaviour, establishing differences
between new and more experienced exporters. In summary, the model predicts that, des-
pite entry costs, firms that start exporting drop out of the business very quickly; but those
which survive tend to grow more than more expert firms both at the intensive (export
growth in a market) and extensive margin (entry into a new market).
Sequential exporting analysis is thus undertaken across destinations; but how do these
export dynamics operate across products within one destination? Moreover, another im-
portant issue is how changes in the trade policy of the market of interest, e.g. trade
liberalisation, affect these dynamics.
Few other studies provide theoretical contributions on export dynamics at the firm-
product level. Bernard et al. (2010) presents an approach addressing the frequency,
pervasiveness and determinants of product switching. From that model, the duration of
a product in a firm’s export basket is longer the greater the greater the sale volume and
the tenure of the product. The approach also predicts that the exit probability of a firm-
product combination is decreasing in product and quality, and that product adding and
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dropping rates are positively correlated.
Another valuable contribution is given by Bernard et al. (2006). The authors predict
that firm-level “ability” raises a firm’s productivity across products, inducing a positive
correlation between intensive and extensive margins. Trade liberalisation makes a firm
drop its marginally productive goods from its mix; while the least productive firms exit;
but those surviving raise their share of products sold abroad and sales per product.
These two papers provide important insights on the survival of products in a firm’s
portfolio; but not precisely on the survival of a firm-product combination in a destination.
Also, the survival probability of a firm in an export market with a product may also depend
on its experience and ability to realise its products’ profitability in that destination, as
well as firm-product-specific characteristics, such as the “core competence” condition of
that product.
Given the gaps described, this chapter contributes to the literature by providing a
theoretical model, inspired by Albornoz et al. (2012), which reorients the sequential
exporting analysis, focusing on the dynamics new exporters undergo in terms of product
diversification within one market, incorporating trade liberalisation into that analysis, in
the shape of a tariff elimination by the destination country on the products exported by a
trading partner, and distinguishing between better performing (core competence) products
and worse performing ones.
My model is a two-period analysis in which firms from an origin country decide whether
or not to export to a destination country, depending on their expected export profitability,
assumed to be perfectly correlated across products and over time. Overall, my model
predicts that new exporters starting in t = 1, conditional on survival, tend to grow more
in a market than more consolidated firms in t = 2 at both the intensive (export growth
with a product) and extensive margin (experimentation with a new product). However,
those new exporters are also more likely to stop selling a product in that market. Trade
liberalisation contributes to exacerbate the intensive margin growth and to reduce the
exit probability for newcomers, as well as boosting the extensive margin growth for the
experts. Also, the exit prevention and probability to experiment with a new product is
larger for a “core competence” product.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 outlines the basics
of the model. Section 3.3 details how firms construct their export decision (how much
to sell of each product). Section 3.4 addresses the firms’ entry decision into the des-
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tination. Section 3.5 explains the predictions from the model. Section 3.6 addresses how
these predictions change if I assume imperfect correlation of the export profitability across
products. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 The Model
Consider one economic environment where firms can export goods from a country of origin,
o, to a destination country, d, over two periods t = 1, 2.
A risk-neutral producer from country o evaluates whether to export or not to country
d. His product portfolio consists of two products A and B. If the firm decides to enter d, it
will have to pay a sunk entry cost Fd for any product it exports, assumed to the identical
across products. This assumption differs from studies like Arkolakis et al. (2015), which
allows the entry costs per product to vary depending on the firm’s product scope. These
sunk entry costs are hypothesised to reflect distribution channels, marketing strategy and
exporting procedures, which might be specific to each kind of product. I assume other
entry costs that are common across products within a market, such as information on
institutional and policy characteristics of the foreign country, to be minimal and/or easily
accessible to firms.
In order to export products A and B to country d, firms must pay a product-specific
unit trade cost (tariff levied by d) τA and τB, such that τA ≤ τB.6 The variable costs
firms have to incur for each product comprise a unit export cost, cAx and c
B
x , and a firm-
specific unit production cost, cAp and c
B
p , such that c
A
p > c
B
p , which means that a firm is
more efficient producing good B than good A. This implies that good B is the firm’s core
competence product; the good in which the firm is more productive. While the production
costs are known to the firm, the unit export costs are unknown. It is true that this cost
characterisation is one particular case, and other scenarios may take place. However, as
I will further explain afterwards, I am particularly interested in the case where, despite
having a “core competence” product, the firm opts for experimenting first with the “non-
core” product, cheaper to export in a scenario without trade liberalisation, and how that
decision changes when trade costs are eliminated. This assumption is not essential for the
development and final predictions of my model. Indeed, a more straightforward scenario
may consist of product A being both the core competence and the one with the lowest
trade cost, and the features of my predictions will remain unchanged, as will be seen
6I make the assumption that home firm pays the tariff, since I do not have information on importers.
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afterwards. The major difference lies on which product is exported first before and after
trade liberalisation.
The demand side, on the other hand, is represented by the following function:
qj(pj) = dj − pj , (3.1)
where qj denotes the quantity of product A or B exported; pj is the price of that product;
and dj is an unknown demand component. In other words, uncertainty can be found
in both the supply and demand sides. The calculation of firms’ export profitability for
product j = {A,B}, denoted as µj , will then consider the unknown demand component
and the unknown unit export cost, as well as the known unit production cost:
µj ≡ dj − cjx − cjp. (3.2)
The unknown components of that export profitability of product j in destination d,
dj − cjx, can be summarised by the term µNj , which is the uncertain variable of interest
in the model. Hence, when it comes to determine the optimal quantity of product j
exported to d in each time period, firms will have to maximise profits –revenues minus
costs–, expressed by:
pij = (µNj − cjp − τ j − qj)qj . (3.3)
The central assumption of this model is that the unknown export profitabilities of
products sold in destination d are perfectly correlated, implying that they are constant
over time and common across products. 7 In other words, µNj is constant at t = 1, 2, and
µNA = µNB = µN .
The model also assumes that the uncertain export profitability µN is a random variable
with a cumulative distribution function G(.), ranging within the interval [µN , µN ].
7Correlation over time can be related to ex ante unknown demand patterns in the target market or
unknown idiosyncratic export costs, which are stable over time.Albornoz et al. (2012) mention, as examples
of these export costs, shipping and port activities, distribution of goods in foreign markets, export finance
and insurance, among others. Similarly, correlation across products may arise from similarities in either
supply or demand conditions across products exported to a particular destination. Regarding this last
point, most of the firms considered in the sample are focused in one industry, exporting goods with
similar supply and demand patterns. Hence, I consider the assumption of correlation across products as
appropriate.
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Consider an initial scenario where τA + cAp ≤ τB + cBp , meaning that it is still cheaper
for the firm to produce and export product A. Subsequently, I incorporate the event of
trade liberalisation by destination d, expressed as τA = τB = 0. Thus, after that event,
the firm finds that it is less costly to export product B, since cAp > c
B
p . In that sense, this
model aims to illustrate the firm’s export decisions over time, depending on the presence
or absence of trade costs, and considering the firm’s own efficiency across products. In
other words, the potential existence of a tradeoff between core competences (expressed in
low production costs) and trade costs (expressed in high tariffs).
3.3 The Firm’s Export Decision
I make an exercise of a firm evaluating profits from exporting to destination d, ex ante at
t = 0. Like Albornoz et al. (2012), I assume that firms do not discount future profits.
Initially, I analyse the firm’s behaviour at t = 1, 2, in a scenario without trade liberal-
isation. I illustrate what decision the firm makes in each period, and the conditions firms
take into account in their decision-making process. Henceforth, I denote as ejt the firm’s
decision to export product j to destination d at time t, taking value 1 if the firm actually
exports, and 0 otherwise. The firm ex ante decides from the following set of options: i)
no entry to destination d; ii) simultaneous entry, exporting both products A and B; or
iii) sequential entry, exporting first the cheaper product A in t = 1, then selling both A
and B in t = 2. It may also be possible, as will be seen afterwards, that the firm decides
to remain exporting product A in t = 2 or dropping that product from market d in that
period, after selling it in t = 1.
3.3.1 The Firm’s Export Decision at t=2
In case the firm decides not to enter to market d, it will not discover the uncertain
export profitability. Hence, in effective terms, µN = 0.
In the simultaneous entry option, the firm will have already realised the export
profitability µN , and will choose qˆj2, its optimal export value for product j = A,B in t = 2
by maximising the profit function in Equation 3.3, provided that the realised µN is greater
than product j’s unit costs:
qˆj2 = 1[µN>τ j+cjp]
(
µN − cjp − τ j
2
)
. (3.4)
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Substituting this optimal output into Equation 3.3, the maximised profit from j in
t = 2 is:
pˆij2 =
(
µN − cjp − τ j
2
)2
. (3.5)
If, in contrast, the realised export profitability does not exceed the known costs (µN ≤
τ j + cpj), qj2 will be zero.
Since I am interested in obtaining the expected value in t = 0 of those maximised
profits in t = 2, and given the assumed distribution of export profitabilities, I construct
the following expression, representing the value of continuing to export product j in t = 2
after µN > τ j + cjp is discovered:
V (τ j ; cjp) =
∫ µN
τ j+cjp
(
µN − cjp − τ j
2
)2
dG(µN ); j = A,B. (3.6)
If the firm opts for sequential entry , it will have inferred µN after exporting product
A in t = 1. Hence, the export value of that product in t = 2, qA2 is given similarly to
Equation 3.4, leading to an expected value of profits in t = 2, denoted as V (τA; cAp ), like
in Equation 3.6.
As for product B, the firm will export it in t = 2 if the maximised profits are larger
than the destination’s sunk cost Fd:
(
µN − cBp − τB
2
)2
≥ Fd. (3.7)
Rearranging Equation 3.7, the firm will export B in t = 2 –eB2 (τ
B; cBp ) = 1– if µ
N ≥
2F
1/2
d +τ
B+cBp . From that inequality, I can obtain a value F
B
d2(τ
B; cpB) for which Equation
3.7 becomes an equality. Thus, I can conclude that eB2 (τ
B; cBp ) = 1 if Fd ≤ FBd2(τB; cBp ).
It can be inferred that FBd2 is strictly decreasing in the known costs τ
B and cBp .
Since eB2 = 1, this implies that µ
N > τB + cBp . Hence, the firm will decide its export
value of product B to d in t = 2 in the same way as it did for product A. Hence,
qˆB2 =
(
µN−cBp −τB
2
)
.
With the output and profits obtained, I am now able to define the expected value in
t = 0 of the firm’s decision to export B to destination d in t = 2:
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W (τB; cBp ;Fd) ≡
∫ µN
2F
1/2
d +τ
B+cBp
[(
µN − cBp − τB
2
)2
− Fd
]
dG(µN )
= {V (τB; cBp )−
∫ 2F 1/2d +τB+cBp
τB+cBp
(
µN − cBp − τB
2
)2
dG(µN )}
− Fd[1−G(2F 1/2 + τB + cBp )].
(3.8)
The term in the left hand side of Equation 3.8, W (τB; cBp ;Fd), represents the expected
value of exporting product B to d after realising µN by previously exporting product A.
The term in curly brackets accounts for the ex ante expected gross profit from exporting
B in t = 2; whereas the last line of the equation stands for the fixed entry cost incurred
to export B, multiplied by the probability that exporting such product is worthwhile.
Recall that my theoretical approach assumes the sunk entry cost per product Fd
identical across products. It is appropriate to assess the effect on the firm’s export decision
in t = 2 in a sequential entry strategy if I followed Arkolakis et al. (2015), allowing the
product entry cost to differ, depending on the exporter’s product scope. In their approach,
these authors argue that a firm’s incremental market access cost may increase or decrease
with exporter product scope. That alternative scenario would not affect the maths of my
ex ante export decision process; but the larger or smaller entry cost for product B after
realising the export profitability by selling product A should be compared with the cutoff
value FBd2(τ
B; cpB) derived from Equation 3.7 to determine if it is profitable enough to
introduce product B in t = 2. A variable Fd for product B will also affect the expected
value W (τB; cBp ;Fd) derived from Equation 3.8, increasing or reducing the total expected
value of the firm’s sequential entry strategy.
3.3.2 The Firm’s Export Decision at t=1
Like in the second period, if the firm opts for not entering destination d in t = 1, it will
not be able to realise the uncertain export profitability; namely, µN = 0.
If the firm undertakes a simultaneous entry strategy, it chooses the optimal export
values qA1 and q
B
1 to maximise its total gross profits for the two periods, expressed by:
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ψ(qA1 , q
B
1 ; τ
A, τB; cAp , c
B
p ) ≡
∫ µN
µN
(µN − τA − cAp − qA1 )qA1 dG(µN )
+
∫ µN
µN
(µN − τB − cBp − qB1 )qB1 dG(µN )
+max{1{qA1 >0}, 1{qB1 >0}}[V (τ
A; cAp ) + V (τ
B; cBp )].
(3.9)
The first two terms on the right hand side of the equation correspond to the expected
gross profits of the firm in t = 1; while the third term represents the expected gross profits
in t = 2, given that the firm exported either product A or B in the previous period.
This latter term accounts for the idea that exporting one product to a destination reveals
information about the firm’s profitability in both products.
By maximising Equation 3.9, the firm obtains the optimal export values for each
product in t = 1, now taking into account the expected value of the uncertain export
profitability, EµN . Thus, the optimal exports are:
qˆA1 (τ
A; cAp ) = 1{EµN>τA+cAp }
(
EµN − τA − cAp
2
)
+ 1{EµN≤τA+cAp }ε. (3.10)
qˆB1 (τ
B; cBp ) = 1{EµN>τB+cBp }
(
EµN − τB − cBp
2
)
. (3.11)
Equation 3.10 shows that it is possible for the firm to decide to export A in t = 1 even if
EµN < τA+cAp , selling an arbitrarily small value ε, representing a case of experimentation
in d with product A. The benefit of this decision is the discovery of the unknown µN . If
such discovered profitability is greater than the known costs, the firm will remain exporting
that good in the subsequent periods. In this model, the firm can adopt that strategy for
product A exclusively, since τA+cAp ≤ τB +cBp and µNA = µNB. The decision for product
B is more restrictive, as the firm will export that product to d in t = 1 if the expected
export profitability exceeds the unit trade and production costs of B.
In the case of exporting ε of A in t = 1, I obtain a positive value for the limit of the
expected gross profits from the simultaneous entry strategy:
lim
ε→0
ψ(ε, 0; τA, τB; cAp , c
B
p ) ≡ V (τA; cAp ) + V (τB; cBp ) > 0, (3.12)
which is clearly greater than the option of not exporting at all in t = 1, since the firm
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would not be able to benefit from realising the export profitability, represented by the
future profits from exports in t = 2.
If, conversely, the firm expects the unknown export profitability to be greater than the
known costs of products A and B, respectively, this will be its expected gross profits from
entering destination d with each product j:
ψj(τ j ; cjp) ≡ 1{EµN>τ j+cjp}
(
EµN − τ j − cjp
2
)2
+ V (τ j ; cjp) > 0. (3.13)
Thus, considering Equations 3.12 and 3.13, and the optimal export values from Equa-
tions 3.10 and 3.11, I can attain the firm’s expected gross profits from the simultanoeus
entry strategy, at optimal output levels:
ψSm(τA, τB; cAp , c
B
p ) ≡ lim
ε→0+
ψSm(qˆA1 (τ
A; cAp ), qˆ
B
1 (τ
B; cBp ); τ
A, τB; cAp , c
B
p )
= ψA(τA; cAp ) + ψ
B(τB; cBp ).
(3.14)
If the firm, on the contrary, opts for a sequential entry strategy, at t = 1 the firm
will enter destination d with product A for being less costly. Hence, it will choose qA1 to
maximise its gross profits:
ψSq(qA1 ; τ
A, τB; cAp , c
B
p ) ≡
∫ µN
µN
(µN − τA − cAp − qA1 )qA1 dG(µN )
+ 1{qA1 >0}[V (τ
A; cAp ) +W (τ
B; cBp ;Fd)].
(3.15)
The expression above emphasises that the firm learns its export profitability in des-
tination d only if it decides to export A (qA1 > 0). Then, by choosing its optimal level
of output for product A, qˆA1 (τ
A; cpA), Equation 3.15 converges to the following expression
for the expected gross profits from the firm’s sequential entry strategy:
ψSq(qA1 ; τ
A, τB; cAp , c
B
p ) ≡ lim
ε→0+
ψSq(qˆA1 (τ
A; cAp ); τ
A, τB; cAp , c
B
p )
= ψA(τA; cAp ) +W (τ
B; cBp ;Fd),
(3.16)
which reflects the firm’s possibility to enter destination d with product A first, even if its
initial expectations are pessimistic: EµN < τA + cAp . This occurs because, by exporting
the arbitrarily small value ε in t = 1, the firm does not only get informed of its success
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in product A, making it export more of such product in t = 2; but it also gets informed
of its potential success in product B, making it jump into that business in t = 2, since
profitabilities in both products are perfectly correlated.
3.4 The Firm’s Entry Decision
When defining the export strategy followed by firm i in destination d, I focused on the
expected gross profits, ψSm and ψSq, from simultaneous and sequential exporting, respect-
ively. However, in order to determine which of these entry strategies to undertake, the
firm will have to consider the net profits from each of those options. Such net profits are
functions of these expected values and the product-specific sunk entry costs Fd. From the
derivation of net profits, I can obtain some cutoff values of Fd which determine whether
it is optimal to adopt a sequential or simultaneous entry strategy, or no entry at all to
destination d.
From Equation 3.14, I can obtain the firm’s net profit from the simultaneous entry
strategy, expressed as piSm:
piSm = ψA(τA; cAp ) + ψ
B(τB; cBp )− 2Fd, (3.17)
which shows that, from the gross profit, the firm has to discount the sunk entry cost for
each product, assumed to be identical across them.
Similarly, from Equation 3.16, I attain the firm’s net profit from the sequential entry
strategy, expressed as piSq:
piSq = ψA(τA; cAp ) +W (τ
B; cBp ;Fd)− Fd. (3.18)
It can be concluded that simultaneous entry into destination d with products A and
B will be optimal if piSm > piSq and piSm ≥ 0. Conversely, sequential entry, by exporting
product A in t = 1 and both products in t = 2 will be optimal if piSq > piSm and piSq ≥ 0. If
neither of these conditions is met, the firm does not enter destination d with any product.
Therefore, from Equations 3.17 and 3.18, I can argue that simultaneous entry is optimal
if Fd < ψ
B(τB; cBp )−W (τB; cBp ;Fd) and Fd ≤ [ψ
A(τA;cAp )+ψ
B(τB ;cBp )]
2 . Comparing these two
expressions, it can be stated that the right hand side of the second condition is necessarily
greater than the right hand side of the first one, since W (τB; cBp ;Fd) > 0 and ψ
B(τB; cBp )
is strictly decreasing in τB and cBp , also considering that τ
A + cAp ≤ τB + cBp . Meeting
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these criteria encourages to prefer simultaneous to sequential entry. Moreover, if the sunk
entry cost Fd is small enough, the firm will even prefer simultaneous entry to no entry to
destination d at all.
Thus, firm i’s entry strategy into destination d at t = 1 can be summarised as follows:
a) simultaneous entry is optimal if: Fd < ψ
B(τB; cBp )−W (τB; cBp ;Fd),
b) sequential entry is optimal if: ψB(τB; cBp ) − W (τB; cBp ;Fd) ≤ Fd ≤ ψA(τA; cAp ) +
W (τB; cBp ;Fd),
which implies that the firm will export product A to destination d in t = 1 if either
condition a) or b) is satisfied. On the other hand, it will export B in t = 1 only if
condition a) is met. These implications can be expressed as:
1. eA1 (τ
A, τB; cAp , c
B
p ) = 1↔ Fd ≤ ψA(τA; cAp ) +W (τB; cBp ;Fd).
2. eB1 (τ
B; cBp ) = 1↔ Fd < ψB(τB; cBp )−W (τB; cBp ;Fd).
In other words, simultaneous entry into d takes place if the sunk entry cost per product
Fd is sufficiently small. The higher this cost is, the better it is to postpone the export of
the more costly product B.
Hence, similar to Albornoz et al. (2012) entry export strategy across markets, I find
that there are thresholds of the sunk entry cost whereby firms determine their entry export
strategy across products within one market. There is a threshold value FSmd at which the
firm is indifferent between simultaneous and sequential entry ; and another threshold FSqd ,
at which it is indifferent between sequential entry and no entry into destination d at all.
These results can be summarised in the following proposition:
Proposition 1:There are threshold values for Fd, such that F
Sq
d > F
Sm
d ≥ 0. At t = 1,
the firm exports both products to d if Fd ≤ FSmd ; only product A if FSmd < Fd ≤ FSqd ; and
no product if Fd > F
Sq
d . The smaller F
Sm
d threshold is positive only if Eµ
N > τB + cBp .
Finally, when FSmd ≤ Fd ≤ FSqd , the firm will export product B in t = 2 if it previously
realises in t = 1 that µN ≥ 2F 1/2d + τB + cBp .
3.5 Predictions from the Model
The model described generates several implications regarding the dynamics of exporters’
behaviour in a particular market. Specifically, there is a difference between firms that are
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new to a particular destination, and more consolidated exporters in that market, in terms
of the export growth of a good –intensive margin–, the decision to export a new product
–extensive margin–, and the decision to stop exporting a product to that destination –
exit–. Here I detail the three main predictions derived from the theoretical model. Each
prediction is presented under the scenarios with and without trade liberalisation, expressed
as an unanticipated elimination of tariffs τ j , in t = 2, by country d on products from
country o, in order to see how the export dynamics change from one case to the other.8
Prediction 1 – Intensive Margin: Conditional on survival, firms tend to experience
a faster export growth in destination d in t = 2, once after they began exporting their first
products there in t = 1. Trade liberalisation exacerbates this growth, which will be larger
the higher the initial tariff and the production costs are.
This implies that exporters raise the sales of their products to a country to a larger
extent when they are new to that market; namely, when they learn their export profitab-
ilities in that destination.9 Once the uncertainty is resolved, there is no reason for further
export growth in the future for those products.10 Also, since exporting those first products
convey all information about a destination, we should not expect export growth for sub-
sequent products exported. Such null export growth is also expected for more experienced
firms that discovered their export profitabilities further in the past.
When trade liberalisation occurs, expressed as a tariff elimination by destination d in
t = 2, such export growth is boosted, especially for those products with higher initial
tariffs and/or production costs.11 Moreover, after the event of liberalisation, the export
growth for first products will be greater for those goods with larger known production
costs; namely, those at which firms are not so efficient –non-core competence products–
. This occurs because firms, when experimenting with a non-core product, realise that
country d’s demand for their product –export profitability– is greater than these high
costs, which prompts them to attempt to profit more from that demand by shipping more
of that product and/or charging a higher price, leading to larger sales and revenues one
period later. Hence, they are motivated to explore their potential with that product.
Additionally, even though expert firms also grow at the intensive margin when tariffs are
eliminated, the effect of trade liberalisation is greater for the less experienced firms in d.
8Appendix A.1 provides a full proof for each of these predictions.
9See Equations A.2 and A.3
10See Equation A.6
11See Equations A.9 and A.10
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Prediction 2 – Extensive Margin: Conditional on survival, firms that started
exporting to destination d in t = 1 are more likely to export a new product to that market
in t = 2 than more experienced firms. That experimentation likelihood is higher for less
costly products. Trade liberalisation increases even more that likelihood, but that increment
is larger for the experts.
Once a firm starts exporting to a destination, and having discovered its profitability,
conditional on survival, it is very likely to explore more that market by exporting new
products in the next period. Conversely, more expert firms in d have already learnt
enough about that market, and are less likely to make that decision, which has probably
been done in the past.12
When trade liberalisation occurs, there is an increase in the probability of new exporters
experimenting with new products in d in the future, regardless of how costly it is to
produce a particular good. However, that increase in the entry probability is larger for
expert firms, which without liberalisation had zero entry likelihood.13 Besides, exporters
are more likely to experiment in the next period with a less costly product, belonging to
its core competences, especially after the event of liberalisation.
If I allowed, like Arkolakis et al. (2015), the sunk entry cost Fd to differ across products,
that would affect the new exporter’s probability of introducing product B in t = 2, after
having sold the cheaper product A in t = 1. If the incremental market access cost decreases
with product scope, as Arkolakis et al. (2015) empirically find, then the entry probability
will rise even more for new exporters. As for the experts, which presumably have already
sold their “core competence” products to d in the past, it is reasonable to claim that a
declining Fd with scope may also raise their likelihood to introduce a new product, but
that would depend on the width of their product scopes, since products lying further from
their core competencies bear lower entry costs but higher production costs.
Prediction 3 – Exit: Firms that exported their first products to destination d in
t = 1 are more likely to stop exporting those goods in t = 2 than more expert firms in
that market. Such likelihood is larger for more costly products; and trade liberalisation
diminishes that probability.
Since more expert firms are more aware of the export profitability in destination d
than newcomers, the latter are more likely to discover that it is not worth exporting a
12See Equation A.13
13See Appendix A.1.2
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particular product to that market, leading to stop exporting that product to d, right after
entering that market.14
Once trade liberalisation takes place, that higher exit likelihood for new exporters
decreases, regardless of the product they export. However, the exit probability is generally
greater for more costly products, not belonging to firms’ core competences, especially after
the event of liberalisation.15
It is appropriate to remind that these three predictions are robust to alternative basics
of my model regarding trade and production costs of products A and B. Thus, if my
model stated that product A was the “core competence” product and the good with the
lowest tariff, it would be that product the most likely to be introduced in Prediction 2
and the least likely to be dropped from market d in Prediction 3. By contrast, product B,
the “non-core” product in this alternative scenario, would have a relatively larger export
growth in Prediction 1. But the nature of the three implications derived from my model
remain unchanged.
3.6 Assuming Imperfect Correlation in Export Profitability Across Products
So far, I have assumed perfect correlation of export profitabilities over time and across
products. Yet, going back to the original definition of µNj (µNj = dj − cjx), it may be
reasonable to argue that the unknown export costs cjx are constant across products; but
less so that they have the same uncertain demand component dj .
Here I explore how my initial predictions vary by assuming positive but imperfect
correlation in export profitabilities across products. This essentially means that exporting
product A, the least costly one, to market d provides incomplete information about the
profitability of exporting product B to that destination. Thus, in order to make a decision
on exporting product B in t = 2, we have to consider the realisation of µNA in t = 1, and
how both profitabilities are correlated.
Here, I assume that export profitabilites of both products follow identical distributions,
G(µNA) and G(µNB). Also, I need to consider the expected value of µNB given the
realisation of µNA, expressed as E(µNB | µNA).
The new assumption of imperfect correlation does not have any effect on the simul-
taneous exporting decisions, nor on the decision to export product A in t = 1 as part
14See Equation A.14
15See Appendix A.1.3
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of the sequential exporting strategy, because firms do not need to consider any previous
information from product A. 16 Indeed, this does not affect the expected values for A in
t = 2. But it does affect the output choice of product B in t = 2 in the sequential export-
ing decision, and hence the expected values for t = 2. Following Albornoz et al. (2012),
who consider the convexity of the maximisation function and Jensen’s inequality, I obtain
that the expected value of profits increase when the output decision is made considering
µNA. By maximising those profits to solve for the optimal output level, denoted as q¯B2 to
distinguish it from the perfect correlation case, I achieve the following:
q¯B2 =
E(µNB | µNA)− cBp − τB
2
. (3.19)
Subsequently, I estimated the expected value of the sequential exporting decision con-
sidering imperfect correlation. As a first step, I needed to define the expected value of
µNB given µNA employed in Equation 3.19. For simplicity, again following Albornoz et al.
(2012), I assume that these profitabilities follow a bivariate normal distribution, with
parameters (EµNA, EµNB, σA, σB, ρ). Thus, I obtain the following:
E(µNB | µNA) = EµNB + (µNA − EµNA)ρσ
A
σB
. (3.20)
This outcome shows that the output choice of B in t = 2 considers not only the export
profitability from product A, both in expected and actual terms, but also the statistical
dependence between µNA and µNB, represented by ρσ
A
σB
, henceforth denoted as ω.
Following the original model, now in a context of imperfect correlation between export
profitabilities, a firm decides to export B in t = 2 in a sequential exporting strategy if
E(µNB | µNA) ≥ 2F 1/2d + τB + cBp , since the total profits from exporting B must be
greater or equal to the fixed entry costs. From that criterion, and using Equation 3.20, I
can get a maximum value for those fixed entry costs, below which it is convenient to export
B in t = 2. Moreover, also from Equation 3.20, I am able to find a cutoff realisation of µNA
above which a sequential exporter will sell B in such period. That cutoff is in function of
the known costs, the expected value of µNB and, more relevant, the statistical dependence
16I should recognise, however, that it is possible that the outcome of product B in t = 2 affects the
decision on product A in t = 1, as firms take expected values and work with imperfect information. But
in this chapter I am interested in the decision on product B in t = 2, given the realisation of A in t = 1.
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between both profitabilities, ω:
µ∗
NA
(ω) ≡ ( 1
ω
)(2F
1/2
d + τ
B + cBp )− (
1− ω
ω
)EµNB. (3.21)
In order to get to this final relation, I had to consider the case in which µNA and µNB
follow a bivariate normal distribution with parameters (EµN , EµN , σ, σ, ρ), meaning that
EµNA = EµNB. µ∗NA is then employed to obtain, expressed in t = 0 expected terms, the
value of the profits from exporting product B in t = 2, which is:
W¯ (τB; cBp ;Fd) ≡
∫ µN
µ∗NA (ω)
[(
E(µNB | µNA)− τB − cBp
2
)2 − Fd]dG(µNA). (3.22)
What is relevant is how this cutoff µ∗NA varies with changes in ω; namely, how the
cutoff varies with the statistical dependence between µNA and µNB. Taking the derivative
of the cutoff with respect to ω, I obtain:
dµ∗NA
dω
=
EµNB − (2F 1/2d + τB + cBp )
ω2
. (3.23)
The effect of ω on the cutoff depends on the numerator, and can be summarised in the
following proposition:
Proposition 2:If EµNB > 2F
1/2
d + τ
B + cBp , the effect of ω on µ
∗NA will be positive,
meaning that the value for the profits from exporting B in t = 2 will be lower (W¯ falls),
because in that case it is better to export B in t = 1. The converse occurs if EµNB <
2F
1/2
d + τ
B + cBp , since now µ
∗NA falls with ω, implying a higher value for the profits from
exporting B in t = 2 (W¯ rises). In that case, the closer to perfect correlation, the more
worthwhile it is to export B in t = 2.
3.6.1 Implications for Prediction 2 (Extensive Margin)
The assumption of imperfect correlation in export profitability across products has no
effects for the predictions on the intensive margin (export growth) and the exit. It does,
however, have an implication for the prediction on the extensive margin (entry). Now
the probability of exporting a new product to destination d in t = 2, having previously
exported a cheaper product in t = 1, is not only a function of the known costs, but also
a function of the expected export profitability for that new product and the statistical
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dependence ω.17 In other words, now this entry probability is a function of the minimum
cutoff µ∗NA obtained in Equation 3.21. This is expressed as follows:
Pr(ej2 = 1 | eA1 = 1&ej1 = 0) = 1−G[(
1
ω
)(2F
1/2
d + τ
j + cjp)− (
1− ω
ω
)EµNj ] > 0. (3.24)
It can be observed that such entry probability is still positive; hence, still higher than
the probability of exporting a new product in a subsequent period t > 2, which is zero,
according to Prediction 2. Nevertheless, this positive likelihood now varies according to
the dependence between export profitabilities and the expected µNj . This outcome holds
both with and without trade liberalisation.
In summary, the entry probability with a new product in t = 2 rises by reductions
in the known costs: the fixed entry cost Fd, the unit trade cost or tariff τ
j , and the
unit production cost cjp. It will also rise the higher the expected export profitability from
product j is. As for the statistical dependence ω, that for simplicity can be treated as the
correlation ρ, its effect on the entry probability depends on the expectation of µNj with
respect to the known costs. Thus, if EµNj < 2F
1/2
d + τ
j + cjp, a rise in ω decreases the
cutoff µ∗NA , increasing the value for experimentation, and consequently raising the entry
probability with product j. The opposite, a reduction of such entry probability, occurs if
EµNj > 2F
1/2
d + τ
j + cjp, since it is more convenient in that case export the two products
simultaneously.
3.7 Conclusions
This chapter develops a theoretical model pursuing to illustrate the firms’ export strategy
in a particular destination, with uncertain export profitabilities, assumed to be perfectly
correlated over time and across products. Depending on their known costs and expected
profits, a firm may decide to export products sequentially over time, simultaneously, or
not to enter at all into that destination.
From that framework, three predictions are derived on the export dynamics of new
exporters –starting to export to market d in t = 1– in terms of their growth in the intens-
ive margin, extensive margin and their exit probability from a product export business,
considering the role of trade liberalisation and the difference between “non-core” and “core
competence” products.
17See Appendix A.1.2 for the proof of Prediction 2 on the extensive margin.
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In summary, these three predictions state that new exporters, conditional on survival,
tend to grow more in t = 2 than firms with longer experience in market d at the intensive
and extensive margins, being more likely to expand their sales of a product and introduce
another product to that destination one period later. However, those newcomers are
also more prone to decide to exit the business of a product in that destination. Trade
liberalisation, expressed as an unanticipated tariff elimination by market d in t = 2 on
products from country o, boosts the intensive margin growth of new exporters, as well
as helping them prevent their exit from the business of a particular product. It also
encourages firms to experiment with new products in the future, but that boost is larger
for the expert firms. Finally, the extensive margin and exit prevention likelihoods are
larger for better performing (core competence) products; whereas the intensive margin
growth tends to be larger for a “non-core” product.
Despite the interesting implications from my theoretical framework, I am aware that
there are several issues not contemplated, which may enrich the model or be subject for
further research. My model does not consider a potential experience of firms in other
markets, which may affect their entry and export decisions in the market of interest. In
the empirics presented in Chapter 4, I control for that issue; but it would be interesting to
incorporate it into a theory. Likewise, I briefly mentioned the implications on my theory
from allowing for entry costs to vary across products; but definitely a deeper analysis
may be put forward in the future. Also, further approaches may focus on the influence
of neighbouring firms in the export decisions of one single firm in a particular market,
not regarded in my approach. As for trade liberalisation, my framework presents it as an
unanticipated tariff elimination by a country. However, firms in the reality may have the
ability to anticipate a trade reform by the country of interest, which certainly affects their
export decisions in that market. A clear step forward would be to incorporate that ability
in a theoretical model and see how firms construct their export and entry decisions across
products. More interestingly, while my current model is a two-period analysis where firms
make decisions from one period to the other, those decisions may actually be delayed
depending on several factors. I address that issue in my theoretical model presented in
Chapter 5.
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4 Sequential Exporting Across Products: Evidence from
Peru
4.1 Introduction
A growing literature has explored the dynamics of exports at the firm level, usually high-
lighting the continuous entry and exit flow of firms into the export activity, despite having
borne entry costs. Eaton et al. (2008), for example, show in the Colombian case that
firms that start and stop exporting tend to account for limited contributions to overall
export revenues. Freund and Pierola (2010), in the Peruvian context, report that this
exit flow is especially likely after the first year exporting, and particularly likely for small
firms. Similarly, analysing USA imports at the country level, Besedesˇ and Prusa (2006a)
show that trade relationships involving either small countries, small exporters or low initial
values tend to be short lived.
Other studies focus on the role of productivity and export experience as determinants
of success in the export market, pointing to the fact that the most productive firms decide
to start exporting, paying sunk entry costs, and increasing their knowledge about their
productivity through learning and experimentation, compared to non-exporters. Roberts
and Tybout (1997) find that this export experience is determinant in Colombian plants’
decision to enter foreign market; but such experience depreciates once they stop exporting.
All these studies focus on export dynamics at the firm or country level; but none of
them establishes differences in these dynamics across products. Only Besedesˇ and Prusa
(2006b) makes a difference between differentiated and non-differentiated products in their
export survival analysis. Moreover, in this literature the issue of trade liberalisation is
just indirectly addressed by, for instance, including dummies accounting for a regional or
bilateral trade agreement between countries, like Brenton et al. (2010) in their survival
analysis for developing countries. Hence, the effect of trade liberalisation on firm export
entry and exit decisions is still a strand for potential research.
Recent literature on firm export dynamics has emphasised the analysis of new exporters
as opposed to more experienced firms in the foreign market. In a descriptive analysis for
Colombian plants, Eaton et al. (2008) report that most new entrants into the export
business leave after one year, and a small minority become incumbents. More recently,
Albornoz et al. (2012), focus their analysis on firms with only one-year experience in
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the Argentinean industry, finding that this type of firm tends to drop out of the export
business very quickly; however, new entrants achieving to remain in the market grow at
both the intensive margin (export growth in one destination) and the extensive margin
(entering new destinations). Thus, those new exporters experience a sequential exporting
process.
This sequential behaviour researched by Albornoz et al. (2012) was in terms of market
(destination) diversification. How do export dynamics work across products within one
particular destination? Moreover, this sequential behaviour has not been tested yet in a
context of trade liberalisation, which represents a gap to be bridged.
In Chapter 3, I presented a theoretical model pointing at the question stated above,
reorienting the sequential exporting analysis, now focusing on the dynamics new exporters
undergo in terms of product diversification within one destination, incorporating trade
liberalisation into that analysis, as well as the differences in firms’ export dynamics between
products; for instance, between better performing (core competence) products and worse
performing ones. This chapter now contributes to the literature by empirically testing
the predictions from that theoretical model. Given the data availability and the recent
occurrence of trade reforms consolidated with the enactment of a Free Trade Agreement
in 2009, the relation between Peru and the United States represents a good scenario to
analyse. As a result, this chapter is one of the first researches on the effect of the recent
USA-Peru Free Trade Agreement on the performance of Peruvian firms in the American
market.
This chapter contributes to the literature in a number of ways. It investigates whether
Peruvian firms with one-year experience in the USA market are more likely than more
experienced firms to grow their exports to that country at the intensive (growth in one
product) and extensive margin (entry with other products). It also researches whether
these newcomers are more likely to give up exporting a product to the USA than more
experienced firms. The chapter additionally explores the role of trade liberalisation, ana-
lysing how the aforementioned process undertaken by Peru with the United States affects
these dynamics. Finally, it investigates whether these dynamics are more evident for core
competence products.
I exploit a very rich dataset of Peruvian firms that exported to USA between 2006
and 2013 to address these questions, estimating three different models on export growth,
entry and exit. A particular challenge for this and future researches is that the enactment
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of USA-Peru FTA occurred simultaneously with the world economic crisis that negatively
affected Peruvian exports. I disentangle the effects of the crisis from those of liberalisation
by controlling for the change in tariffs levied by USA on each Peruvian product exported,
as well as considering year fixed effects.
The results support the hypotheses from the model in Chapter 3, showing that firms
with only recent experience in the USA market, conditional on survival, tend to experience
a larger intensive margin export growth with the first products they sell to that market,
as opposed to subsequent products and more consolidated firms. They are also more likely
to experiment with a new product in that destination in the future (extensive margin).
However, these new firms are more prone to drop out of the export of a product in USA
than incumbents.
Trade liberalisation, expressed as the tariff elimination by USA on Peruvian products in
2009, helps the one-year experienced firms to remain exporting a product to that market.
On the other hand, such tariff elimination facilitates the decision by more experienced
firms to experiment in the USA market by selling new products there.
The export growth on the intensive margin by new exporters is increased if the firm
exports a non-core competence product; namely, a product in which the firm does not
tend to perform well in terms of sales. In contrast, the extensive margin growth is boosted
for core competence products and if the firm has previously exported a similar product.
Moreover, a new exporter selling a core product to USA is less likely to exit that business.
These core competence effects on the new exporters’ performance tend to be more relevant
for the smallest firms.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 provides details of the
Peru-USA trade relations which motivates my research. Section 4.3 describes the data and
provides a descriptive analysis of Peruvian firms’ export performance in the USA market.
Section 4.4 presents the three empirical models with their respective results. Section 4.5
complements with some robustness checks. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 USA-Peru Trade Relations
This section outlines the stages undergone by Peru and the United States in terms of their
bilateral trade policy from the 1990s to 2009, the year in which the Free Trade Agreement
between these countries came into force.
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After a severe economic crisis in the late 1980s, characterised by a dramatic hyperin-
flation, enhanced by an intense state control and protectionist measures, Peru started to
undertake a series of liberal economic reforms, including a determined increase of its trade
openness, unilaterally reducing tariff levels and dispersion. Between 1991 and 1999, those
tariff reductions led to a flatter and more uniform tariff structure, moving from 39 to only
4 different tariff categories, with rates between 12% and 30%. Indeed, 84% of products
were levied the lowest rate of 12%. This open trade policy also involved the elimination
of export tariffs, import licences, import prohibitions, along with the simplification of
sanitary controls.
In parallel, the United States, historically Peru’s most important trading partner,
implemented since 1991 unilateral trade preferences to several Peruvian exports through
the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) and the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug
Eradication Act (ATPDEA), which were periodically renewed, although without a uniform
frequency.
Figure 4.1: Peru-USA: Evolution of Trade Relations
4.2.1 Before the USA-Peru Free Trade Agreement
4.2.1.1 Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA)
ATPA came into force in Peru in August 1993 –initially enacted in December 1991–
with the purpose of expanding private opportunities and investment in non-traditional
sectors of the Andean countries, as an alternative to illegal drug production, diversifying
their economies and expanding their exports. Through ATPA, the USA president pro-
claimed duty-free treatment for eligible articles from Peru, as well as Bolivia, Colombia
and Ecuador.
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Under ATPA, about 5,600 tariff lines, out of over 10,000 8-digit codes, were covered
by USA unilateral trade preferences. These preferences favoured a wide variety of indus-
tries, but explicitly excluding most textiles and apparel, certain footwear, canned tuna,
petroleum and derivatives, certain watches and watch parts, certain sugar products, rum
and tafia. For some products, duty-free entry under ATPA was subject to additional con-
ditions. For example, imports of sugar and some other agricultural products (beef, dairy
products, certain food preparations and cotton fibers), remained subject to USA tariff-rate
quotas (TRQs) and food-safety requirements. In-quota shipments of these products sub-
ject to TRQs were eligible to free-duty entry under ATPA. Other products, like certain
leather handbags, luggage, wallets, portfolios, work gloves and leather wearing apparel
were eligible for reduced rates of duty, but not free (between 3.5% and 22.5%).
4.2.1.2 Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA)
ATPA expired in December 2001 and was renewed in August 2002 as ATPDEA. This
renewal was retroactive from ATPA’s expiration date. This new Act was extended until the
end of 2006, aiming to renew the ATPA benefits, as well as to extend the trade preference to
a set of new 700 tariff lines, previously ineligible for preferences under the original ATPA,
including certain textiles and apparel, footwear, tuna in foil or other flexible airtight
packages (not cans), petroleum and derivatives, watches and watch parts (including cases,
bracelets and straps). Leather and other manufacturing products, previously eligible for
reduced rates of duty under the original ATPA, became eligible for duty-free treatment
under ATPDEA. 17 footwear tariff lines were still subject to reduced rates of duty.
However, some other products were still excluded from any preferential treatment
under ATPDEA: certain textile and apparel articles; canned tuna; above-quota imports
of certain agricultural products subject to TRQs, including sugars, syrups, and sugar-
containing products; rum and tafia.
Textile and apparel products under ATPDEA, elaborated with local inputs, were eli-
gible to duty-free entry to the USA up to an amount equal to 2% of total USA apparel
imports. That share steadily increased until 5% in 2006. Additionally, apparel products
elaborated with USA inputs were eligible for duty-free treatment, without any quota or
other restriction.
As a general rule, ATPDEA products must be either wholly grown, produced, or manu-
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factured in an ATPDEA country, or be “new or different” articles made from substantially
transformed non-ATPDEA inputs. The cost of the ATPDEA inputs and the direct costs
of processing in one or more ATPDEA countries must total at least 35% of the customs
value of the product when entering USA.
Since 2006, the USA Congress authorised several short-term extensions of ATPDEA,
before allowing it to lapse in February 2011. In October of the same year, ATPDEA was
again renewed retroactively, until the Act finally expired in July 2013.
The USA also used to offer unilateral trade preferences under a Generalised System
of Preferences (GSP), either duty-free entry or reduced tariffs, to over 4,650 products of
approximately 140 developing countries. It was enacted in January 1976, for 10 years,
and was renewed several times. In August 2002, the GSP was renewed until December
2006. The aim of this programme is to promote economic growth of developing countries
by encouraging exports. In 1989, according to USA statistics, 25% of Peruvian exports
to that country entered under GSP; however, in 2003 they only accounted to 4.6%, surely
because a large share of these former GSP exports opted for the ATPA regime since 1994.
4.2.1.3 Benefits of ATPA-ATPDEA to Peruvian Exports to USA
Since ATPA came into force, Peruvian exports to USA increased at an average annual
rate of 12.7% from 1993 to 2001. However, that was not a sustained growth, with a null
growth in 1993-1994, a high increase (27%) in 1995-1998, and a negative growth (-1.6%)
in 1999-2001. Exports favoured with ATPA accounted for 39% of Peruvian exports to
USA in 2001. That year, the main exports were copper (31% of total exports), textiles
(22%) and agricultural products (12%). Additionally, a very small number of products
took advantage of ATPA. In 2001, the 10 main products favoured accounted for 99.4% of
ATPA exports to USA. These products included jewels, asparagus, mangoes and onions.18
With the implementation of ATPDEA, the textile and apparel sector was clearly the
main favoured industry, as part of it was eligible for free entry to the USA market. From
2002 to 2008, Peruvian exports to USA significantly rose from about US $ 1.9 billion to
US $ 5.8 billion approximately. About 20% of Peruvian exports to the United States
were under ATPDEA in 2002, and that share rose to 54.2% in 2008. In that year, 30
products accounted for the 91% of exports benefited under that regime, among which oil
18Ministry of Economics and Finance of Peru (2001), “Bulletin of Fiscal Transparency”.
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and derivatives, t-shirts and vegetables like asparagus clearly stand out.19
Despite the importance of these mentioned trade preference regimes, they were not
the only drivers of Peruvian exports to the American market. Indeed, most of these
exports, such as minerals like gold, tin and zinc, entered that market without any trade
preference, and also experienced a positive evolution. Indeed, from 2002 to 2008, exports
from non-ATPDEA products rose from about US $ 1.4 billion to US $ 2.4 billion.20
4.2.1.4 Trade Preferences by Other Trading Partners
• Chile: since July 1998, constant tariff reduction and elimination to Peruvian exports.
By 2004, 73% of tariff lines were already liberalised.
• Brazil: since August 1999, preferences to about 23% of tariff lines.
• Argentina: similarly, 23% of tariff lines were offered any trade preference since June
2000.
• Andean countries: by late 2004, 100% of Peruvian exports had duty-free access
to Bolivia and Colombia. These shares were 93.7% for Ecuador and 99.6% for
Venezuela.
• European Union: since late 1991 an Andean Generalised System of Preferences was
established, allowing some trade preferences to all industrial products (chapter 25
to 97 of HS tariff lines) and some agricultural and fishery goods. This regime has
been periodically renewed. In 1999, it was estimated that 82% of Peruvian exports
to the European Union entered under GSP, with products as asparagus, textiles and
apparel, fish and crustaceous as the main beneficiaries.
4.2.2 The USA-Peru Free Trade Agreement
In November 2003, the USA government announced its intention to start negotiations
with Peru and Colombia, as well as Ecuador and Bolivia, in order to achieve a Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) with each of these countries. Negotiations began in 2004, and finished
after 13 negotiation rounds. The Free Trade Agreement between Peru and the United
States was enacted in Washington in 2006, coming into force on the 1st of February 2009.
19Source: US International Trade Commission.
20Ibid.
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Under this agreement, Peru consolidated the preferential access to the USA market
for products eligible under the ATPDEA regime; and, more importantly, expanded those
preferences to the rest of Peruvian export supply. Thus, the FTA means a big step forward,
providing more security to the preferences previously enjoyed by many products, making
it more difficult to cancel them. Given that advantage, it was expected that the USA-
Peru FTA would contribute to the growth and diversification of Peruvian exports in the
medium run, especially for non-traditional exports.21
Since this is a bilateral agreement, this FTA also entails the preferential access to the
Peruvian market of USA exports, providing a wider availability of consumption goods, as
well as intermediate inputs and capital goods.
4.2.2.1 Objections Against the FTA
During the process to attain the final agreement, several agents displayed their scepti-
cism about the benefits of the USA-Peru FTA to the Peruvian industry. Social movements,
trade unions, left-wing parties and some non-governmental organisations argued that the
conditions under which the treaty was approved involved high risks, which were not suf-
ficiently compensated for by the potential benefits. Among those risks, such movements
mentioned threats related to judicial sovereignty, food safety, intellectual property, pro-
tection of the environment, biodiversity, natural resources, public health, etc.22
Sectors considered sensitive to those threats are the non-exporting agricultural industry
and small and micro businesses. Representatives from those sectors alleged that the FTA
would mean the exit from business for domestic firms, especially the smallest and least
technologically skilled, in unequal conditions to compete with larger highly skilled and
more efficient companies. Indeed, in December 2005, right after the end of the USA-Peru
negotiations, the then leader of the Peruvian Agricultural Convention (CONVEAGRO
in Spanish) declared that the FTA would condemn the 97 % of Peruvian agricultural
industry to bankruptcy. The non-exporting agricultural sector, it was argued, would be
severely affected by the entry of heavily subsidised agricultural products from USA. The
latter was deemed as a serious danger, as agriculture accounted for over 20% of Peruvian
21Ministry of Foreign Trade and Tourism of Peru (2012), “Estudio de Aprovechamiento del TLC Peru´-
EEUU - Tercer An˜o de Vigencia del TLC”, on http : //www.acuerdoscomerciales.gob.pe
22Ferna´ndez Maldonado (1999), “El TLC con Estados Unidos y su Impacto sobre el Empleo”, on http :
//revistaargumentos.iep.org.pe/articulos/el− tlc− con− estados− unidos− y− su− impacto− sobre−
el − empleo/
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labour force in 2006, and most farmers lived in poor rural areas. Among the Peruvian
agricultural products judged as highly sensitive to that liberalisation process were cotton,
maize, sugar, meat and dairy products.23
Another objection was given in 2007 by Pedro Francke, a Peruvian politician, special-
ised in health issues, arguing that the FTA was not necessary since many products were
already liberalised under ATPDEA, and would actually “equalise the treatment” for both
Peruvian and American products. Additionally, he was concerned about a potential rise
in the price of medicines, due to tighter intellectual property rules.24
4.2.2.2 USA-Peru FTA Liberalisation Schedule
The United States offered a total liberalisation of 99.5% of its tariff lines in a period up
to 17 years from 2009. This offer includes 100% of non-textile industrial goods imported
from Peru, liberalised since the start of the FTA enforcement.
A total of 6,417 tariff lines, 60% of all products included, were immediately liberalised
under the FTA, whereas about 4,000 lines got their ATPDEA preference confirmed by the
FTA. Hence, 98% of products included in the USA schedule are already liberalised from
2009. The non-immediately liberalised products are detailed in Table 4.1, their trade costs
being gradually reduced.
23BBC World (2006), “Peru´ y las dos caras del TLC”, on http :
//news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/business/barometroeconomico/newsid4915000/4915384.stm
24Gran Combo Club (2007), “Los debilitados argumentos en contra del TLC”, on http :
//grancomboclub.com/2007/11/los− debilitados− argumentos− en− contra.html
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Table 4.1: USA-Peru Free Trade Agreement - Liberalisation
Schedule for Non-Immediately Liberalised Products
N◦ Tariff Lines Industries Trade
Cost
Fully Liberal-
ised By
3 Wool Tariff 2013
21 Footwear,
Tuna Fish and
Dairy
Tariff 2018
51 Meat, Chocol-
ate, Rum and
Tobacco
Tariff 2023
4 Dairy Tariff 2025
26 Dairy Quota 2023
56 Cheese and
Condensed
Milk
Quota 2025
47 Sugar Quota Not liberalised
Source: PROMPERU´
As for Peru, it has offered immediate free access to 76% of its tariff lines. The rest is
in process to be liberalised between 2 and 17 years since the FTA took effect. Within the
products immediately liberalised, the list includes 451 agricultural tariff lines (56% of all
agricultural products). On the other hand, 125 products considered sensitive by Peru were
given a liberalisation schedule greater or equal to 10 years. Additionally, Peru can apply
a special safeguard per volume for 36 sensitive products, such as evaporated milk, cheese,
lamb meet, rice, and chicken parts, among others. Finally, Peru promised to extend to
the USA more favourable conditions offered in future agreements to 139 tariff lines.
4.2.3 Impact on Peruvian Exports
Since the arrangement of the Free Trade Agreement between Peru and the United States,
exports from Peru to that country rose from US $ 5.9 billion in 2008 to about US $ 7.4
billion in 2013, representing an average annual growth rate of 5.81%. Nevertheless, in some
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years like 2011 and 2009 itself, exports experienced significant falls. Indeed, the decline
occurred in 2009, the year the FTA came into force, was mainly due to the economic crisis
affecting USA, as will be more clearly observed in Section 4.3, with the actual firm-level
data utilised.
Although the overall trend of Peruvian exports to USA has been positive since the
start of the FTA, a very large part of that increase is accounted for by a small number
of products; most of them traditional exports. In fact, raw gold in 2013 accounted for
about 28% of total exports, followed by two oil and fuel tariff lines, accounting for almost
15%, and raw silver (5%). The first non-traditional export in the list is asparagus, only
representing 3.4% of total exports to the American market. In 2013, the top 20 Peruvian
products exported to the United States account for almost 75% of total exports, meaning
a huge concentration of exports in few types of products. Within that group, other non-
traditional exports can be found, such as cotton t-shirts, fresh grapes and some fishery
products; but the majority of the products in that list belong to the mining and oil
industries.
The total number of products exported from Peru to the United States has steadily
increased since the FTA became effective. The year before, 2008, a total of 2,099 different
products were sold to USA, whereas in 2013 the amount rose to 2,342. However, like the
export growth, the number of products exported also underwent decreases in some years,
such as 2010 and 2013.
Also, a study by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Tourism of Peru found in 2012
that after three years of the start of the FTA, a total of 1,973 new firms began exporting
to the United States, and 90% of them were small and micro enterprises. Indeed, 535 of
these new exporting firms were small firms, and 1247 were micro enterprises. However,
only 180 out of the 1973 new exporting firms actually exported during all the three years
analysed.25
These overall figures give a preliminary idea of how difficult it is for Peruvian firms
to survive in the USA export market. Such difficulty is more evident at the firm-product
level, as I present in the next section. However, the positive export evolution from Peru
to USA described earlier might tell us something about the potential growth of surviving
firms at both the intensive and extensive margin, in terms of products. How likely are
25That study considered as large firms those that exported over US $ 10 million per year; medium firms
were those exporting between US $ 1 million and US $ 10 million; small firms exported between US $
100,000 and US $ 1 million; and finally micro enterprises exported less than US $ 100,000 per year.
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Peruvian firms to intensify their sales of a particular product in the USA market? How
likely are they to introduce a new product to that destination? How long does it typically
take to a firm to sell a product to USA for the first time? How vulnerable are they in
terms of their probability to fail? Are there differences in the dynamics between new
entrants and expert firms? What is the role of trade liberalisation with respect to those
dynamics? Are there difference in the performance across products? All of these concerns
are addressed in this chapter and in Chapter 5.
4.3 Data and Descriptive Analysis
4.3.1 The Data
4.3.1.1 Data Collection
The main stage of my collection process was to obtain Peruvian exports data at the firm
level. For that purpose, I contacted the Foreign Trade Society of Peru (COMEXPERU´ in
Spanish), a business union which manages data on daily export and import transactions
from different sectors. This information is collected from the Peruvian Tax and Tariff
Agency (Superintendencia Nacional de Administracion Tributaria SUNAT in Spanish).
The time period of the original datasets is from 1993 to 2013, and each of the eight
datasets compiles information on daily export transactions per firm, from the following
sectors:26
1. Agriculture, including traditional commodities like coffee, cotton and sugar, as well
as non-traditional products like asparagus, grapes, artichokes, capsicum, among
other fruits and vegetables.
2. Basic Metal Industries, including processed minerals, like gold, silver, copper, steel
and iron, utilised as inputs for other production processes.
3. Chemical, including products like medicines, cosmetics, diverse body care items and
other products containing chemical solutions.
26Initially, I had also collected custom-level exports data from other sectors like mining, fishery and oil
and derivatives, which traditionally account for more than 50 % of total Peruvian exports. However, since
the focus of this thesis is on manufacturing industries, those sectors were discarded from the analysis. I
focus on manufacturing industries because, as mentioned earlier, there was a previous controversies on a
potential damage by an FTA with the USA to Peruvian manufacturers, especially the smallest firms.
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4. Jewellery, including jewels made of different metals like gold and silver. This is the
sector with the least amount of tariff lines exported.
5. Metallic-Mechanics, including machinery and different tools made of minerals like
steel, iron and aluminium (nails, screws, saws, clippers, hammers, among others).
6. Non-Metallic Mining, including mineral-based products like salt, cement, marble,
pottery, dishes, glass, among others.
7. Textile and Apparel, including products like T-shirts, trousers, shirts and other
kinds of clothes and fabrics.
8. Timber and Paper, including gross timber and diverse products made of timber,
like furniture, as well as books, notebooks and other products made of paper and
cardboard.
Each of the transactions from these eight industries contains very detailed information,
such as: Firm tax code, firm name, tariff code, tariff description, sector and industry (sub-
sector), export type (traditional or non-traditional), port of shipment, port of arrival, year,
month and day of the transaction, export value (US $), weight (kg.), quantity and unit of
measure.
From the Peruvian Tax and Tariff Agency, I have also collected some firm-level in-
formation, such as data on the year each firm came into existence and, where relevant, the
year they exited the market, as well as the region of location of their main headquarters.
Unfortunately, it was not possible to collect other relevant firm-level information, such
as their balance sheet, domestic sales, cost structure and use of inputs, since it is not
available for all the firm universe. There is an annual publication of financial information,
but it is only for the top 10,000 Peruvian firms in terms of turnover. The sample is not
constant over time.
Finally, in order to account for trade liberalisation, I have collected data on ad valorem
tariff rates levied by the United States at the 8-digit level, from the World Integrated Trade
Solutions (WITS) database of the World Bank. The tariff rates collected derive from the
Most Favoured Nation (MFN) scheme, until 2008. From 2009 onwards, I make use of the
tariffs valid under the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between Peru and the United States.
That information comes from a detailed spreadsheet prepared by the Peruvian Agency for
Export Promotion (PROMPERU´), containing the whole schedule for the tariff reduction
and elimination by the United States on Peruvian exports. Additionally, given that many
products were unilaterally liberalised by USA before the enactment of the FTA, under
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the mentioned ATPDEA scheme, I also collected from WITS the list of 8-digit tariff lines
eligible under that regime, with their respective effective tariff until 2008.
Prior to the collection of that main data, I started my thesis research with a basic
data collection of Peruvian indicators at the macro level, such as nominal and real GDP,
USA-Peru nominal and real exchange rate, exports per destination and sector, balance
of payments, among others. The main sources from which this information was obtained
were the Central Bank of Peru (BCRP), the Agency for Export Promotion (PROMPERU)
and Peru’s Tax and Customs Agency (SUNAT).
These indicators were very useful to understand the Peruvian macroeconomic context,
and some of them were utilised to document the trade relation between Peru and the
United States in the introduction of this thesis. Others, such as the USA GDP deflator
and the nominal and real exchange rates were employed in the subsequent processing of
the custom-level data.
4.3.1.2 Data Processing
In order to get to the final dataset for the research, I initially worked on the ori-
ginal export transactions datasets provided in Excel format. Subsequently, I transferred
each of the eight datasets to Stata. For each firm, I created the following list of general
information:27
• Total annual exports per firm (US Dollars).
• Number of trading destinations per firm, annually.
• Number of tariff codes exported by firms, annually.
• Total annual exports to a specific destination per firm (US Dollars).
• Total annual exports of a specific tariff code per firm (US Dollars).
• Firm dummies according to destination exported to.
• Firm dummies according to the tariff code exported.
• Dummies referring to the year each firm exported.
• Number of years within the sample, in which each firm exported.
27I had also collected import transaction data, but its main shortcoming was that there was no inform-
ation on the importing firm in most cases.
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During the conversion process, I took the chance to eliminate from the dataset those
transactions that are not subject of the analysis, such as the transactions made by indi-
viduals, and those which had as destinations regions like free zones, international seas,
neutral zones, among others, in order to have a uniform firm-product dataset of sales
to final destinations. Additionally, those cells from the columns of export values and
weight, with a hyphen instead of a number, were assumed to be zero and dropped from
the dataset for not being reliable enough. After all that editing, it was decided to disregard
the transactions of the first 5 years of the sample, since it was deemed as not so relev-
ant for my analysis, which is more interested in the enactment of the USA-Peru FTA in
2009. Moreover, during that period between 1993 and 1997, Peru was experiencing several
changes that certainly had an effect on firms’ decisions. Hence, I finally produced a set of
transactions from 1998 to 2013, which is afterwards used for the descriptive analysis.
This conversion and variable creation process was not exempt from complications. The
creation of variables related to tariff codes was not possible on Stata for very long data-
sets like agriculture, textile and apparel and chemical. Hence, it was necessary to make
use of the PostgreSQL software to obtain the desired outcome for those sectors. Another
challenge was to harmonise the variables created across the eight separate datasets, espe-
cially the dummies per destination and tariff code. That issue was solved by encoding the
countries’ names and product codes on Stata.28
Once the mentioned variables above were created for each of the eight sectors, I pro-
ceeded to merge the original transaction datasets with the newly created variables per
sector. Subsequently, it was appropriate to deal with one important shortcoming: the
missing values per firm/product/year. Obviously, there are firms which did not export in
a specific year, and that was not reflected in the original datasets as zero values. Hence,
I created on Stata those missing observations, which gave the value “zero” for all the
variables in the year a firm did not participate in the export market with a product. Some
of these zero values were eliminated in a further stage when, by checking the information
from each firm, I could certainly know whether the firms exited the business as a whole
during the sample period.
As a final result, I obtained for each sector a dataset where each observation is at
the firm/year/product/destination level. Since the main interest of this thesis is the USA
market, as a next step I selected only the firms which have exported to that country within
28Initially, the dummies per destination and tariff code where named in numerical order, starting from
1, in each separate dataset.
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the time period. Combining the datasets for the eight sectors, I achieved a broad dataset
of Peruvian exports to USA, consisting of 8,976 Peruvian firms, covering the 1998-2013
period. The construction of export transactions per 8-digit tariff line/year led to a total of
3,654 manufacturing 8-digit tariff lines. With this broad dataset, I started the descriptive
analysis.
It is important to mention that, in order to get to that final number of tariff lines,
a further stage involved merging that combined dataset with another one containing the
USA tariffs per 8-digit tariff line/year, considering the effective tariffs before and after
the enactment of the USA-Peru FTA, as well as the unilateral trade preferences given by
USA to some Peruvian products under ATPDEA. This process involved the elimination
of firm-product pairs, due to the lack of consistent tariff data over time. Specifically, some
products had no complete information on tariffs between 1998 and 2008, the span prior
to the enactment of the FTA. A potential reason for this is the periodical updating of
tariff lines under the Harmonised System, involving the incorporation of some lines into
a broader one. But other products registered a tariff rate in one year, disappearing from
the dataset the year after, to then return afterwards. Hence, I maintained in my sample
those 8-digit products from which I had full tariff information before and after 2009, until
2013. That process led to the loss of approximately 33% of the tariff lines from the original
1998-2013 broad dataset. However, that loss does not affect considerably the strength of
my final dataset, for various reasons. Firstly, many of the tariff lines discarded belong to
non-manufacturing sectors like mining, fishery and oil and derivatives, not contemplated
in this research. Secondly, and most importantly, for my subsequent empirical approach, I
restrict my analysis to the 2006-2013 period and to firms starting to export to USA since
2006, thus disregarding the tariff information lost between 1998 and 2005.
From the aforementioned 1998-2013 final dataset, I made further transformations so
as to generate relevant variables for my econometric approach, to be defined afterwards.
Among those transformations, I can highlight the creation of dummies to control for firms
with one-year experience in the USA market, the firms’ previous experience in markets
other than USA, the “core competence” condition of a product, and the fact that a firm
has previously exported a similar product to USA in t− 1 to the one exported in t.
Additionally, in order to categorise these firms by size, I calculated as an approximation
the mean of firms’ total annual exports throughout the 1998-2013 period, which led to the
four groups listed in Table 4.2.29
29According to this categorisation, 54.16% of firms are very small and only 6.97% are large.
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Table 4.2: Categorisation by Firm Size
Size Mean Annual Exports (US $)
Large > 1, 000, 000
Medium > 100, 000− ≤ 1, 000, 000
Small > 10, 000− ≤ 100, 000
Very Small ≤ 10, 000
4.3.2 Descriptive Analysis
4.3.2.1 Export Statistics
From this original dataset of Peruvian firms that exported at least once to the United
States, I plotted the evolution of their exports to that destination from 1998 to 2013 in
US Dollars (Figure 4.2) and their annual growth rates (Figure 4.3). Exports follow a
continuous growth that gets more pronounced from 2004, but then sharply fall in 2009,
exactly the same year the Free Trade Agreement between Peru and the United States
came into force. Afterwards, there was a sustained recovery of exports until 2011, and
then slightly decreased again from 2012. A similar tendency can be found for the overall
exports of this sample.
Figure 4.2 Figure 4.3
The pronounced decrease of exports in 2009, when the enactment of the USA-Peru
FTA took place, represents a challenge for the analysis in this paper and further studies,
as it is necessary to disentangle the effects of trade liberalisation from those from an
economic crisis.
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Figure 4.4 displays the evolution of the number of Peruvian firms exporting to USA
during the period analysed. Unlike the export volumes, the number of exporters follows
a steady pace until 2008 and then roughly constant, despite any external shock produced
by the crisis during those years. The main effect of the crisis was, therefore, expressed
in export volumes; namely, the intensive margin. This outcome is clearly in line with
the findings from Behrens et al. (2013) on the financial crisis effect on Belgian trade.
Indeed, the authors found that the fall in exports and imports at the firm-product-country
level occurred mostly at the intensive margin, whereas the number of exporting firms,
destinations and products sold per market changed only very little.
Figure 4.4
According to the categorisation in Table 4.2, 54.16% of firms are very small and only
6.97% are large. I employ this criterion in further estimations; but in this section I compare
the evolution over time of the mean annual exports to USA of firms across size categories.
The statistics provided by Figure 4.5 are striking. All types of firms except the large
ones experience a continuous positive evolution in exports during the last four years of
the sample, exactly when the USA-Peru FTA was in course, with a pronounced jump in
2013. By contrast, the figures for larger firms follow the overall trend presented earlier.
Figure 4.5 might give a first sign that bilateral trade liberalisation between both countries
facilitated the export growth and entry of new Peruvian firms into that market, especially
the smallest ones.
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Figure 4.5
4.3.2.2 Firm Entry and Exit
For the subsequent econometric analysis, I reduced the sample to the 2006-2013 time
period. I deemed convenient to focus on that period because, after the negotiations to
achieve the FTA between Peru and USA finalised in late 2005, some uncertainty remained
about the ratification of this treaty by both countries, as well as its implementation from
2009 when the agreement came into force. That uncertainty is more likely to affect firms
with less experience in the USA market, with respect to firms with several years selling
to that destination. Such difference between newbies and experts is the focus of the
subsequent empirical approach.
This sample reduction led to 4,579 Peruvian exporters, 2,371 8-digit tariff lines and
31,311 firm-product pairs. Since some tariff lines did not have available information on
actual tariff levels before the enactment of the Free Trade Agreement, they had to be
removed from the dataset, also leading to the removal of some firms from the analysis.
With this reduced sample, I made an analysis of the continuity of Peruvian firms in
the USA export market. Figure 4.6 indicates that from the 1,914 firms that exported to
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USA in 2006, 64.73% (1,239 firms) exported in 2007. Overall, this chart shows that just
over 60% of firms that exported to the USA in a particular year do it the year after, which
means that over 30% of firms leave the USA market after one year. Hence, attrition levels,
although showing a pretty stable pattern, are quite high.
Figure 4.6
But a parallel exercise shows that, for example, from the 1,927 firms that exported
to USA in 2007, 64.30% (1,239 firms) did it in 2006. In general, between 63% and 76%
of firms that exported to USA in a particular year did it the year before. That means
that between 24% and 37% of firms each year entered or re-entered into the USA export
market. Therefore, these numbers provide an idea of how dynamic this market is in terms
of entry and exit.
A similar analysis considered this time the firm-product pairs at the 8-digit level.
62.49% of them are present in the sample only for one year, whereas 15.94% do it for
two years. Thus, Figure 4.7 says that over 50% of firm-product pairs present in the USA
export market in a year leave it the year after. But a parallel exercise done showed that
between 42% and 52% of pairs exporting in a year did it the year before, meaning that
from 48% to 58% of pairs that exported in that year were new or re-entrants. Hence, entry
and exit dynamics are more evident at the firm-product-pair level.
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Figure 4.7
4.3.2.3 First vs. Subsequent Exports
Since the focus of this paper is to analyse the dynamics of genuinely new exporters, in
my empirical approach I restrict even more my sample, considering only those firms that
began exporting to the USA market since 2006. Thus, I can more appropriately analyse
the export dynamics differences between firms with only one-year experience in the USA
market and more experienced exporters in that destination. In other words, I disregard
the firms with prior experience in that destination and those that re-entered that market
from 2006 onwards. That process is facilitated by the firm-transaction data availability
dating back to 1993. As a result, in my estimations I work with a final “non-re-entrants”
sample of 2,720 firms, 1,579 8-digit tariff lines and 12,074 firm-product pairs.
With this final dataset, I constructed some Kernel density graphs, addressing the
difference in export values between the first exports made by Peruvian firms and their
subsequent shipments into USA.
Figure 4.8 compares the densities between the values of the first non-zero real exports
to USA per firm-product pair at the 8-digit level and the subsequent ones. Clearly, the
subsequent export values tend to be greater than the initial shipments, as the theoretical
model implies. The latter achieve a mean of US$ 28,283.14; whereas the former are on
average US$ 95,766.40.
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Figure 4.8
In order to confirm that tendency, I normalised the export values per firm-product pair
by employing the total sum of real exports of product j to USA in 2013, the final year
of the dataset. The outcome is shown in Figure 4.9, with the non-zero normalised values,
confirming that subsequent real exports to USA tend to be larger than the first ones.30
Figure 4.9
I argue in my empirical approach that there might be differences in the export perform-
ance of Peruvian firms in the USA market, depending on whether they have previously
30The mean of normalised first real exports is 9.39; while that for further shipments is 2.57. However,
the initial exports have a much larger standard deviation of 287.03 than that for further values (85.63).
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exported product j to another destination. Figure 4.10 displays an exercise for the log
of the first real exports by firms of product j, distinguishing whether such product was
exported elsewhere in t−1 or not. The distributions are clearly different, and even though
the first exports for the “non-elsewhere” firms have a larger mean (US$ 70,480 against
US$ 58,056), the first exports of the “elsewhere” firms have a larger 50% percentile, and
a lower dispersion.
Figure 4.10
When it comes to analysing the subsequent exports, however, the figures change, as
Figure 4.11 suggests. If firm i exported product j elsewhere in t−1, it tends to send larger
shipments to USA in t than those firms not exporting to anywhere else. Both means and
medians are much larger for the “elsewhere” firms, and their degree of dispersion is greater
as well. This outcome might entail that the experience in other destinations is relevant to
encourage firms to explore more and more the USA market.31
31“Non-elsewhere” firms have a mean export value to USA of US$ 46,104.38; “elsewhere” firms, US$
289,839.70. As for the 50% percentile, the values are US$ 2,366.73 against US$ 14,324.90.
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Figure 4.11
4.3.2.4 New vs. Expert Firms
As a first attempt to test the first prediction of the theoretical model, Figure 4.12
compares the export growth of real exports of product j to USA between new firms –
those that began exporting to USA in t − 1– and the incumbent or expert firms in that
market. This is a first assessment of the differences between new and expert firms at the
intensive margin, which shows that the export growth rate for less experienced Peruvian
firms in USA tends to be larger than for the incumbents. Furthermore, the distribution
for the new firms is more skewed to the left, meaning that their export growth have a
positive tendency.
Figure 4.12 Figure 4.13
But the theory also argues that this difference in export growth between new and
expert firms is boosted by trade liberalisation. As a preliminary evidence of that, Figure
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4.13 presents the densities of real export growth rates exclusively for 2009, the year most
of the tariff eliminations by USA on Peruvian products took place. Clearly, the difference
in favour of new firms is much more evident, with a greater frequency of positive export
growth rates than for incumbent firms.
4.4 Empirical Approach
Now I present the three econometric models designed for my study on sequential exporting
across products, with their respective main results. Each identification seeks to test the
three predictions derived from the theory described earlier, on the export dynamics of less
experienced firms at the intensive margin (Model 1), extensive margin (Model 2) and exit
from an export business (Model 3). The models are tested for the case of Peruvian firms
exporting to the United States.
The observations for the three models are defined as a Peruvian firm i exporting a
product j to the United States at year t. The analysis considers the 2006-2013 time
period, and product j is defined at the 8-digit level. The main results are based upon
samples restricted to firms that began exporting to USA from 2006 onwards, also called
non-re-entrants, in order to facilitate the comparison between one-year experienced firms
and firms with longer presence in the USA market.
4.4.1 Model 1: Intensive Margin (Export Growth)
The purpose of this first estimation is to test Prediction 1 on intensive margin derived
from the theory, which states that, conditional in survival, new firms exporting their first
products to a destination experience a greater intensive margin export growth than more
expert firms.
The basic specification is presented in Equation 4.1, estimated by a firm Fixed Effects
Model, with robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. The dependent variable
∆ln real evijt is the change in the log of firm i’s real exports of product j in year t. It is
regressed on a binary variable new USAi,t−1 taking value 1 if that firm exported to the
USA market for the first time in year t − 1. This dummy was defined to control for the
condition of firms having an overall one-year experience in the USA market, as well as the
condition of product j being the first product exported to that destination.
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∆ln real evijt = α0 + α1new USAi,t−1 + α2ftajt+
α3newUSA ∗ lag2elseijt + α4fta ∗ new USAijt+
α5lag1 core50ijt + α6newUSA ∗ lag1core50ijt + µijt.
(4.1)
This effect on export growth might be enhanced by the existence of the Free Trade
Agreement between Peru and USA since 2009. To account for that, I include a variable
accounting for this trade liberalisation process, named ftajt, which represents the change
in log of unity plus the proportional tariff levied by the United States to product j (8-
digit tariff line), from t− 1 to t. This variable is included on its own and interacted with
the dummy controlling for one-year experienced exporters in the USA market, denoted
as fta ∗ new USAijt. The outcome I expect from these variables is a negative sign, since
my initial hypothesis is that a reduction in tariff rates in the USA market facilitates the
export performance of Peruvian firms in product j, especially the newcomers.
It is important to stress that ftajt is also useful to disentangle the effects of trade
liberalisation from the effects of the economic crisis that lowered Peruvian exports in
2009, the same year the USA-Peru FTA came into force.
Although the main focus is the bilateral trade relation between Peruvian firms and
the United States, it is also necessary to consider the rest of markets firm i trades with
and how it might influence its performance at the market of interest. For that reason, I
include the variable newUSA∗ lag2elseijt, the interaction between new USAi,t−1 and the
dummy lag2else, which takes value 1 if firm i exported product j to any other destination
in t− 2, and zero otherwise. The idea behind this interaction is to illustrate the case of a
Peruvian firm that previously exported j elsewhere in t− 2, then exporting it sequentially
to the USA market in t − 1, in order to test whether having exported elsewhere in the
past has an extra effect on new exporters in the United States.
The model addresses the differences across products (“core competence” vs. the rest)
by the inclusion of the last two variables. lag1 core50ijt takes value 1 if product j accoun-
ted for a minimum of 50% of firm i’s total exports to the world in t− 1.32 In other words,
this variable controls for products belonging to firm i’s core competences in the previous
year. lag1 core50ijt is included on its own and interacted with new USAi,t−1. Since my
theoretical approach predicts that the firm, particularly a one-year experienced one, will
32This criterion is an approximation to what the theory considers as less costly products, given that I
do not count on firms’ actual cost data.
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have a greater export growth over time with a non-core product, I expect a negative sign
for both variables. Thus, growth at the intensive margin is higher if a firm exports a
non-core product, compared to a core one.
Apart from controlling for firm fixed effects as mentioned earlier, the model is enriched
with the inclusion of fixed effects at different levels. Year dummies control for particular
demand shocks occurring in a specific year, like 2008 and 2009 when the recent economic
crisis in USA and Europe took place. The reference year is 2006, the beginning of the
sample. Besides, I take into account the issue that many products exported to the United
States were previously liberalised by the ATPDEA unilateral liberalisation or enjoyed a
0% tariff from the Most-Favoured-Nation scheme, even before the enactment of the FTA.
Regarding sector fixed effects, dummies accounting for the industry each product belongs
to are added as well. Recall I work with eight different sectors, and the reference for this
analysis is agriculture.
It is also feasible that export growth of product j by firm i in the USA market is
influenced by firm i’s export performance in the previous year. That is why I incorpor-
ate in further estimations the log of firm i’s overall real exports to USA in year t − 1,
lag ln real ev USA toti, the sign of which I expect it to be negative because it is argu-
able that larger exports to USA imply that the firm is close to its equilibrium level of
exports.
It is necessary to mention that for this first model, working on export growth, the
sample is restricted to firms that exported a product to USA for at least two consecutive
years.
4.4.1.1 Main Results
Table 4.3 reports the main results from Model 1 on the intensive margin. The basic
specification from Equation 4.1 is presented in Column (1), while Columns (2)-(4) test the
robustness of this main estimation by adding further interactions with the tariff change
variable. Additionally, Columns (3)-(4) exclude the newUSA ∗ lag2elseijt variable to
compare the significance of the main variables of interest.
These first estimations confirm the positive and significant association between the
condition of being a one-year experienced Peruvian firm in the USA market, exporting
its first products to that market, and the intensive margin export growth. However,
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that positive relation is eliminated if such new firm has also been exporting the same
product j to any other destination, according to the negative and significant coefficients
of newUSA ∗ lag2elseijt.33
Table 4.3: Model 1 - Intensive Margin
Dependent Variable ∆ln real ev
Estimation Firm FE Robust
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
new USA 2.254*** 2.282*** 2.091*** 2.090*** 1.220*** 1.222*** 1.130*** 1.130***
(0.260) (0.260) (0.259) (0.258) (0.233) (0.231) (0.227) (0.227)
newUSA*lag2else -2.415*** -2.402*** -0.932*** -0.931**
(0.435) (0.436) (0.360) (0.361)
lag1 core50 -4.061*** -4.068*** -3.997*** -4.009*** -2.195*** -2.196*** -2.165*** -2.165***
(0.201) (0.201) (0.201) (0.204) (0.155) (0.155) (0.154) (0.158)
newUSA*lag1core50 0.417 0.309 -0.0533 -0.0424 0.203 0.194 0.0587 0.0588
(0.340) (0.346) (0.359) (0.359) (0.295) (0.299) (0.296) (0.298)
fta -4.758* -4.773* -4.734* -4.501 -3.099 -3.099 -3.027 -3.026
(2.698) (2.698) (2.707) (2.865) (2.406) (2.407) (2.410) (2.506)
fta*new USA 7.304 9.053* 10.02* 9.783* 3.248 3.391 3.653 3.652
(4.792) (5.408) (5.431) (5.497) (4.046) (4.619) (4.577) (4.619)
fta*lag1core50 -1.941 -0.00585
(5.215) (4.088)
ftanewUSA*lag1core50 -8.938 -10.03 -8.083 -0.727 -1.096 -1.091
(6.336) (6.280) (7.980) (5.848) (5.784) (7.025)
lag ln real ev USA tot -0.554*** -0.554*** -0.555*** -0.555***
(0.0209) (0.0210) (0.0210) (0.0210)
Year FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
ATPDEA and MFN dummies No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 17077 17077 17077 17077 17077 17077 17077 17077
r2 o 0.0331 0.0331 0.0329 0.0329 0.164 0.164 0.164 0.164
N clust 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters in firms.
*Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level;
***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
When it comes to the condition of “core competences” by product j, represented
by the lag1 core50ijt dummy and its interaction with new USAi,t−1, the negative and
significant estimates of the former convey that the export growth to USA of products
the firm usually performs better at in terms of sales is lower compared to the “non-core
33Recall from Figures 4.10 and 4.11 that firms that exported product j elsewhere in t− 1 tend to export
larger volumes to USA. Hence, it is expectable that growth rates between these volumes are not as large
as rates for firms which experiment with product j only in USA.
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competence” products, just like the theoretical model predicts. This effect holds for both
new and incumbent Peruvian firms in the USA market and, given the insignificance of the
newUSA ∗ lag1core50ijt interaction, there does not seem to be an outstanding difference
in that effect between both types of firms.
Regarding the variables controlling for trade liberalisation, the tariff growth rate ftajt
and its interaction with the “new exporter to USA” dummy, the estimates attained are not
significant; but exhibit a positive sign that differs from the theory’s implications, which
might entail that trade liberalisation is not so determinant for the intensive margin. This
result might imply that the export growth is explained by other factors apart from the
τ
2 obtained from the theoretical model. Among those, I can think of the ability of some
firms, particularly the incumbents, to anticipate the liberalisation process in their export
decisions, making them adjust their overall cost structure and make the most of the tariff
elimination by raising their export levels.
Columns (5)-(8) show the results when additionally controlling for the firm’s past per-
formance in the USA market, time and sector fixed effects and the ATPDEA and MFN
dummies, all included at once because thus the main variables of interest obtain less over-
estimated and more reliable results. Indeed, the condition of “new exporter” maintains
the positive effect on the export growth, but to a lower extent. The same can be argued for
the estimates for the role of having exported product j elsewhere and the past “core com-
petence” condition of such product. The negative coefficients for lag ln real ev USA toti
imply that the better the firm did in t− 1 in terms of export sales to USA, the lower the
export growth for product j to that market, which makes sense, as it provides the idea
that a firm might be close to their equilibrium value of exports to USA in t − 1. Hence,
the export growth in t does not need to be so large.
4.4.2 Model 2: Extensive Margin (Entry)
Through this second estimation on the extensive margin, I test Prediction 2 from the
theory, which states that, conditional on survival, new firms in the USA market are more
likely to export new products to that destination than more experienced firms.
Applying a Linear Probability Model with firm fixed effects and standard errors clustered
at the firm level, the dependent variable for this regression, expressed in Equation 4.2, is
denoted as Entryijt. That is a binary variable taking value 1 if firm i exported product j
for the first time to the United States in year t, and 0 otherwise. That dummy is regressed
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on the known binary variable, new USAi,t−1, taking value 1 if the firm entered the US
market for the first time in year t − 1. Such variable again controls for new Peruvian
exporters to USA, and it is expected to obtain a positive coefficient, since new exporters
have more unexploited opportunities to follow up.
Pr[Entryijt = 1] = β0 + β1new USAi,t−1 + β2ftajt + β3fta ∗ new USAijt+
β4similar prodij,t−1 + β5newUSA ∗ lag1elseijt+
β6core50ijt + β7newUSA ∗ core50ijt + µijt.
(4.2)
The effect of trade liberalisation is controlled for by the ftajt variable described earlier,
adding it on its own and interacting it with the dummy of new exporter in the USA market.
Given the implications from the theory, I expect a negative coefficient for the tariff change
variable, making the entry probability with a new product higher for all firms. However,
for fta ∗ new USAijt, I would expect a positive sign, since Prediction 2 states that the
increment in the entry probability is larger for the incumbent firms, for which it would be
easier to export a liberalised product than for newcomers.
My extensive margin prediction is affected by the positive but imperfect correlation of
the unknown export profitability µN across products. Such correlation can be interpreted
as similarities across products, in terms of demand and supply patterns. In that sense,
I incorporate the similar prodij,t−1 dummy, which takes value 1 if firm i exported to
USA in t − 1 at least one product belonging to the same 4-digit HS tariff group as the
product j the firm exports in t. I expect a positive sign for that variable, as a firm that
had a previous experience in t − 1 exporting to USA a product from a particular tariff
group would be more likely to experiment with a new product from that group. In further
estimations, this dummy is interacted with the variables accounting for new exporters
and trade liberalisation. The expected signs for these interactions are uncertain since
the theory predicts that the effect of positive correlation depends on the firm’s expected
export profitabilities with respect to the known costs.
I also need to control for “core competence” products, by including the core50ijt
dummy and its interaction with the new exporters dummy, newUSA ∗ core50ijt. Un-
like Model 1, this time I use the level of core50, which takes value 1 if product j accounts
for 50% or more of firm i’s total exports in year t. For that dummy and its interaction, I
expect, according to the prediction, a positive coefficient, as firms tend to experiment with
a new product for which known production costs are lower; feature that is approximated
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by higher overall export sales.
As an additional covariate to control for the firm’s experience in other destinations, I
incorporate the interaction newUSA ∗ lag1elseijt, similar to that from Model 1; but now
new USAi,t−1 is interacted with the lag1else dummy, taking value 1 if firm i exported
product j to another market in t − 1. My hypothesised sign is positive for this variable,
as I can argue that a firm that exported a product to a previous destination, once in the
US market will experiment there with that same product.
The entry into the USA market with a new product might be also influenced by the
performance of other firms in the Peruvian industry in the previous year. For that reason,
inspired in Albornoz et al. (2012), in further estimations I include ln lag n sec exp USAt,
the number of exporters to the United States in year t − 1 from the sector the product
belongs to, as well as the growth of the log of exports from that sector to USA in year
t, gr ln real sector USA exportst. Like in Model 1, the log of exports by firm i to the
US in t− 1 is added in some specifications. Year, sector and product fixed effects are also
included.
Once again, the sample is restricted to firms exporting to USA for at least two years.
However, since I am interested in the entry into the business of a particular product, once
that product is introduced by firm i in year t, the firm-product pair is dropped from the
sample from year t+ 1 onwards.
4.4.2.1 Main Results
Table 4.4 reports the main results from Model 2 on the extensive margin. The basic
regression is shown in Column (1), while Columns (2)-(4) check the robustness of this
first estimation controlling for further interactions involving ftajt and similar prodij,t−1.
Columns (5)-(8) replicate the exercise, adding controllers on the size of product j’s sector.
A Peruvian firm with only one year of experience in the US market is more likely to
export a new product j to that country in t than a more consolidated exporter, according
the positive and significant estimates for new USAi,t−1 across all the specifications. These
numbers match the second prediction of the theoretical framework. Such positive effect is
clearly boosted if that new exporter has exported product j elsewhere in t− 1.
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Table 4.4: Model 2 - Extensive Margin (Entry)
Dependent Variable Entry ijt
Estimation LPM
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
new USA 0.174*** 0.174*** 0.196*** 0.196*** 0.171*** 0.171*** 0.193*** 0.193***
(0.0353) (0.0354) (0.0371) (0.0371) (0.0353) (0.0354) (0.0372) (0.0372)
newUSA*lag1else 0.0861** 0.0870** 0.107*** 0.107*** 0.0866** 0.0875** 0.108*** 0.108***
(0.0376) (0.0375) (0.0367) (0.0367) (0.0375) (0.0375) (0.0366) (0.0366)
core50 0.541*** 0.542*** 0.553*** 0.552*** 0.539*** 0.539*** 0.551*** 0.550***
(0.0195) (0.0200) (0.0191) (0.0186) (0.0195) (0.0201) (0.0192) (0.0186)
newUSA*core50 -0.112** -0.100** -0.00700 -0.00605 -0.111** -0.0993** -0.00619 -0.00538
(0.0445) (0.0461) (0.0459) (0.0456) (0.0444) (0.0460) (0.0458) (0.0456)
fta -0.682*** -0.686*** -0.810*** -0.800*** -0.572*** -0.575*** -0.698*** -0.690***
(0.211) (0.217) (0.235) (0.228) (0.211) (0.217) (0.235) (0.228)
fta*new USA 1.341*** 1.309*** 1.215** 1.204** 1.312*** 1.278*** 1.190** 1.181**
(0.441) (0.447) (0.496) (0.492) (0.439) (0.445) (0.494) (0.490)
fta*core50 0.0831 0.183 0.0544 0.154
(0.466) (0.472) (0.467) (0.473)
ftanewUSA*core50 1.733 1.984 2.167 1.755 2.006 2.160
(1.673) (1.431) (1.341) (1.662) (1.424) (1.333)
similar prod 0.217*** 0.217*** 0.336*** 0.336*** 0.214*** 0.214*** 0.332*** 0.332***
(0.0202) (0.0202) (0.0275) (0.0275) (0.0204) (0.0204) (0.0277) (0.0277)
newUSA*similar -0.241*** -0.241*** -0.240*** -0.240***
(0.0399) (0.0399) (0.0398) (0.0398)
core50*similar -0.303*** -0.302*** -0.302*** -0.302***
(0.0579) (0.0579) (0.0580) (0.0580)
fta*similar 1.579*** 1.572*** 1.564*** 1.557***
(0.457) (0.456) (0.460) (0.458)
ftanewUSA*similar -1.098* -1.091 -1.109* -1.102*
(0.667) (0.665) (0.667) (0.666)
ln lag n sec exp USA 0.0445*** 0.0445*** 0.0429*** 0.0430***
(0.00717) (0.00716) (0.00719) (0.00719)
gr ln real sector USA exports -0.0340** -0.0340** -0.0341** -0.0341**
(0.0153) (0.0153) (0.0153) (0.0154)
N 28488 28488 28488 28488 28488 28488 28488 28488
r2 o 0.100 0.101 0.107 0.107 0.102 0.102 0.109 0.109
N clust 1158 1158 1158 1158 1158 1158 1158 1158
Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters in firms.
*Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level;
***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
The hypothesis on the relation between the “core competence” condition of a product
and the extensive margin growth is supported by the estimations, since I obtain positive
and significant coefficients for the core50ijt dummy. This means that firm i is more likely
to export to USA a new product that accounts for a minimum of 50% of its total exports, as
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a proxy for production efficiency. That effect is also positive for new Peruvian exporters to
USA; however, given the negative sign and lower absolute values for the newUSA∗core50ijt
interaction, such effect for new firms is not as large as for more consolidated exporters.
The variables controlling for trade liberalisation provide results that are consistent
with the implications from the theory. A tariff elimination by USA on Peruvian products
is linked with an increase in the entry probability by a firm into that market with product
j, according to the negative and significant coefficients for ftajt across all specifications.
However, that rise in the entry probability is more than offset for newcomers, compared
to the most established firms in the USA market. That is represented by the positive
and significant values for fta ∗ new USAijt, which is larger in absolute value, meaning
that new Peruvian exporters are at a disadvantage relative to the incumbents in the
USA market at the extensive margin, presumably due to a larger degree of competition
from liberalisation. The latter gives certain support to Prediction 2, which states that
the increase in the entry probability with trade liberalisation is larger for expert firms.
Regarding the fta ∗ core50 and ftanewUSA ∗ core50 interactions, there seems not to be
differences in the liberalisation effect between core and non-core products.
The positive and imperfect correlation across products, understood as similarities
across goods, is accounted for by the similar prodij,t−1 dummy, which is positive and
significant in all the regressions, supporting my initial expectations. Hence, firms tend to
undertake a sequential exporting strategy with products that belong to a common 4-digit
tariff group. The interactions of that dummy provide interesting results. The interac-
tion with new USAi,t−1 gives negative and significant numbers with lower absolute value,
meaning that the effect of having previously exported a similar product to USA is greater
for an incumbent firm. These negative signs can also be related to the prediction arising
from the case in which EµNj > 2F
1/2
d + τ
j + cpj , meaning that new firms tended to export
correlated products simultaneously, rather than sequentially.34 Likewise, the negative and
significant values for the interaction between similar products and the core50ijt dummy
entail that the “similar” effect might be larger for ”non-core competence” products. How-
ever, the results for these variables are afterwards compared with further regressions.
More consolidated firms in the USA market are encouraged to diversify their export
portfolio with other type of products when liberalisation occurs. That is expressed by
34Recall that in such case, the larger the correlation across products, the greater the cutoff of µNA above
which a firm exports sequentially, meaning that the value of experimentation is lower. Hence, it will be
preferred to export simultaneously.
64
the positive and significant coefficients for the fta ∗ similar interaction. In contrast,
the ftanewUSA ∗ similar interaction, through its negative –although less significant–
coefficients, indicate that the disadvantage for new firms at the extensive margin in the
event of liberalisation is somehow compensated if those firms experiment with a similar
product to the one previously exported.
No major changes in the coefficients of interest take place when adding the variables
on the size of product j’s sector, accounting for competition level. These variables im-
ply that the entry probability with product j is positively associated with the degree of
competition in terms of number of exporters to USA from that sector (positive values for
ln lag n sec exp USA); while a negative association is attained in terms of the growth of
the sectoral export volume (negative coefficients for gr ln real sector USA exports).
Appendix B.1 reports the results from Model 2 when controlling for firm i’s past per-
formance in the USA market, time and sector fixed effects and product-specific dummies.
The most evident change is the loss of significance for the variables of interest –new ex-
porter and trade liberalisation covariates– when lag ln real ev USA toti is included. This
variable, controlling for exports to USA in t−1, always provides positive coefficients, mean-
ing that the more a firm exports to USA, the more likely it is to experiment in the future
with new products. This outcome implies that the past performance plays a determinant
role in Peruvian firms’ export decisions in both the intensive and extensive margin.
There is another relevant and striking change when these additional controllers are in-
cluded. The newUSA∗similar interaction, which was negative and significant in the main
results, now turns positive and significant in most regressions. That difference between
results can be interpreted as follows: a large export value to USA by a firm can be argu-
ably associated with the number of products it exports to that market. From my dataset,
I can identify that larger exporters with more years in the USA market, have already sold
many products from the same tariff group in the past. In contrast, less experienced firms,
tending to start with fewer products and lower values, might be more likely to continue
experimentation with a product from the same 4-digit tariff group as those exported to
USA last year.
4.4.3 Model 3: Exit from a Market
The last model I present was designed to test Prediction 3, which states that new firms
in the USA market are more likely than more consolidated exporters to stop exporting a
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particular product to that country; and that such probability is reduced by trade liberal-
isation, and is also lower for core competence products.
Another Linear Probability Model with firm fixed effects and standard errors clustered
at the firm level is estimated, the basic specification of which is expressed in Equation
4.3). The dependent variable, denoted as Exitijt, is a binary variable that takes value 1
if firm i stops exporting product j to the United States in year t, and 0 otherwise.
Pr[Exitijt = 1] = γ0 + γ1new USAi,t−1 + γ2ftajt+
γ3fta ∗ new USAijt + γ4newUSA ∗ lag1elseijt+
γ5core50ijt + γ6newUSA ∗ core50ijt + µijt.
(4.3)
That dummy is regressed on the new USAi,t−1 binary variable defined in Model 1,
controlling for the entry of firm i into the USA market in year t − 1 with product j.
The variable accounting for the USA trade liberalisation in 2009 is included on its own,
and interacted with new USAi,t−1. I expect a positive coefficient for the dummy on new
exporters to USA. For the liberalisation variables, I also expect positive signs, because
the theoretical framework predicts that a tariff reduction diminishes the exit likelihood
by firms, especially the less experienced ones, from the business of exporting product j to
destination d.
Like in the previous models, I control for the firm’s performance in other destinations
by incorporating the aforementioned newUSA ∗ lag1elseijt, for which I expect a negative
sign, meaning that a new exporter to USA is less likely to stop exporting product j to
that market if it previously exported that good elsewhere.
Regarding the role of production costs, I again try to approximate their effect by
using the core50ijt dummy on its own and interacted with new USAi,t−1. Following
the theory, I expect both variables to provide negative coefficients, meaning that a core
competence product makes the firm’s exit probability lower, especially for new firms in
the USA market. For reasons I will explain when presenting the results, I experiment by
using these variables both contemporaneously (core50ijt) and in lags (lag1 core50ijt), like
I used in the intensive margin model.
Aiming to control for firm i’s past performance in the USA market, I include in some
specifications the variable lag ln real evijt, which represents the log of the real export
value of product j by firm i to the United States in t − 1. Fixed effects utilised in the
previous models are included, as well as the ATPDEA and MFN dummies.
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For this third estimation, all exporters to USA from 2006 to 2013 are considered,
with no restriction on the number of years they have exported within the sample. As I
am interested in the transition from exporting to not exporting, observations with zero
exports per firm-product pair before the first non-zero export are dropped, as well as those
after the year the Exitijt dummy becomes 1.
4.4.3.1 Main Results
Table 4.5 displays the main results from this model. The basic specification from
Equation 4.3 is presented in Column (1), while the next two columns incorporate some
interactions with the tariff change variable. Columns (4)-(6) mirror those estimations,
but additionally control for the lag of firm i’s export of product j to USA, year, sector,
ATPDEA and MFN dummies.
These specifications indicate that a Peruvian firm with only one year of experience in
the USA market, exporting their first products in t − 1, is more likely to stop exporting
product j to that country in year t, compared to the incumbent exporters. This is shown
by the positive and highly significant coefficients for new USAi,t−1. That exit probability
tends to diminish if that new firm previously exported product j to another market in t−1,
given the negative values for the newUSA ∗ lag1elseijt interaction, which are significant
in Columns (4)-(6).
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Table 4.5: Model 3 - Exit - controlling for core products in year t
Dependent Variable Exit ijt
Estimation LPM
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
new USA 0.172*** 0.173*** 0.173*** 0.186*** 0.187*** 0.187***
(0.0245) (0.0246) (0.0246) (0.0173) (0.0173) (0.0173)
newUSA*lag1else 0.00185 0.00212 0.00215 -0.0699*** -0.0698*** -0.0698***
(0.0314) (0.0313) (0.0314) (0.0212) (0.0211) (0.0211)
core50 -0.510*** -0.511*** -0.515*** -0.343*** -0.343*** -0.343***
(0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0117)
newUSA*core50 -0.0482* -0.0604** -0.0573** -0.160*** -0.165*** -0.166***
(0.0285) (0.0288) (0.0288) (0.0224) (0.0228) (0.0228)
fta 0.228 0.227 0.301 -0.222 -0.222 -0.228
(0.263) (0.263) (0.289) (0.173) (0.173) (0.184)
fta*new USA 0.589 0.711 0.634 0.704*** 0.757*** 0.763***
(0.430) (0.455) (0.469) (0.269) (0.282) (0.290)
fta*core50 -0.613* 0.0491
(0.357) (0.284)
ftanewUSA*core50 -1.219** -0.607 -0.495 -0.544
(0.525) (0.629) (0.448) (0.526)
lag ln real ev 0.0491*** 0.0491*** 0.0491***
(0.00163) (0.00163) (0.00163)
Year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
ATPDEA and MFN dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes
N 31882 31882 31882 27434 27434 27434
r2 o 0.0986 0.0986 0.131 0.246 0.246 0.246
N clust 2599 2599 2599 2599 2599 2599
Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters in firms.
*Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level;
***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
The negative and significant estimates for the variables controlling for core products
inform us that the firm is more likely to remain exporting a product if it was one of
the firm’s core competences in year t. There is an additional factor reducing the exit
effect of core50ijt for new firms, identified from the negative and significant values for the
newUSA ∗ core50 interaction.
Regarding the liberalisation variables, the tariff change on its own does not seem to
represent any effect on the exit likelihood. However, it does represent an effect for new-
comers, because the positive and significant coefficients for fta ∗ new USAijt in Columns
(4)-(6) report that the tariff elimination by USA in 2009 reduced the new firms’ probability
of stopping the export of product j to that market. The interactions of trade liberalisation
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with the core50ijt dummy do not provide quite significant effects.
When controlling for firm i’s past performance and the other fixed effects, few changes
to the variables of interest occur. The positive and significant values for the firm’s export
value of product j in t− 1 might be an indicator that the more of j the firm exported in
the past, the more ready it is to export other products.
Appendix B.1 contains six additional regressions for Model 3. The first three columns
show results controlling for MFN and ATPDEA dummies, along with time and sector
fixed effects; while the other three only add the lag of the export value of product j.
No major differences from the main regressions are perceived, except that the robustness
of the main conclusions for the variables of interest is strengthened by the inclusion of
lag ln real evijt.
Since the “core competence” condition of a product may vary over time, I considered it
informative to make an experiment, shown in Appendix B.1, which replace the level of the
“core50” condition with its first lag, lag1 core50ijt, including the newUSA∗ lag1core50ijt
interaction. The patterns followed by the main variables of interest remain unchanged.
Moreover, fta∗new USAijt and newUSA∗lag1elseijt exhibit a greater significance across
regressions. However, the fall in the exit likelihood for products that account for 50% or
more of the firm’s total exports is not so evident when controlling for “core competence”
products in t − 1. Without including the lag of the firm’s export value of product j, the
lag1 core50ijt variable and its interaction with new USAi,t−1 obtain positive and signi-
ficant values. But when controlling for firm i’s past performance, although lag1 core50ijt
reports negative estimates like in Table 4.5; the newUSA ∗ lag1core50 interaction again
gives positive coefficients.35
4.5 Robustness Checks
In this section, I summarise the main results from the robustness checks run for the three
models developed, mainly focusing on alternatives to control for core competence products,
and how this “core competence” effect on the export growth, entry and exit differs across
firm sizes.
35The sign change for lag1 core50ijt when including the lag of exports of product j to USA makes sense,
as the “core competence” condition of product j in t− 1 might partly be explained by the amount of that
good exported to USA in that year.
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4.5.1 Interactions between Core Products and Firm Size
One first attempt is to interact the original core50 dummy with binary variables account-
ing for firm size, proxied by the mean total annual exports of firms between 1998 and
2013, in order to determine whether there are differences in the effect of “core compet-
ence” products across sizes. In the previous descriptive analysis, I distinguished four size
categories described in Table 4.2, from which the very small firms is the base category.
These dummies are also interacted with the previously constructed interaction between
core50 and the new USA variable. I should recognise, however, that the firm size ap-
proximation I am employing may lead to an endogeneity problem, since the firm size is
determined by its exports, and I do not count on data on domestic output and number
of employees. Nevertheless, one way to attenuate this issue is to use, as described earlier,
the firms’ mean annual exports to everywhere during a longer time span (1998-2013).
For Model 1 on the intensive margin, as can be recalled, I used the first lag of that
core50 dummy to assess if the “core competence” condition of product j in t− 1 had an
effect on the export growth in time t. Table 4.6 presents the results of this robustness
check, which does not lead to major changes for the main variables of interest. In fact,
new USAi,t−1 conserves its positive and significant values; while the tariff change from
2008 to 2009 still shows negative but rarely significant coefficients.
Regarding the results for lag1 core50 and its interaction with new USAi,t−1, the neg-
ative and significant values for the former and the significantly positive numbers for the
latter confirm what the main estimations showed, matching the prediction from the theor-
etical analysis: export growth rates are bigger for “non-core competence” products. That
effect holds for both new and expert firms; but tends to be larger for the latter.
The incorporation of the firm size provides an interesting outcome: this positive effect
for non-core products tend to fade out the larger the firm is in terms of export sales.
That is derived from the positive and significant numbers for the interactions with firm
size, implying that the effect of non-core products, as an approximation of more costly
products, on the intensive margin is more relevant for the smallest firms.
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Table 4.6: Model 1 - Intensive Margin, including interactions between lag1 core50 and
firm size
Dependent Variable ∆ln real ev
Estimation Firm FE Robust
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
new USA 2.261*** 2.285*** 2.090*** 2.088*** 1.203*** 1.199*** 1.113*** 1.112***
(0.261) (0.261) (0.259) (0.259) (0.232) (0.230) (0.226) (0.226)
fta -4.828* -4.839* -4.809* -4.478 -3.086 -3.086 -3.011 -2.888
(2.683) (2.682) (2.693) (2.855) (2.400) (2.400) (2.403) (2.504)
fta*new USA 7.519 9.031* 10.03* 9.691* 3.678 3.439 3.672 3.549
(4.776) (5.411) (5.432) (5.502) (4.047) (4.611) (4.572) (4.614)
newUSA*lag2else -2.458*** -2.446*** -0.844** -0.845**
(0.436) (0.437) (0.366) (0.367)
lag1 core50 -6.171*** -6.172*** -6.155*** -6.167*** -3.769*** -3.768*** -3.759*** -3.763***
(0.333) (0.334) (0.335) (0.337) (0.257) (0.257) (0.257) (0.258)
lag1core50*small 1.879*** 1.874*** 1.939*** 1.926*** 1.282*** 1.283*** 1.305*** 1.300***
(0.472) (0.472) (0.474) (0.477) (0.340) (0.340) (0.340) (0.343)
lag1core50*medium 3.307*** 3.299*** 3.331*** 3.333*** 2.816*** 2.817*** 2.828*** 2.828***
(0.509) (0.509) (0.510) (0.510) (0.360) (0.360) (0.360) (0.360)
lag1core50*large 4.721*** 4.720*** 4.807*** 4.809*** 2.867*** 2.867*** 2.894*** 2.895***
(0.542) (0.542) (0.546) (0.546) (0.400) (0.400) (0.401) (0.401)
newUSA*lag1core50 1.139** 1.070** 1.006** 1.019** 1.191*** 1.202*** 1.188*** 1.193***
(0.473) (0.476) (0.487) (0.488) (0.417) (0.418) (0.420) (0.421)
newUSA*lag1core50*small -0.131 -0.194 -0.483 -0.471 -0.112 -0.102 -0.206 -0.202
(0.563) (0.565) (0.585) (0.586) (0.508) (0.509) (0.515) (0.516)
newUSA*lag1core50*medium -1.425** -1.450** -1.953*** -1.956*** -2.113*** -2.109*** -2.288*** -2.289***
(0.679) (0.679) (0.693) (0.693) (0.622) (0.621) (0.616) (0.616)
newUSA*lag1core50*large -0.664 -0.642 -1.341 -1.346 -2.511*** -2.515*** -2.767*** -2.768***
(0.964) (0.965) (0.941) (0.941) (0.849) (0.848) (0.835) (0.835)
fta*lag1core50 -2.773 -1.003
(5.106) (4.059)
ftanewUSA*lag1core50 -7.840 -8.947 -6.167 1.234 0.902 1.907
(6.410) (6.383) (7.980) (5.909) (5.862) (7.077)
lag ln real ev USA tot -0.551*** -0.551*** -0.552*** -0.552***
(0.0209) (0.0209) (0.0209) (0.0209)
Firm Size dummies No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
ATPDEA and MFN dummies No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 17077 17077 17077 17077 17077 17077 17077 17077
r2 o 0.0421 0.0420 0.0417 0.0417 0.172 0.172 0.172 0.172
N clust 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters in firms.
*Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level;
***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
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Equally interesting results are obtained for Model 2 on the extensive margin, presented
in Table 4.7. The main variables of interest, controlling for new exporters and trade liber-
alisation, do not experience obvious modifications in sign and significance. The same can
be argued for similarities across products, the size of the sector and condition of exporting
elsewhere. Appendix B.2 shows, however, that significance is lost when controlling for
year and sector fixed effects, ATPDEA and MFN dummies and firm i’s past performance
in the USA market.
The core50 dummy obtains the positive and significant values predicted by the theoret-
ical model. All specifications show that both new firms and incumbents tend to experiment
in the USA market with a core product, but such effect tends to be slightly larger for the
expert ones. When controlling for the firm size, the role of “core competence” products
turns more irrelevant the larger the firm is. As a result, the effect of a top 50% product,
as an approximation of less costly products, on the extensive margin is greater for the
smallest firms.
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Table 4.7: Model 2 - Extensive Margin (Entry), including interactions between core50
and firm size
Dependent Variable Entry ijt
Estimation LPM
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
new USA 0.171*** 0.171*** 0.194*** 0.194*** 0.168*** 0.168*** 0.191*** 0.191***
(0.0353) (0.0354) (0.0372) (0.0372) (0.0353) (0.0354) (0.0372) (0.0372)
fta -0.676*** -0.688*** -0.814*** -0.796*** -0.564*** -0.575*** -0.701*** -0.684***
(0.211) (0.217) (0.234) (0.227) (0.210) (0.216) (0.234) (0.227)
fta*new USA 1.329*** 1.327*** 1.221** 1.203** 1.299*** 1.296*** 1.197** 1.180**
(0.438) (0.445) (0.496) (0.491) (0.436) (0.443) (0.493) (0.489)
similar prod 0.221*** 0.221*** 0.336*** 0.336*** 0.218*** 0.218*** 0.333*** 0.333***
(0.0200) (0.0200) (0.0275) (0.0275) (0.0201) (0.0202) (0.0277) (0.0277)
ln lag n sec exp USA 0.0472*** 0.0472*** 0.0456*** 0.0456***
(0.00744) (0.00744) (0.00743) (0.00743)
gr ln real sector USA exports -0.0337** -0.0337** -0.0336** -0.0337**
(0.0153) (0.0153) (0.0153) (0.0153)
newUSA*lag1else 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.120*** 0.120*** 0.104*** 0.105*** 0.120*** 0.120***
(0.0382) (0.0382) (0.0373) (0.0373) (0.0381) (0.0381) (0.0372) (0.0372)
core50 0.723*** 0.725*** 0.728*** 0.726*** 0.723*** 0.724*** 0.728*** 0.726***
(0.0221) (0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0222) (0.0220) (0.0224) (0.0224) (0.0221)
core50*small -0.211*** -0.211*** -0.206*** -0.206*** -0.214*** -0.214*** -0.209*** -0.209***
(0.0415) (0.0415) (0.0406) (0.0406) (0.0415) (0.0415) (0.0405) (0.0405)
core50*medium -0.356*** -0.356*** -0.347*** -0.348*** -0.361*** -0.360*** -0.352*** -0.352***
(0.0405) (0.0406) (0.0398) (0.0398) (0.0404) (0.0405) (0.0397) (0.0397)
core50*large -0.590*** -0.591*** -0.577*** -0.576*** -0.593*** -0.594*** -0.581*** -0.579***
(0.0645) (0.0646) (0.0625) (0.0624) (0.0646) (0.0646) (0.0625) (0.0624)
newUSA*core50 -0.119** -0.118** -0.0772 -0.0752 -0.118** -0.118** -0.0770 -0.0752
(0.0475) (0.0485) (0.0510) (0.0507) (0.0475) (0.0485) (0.0510) (0.0506)
newUSA*core50*small 0.00702 0.0120 0.0969 0.0964 0.00789 0.0127 0.0972 0.0968
(0.0832) (0.0827) (0.0717) (0.0716) (0.0833) (0.0827) (0.0718) (0.0718)
newUSA*core50*medium -0.137 -0.126 -0.0771 -0.0772 -0.135 -0.124 -0.0754 -0.0755
(0.0962) (0.0992) (0.0960) (0.0960) (0.0960) (0.0989) (0.0957) (0.0957)
newUSA*core50*large 0.0758 0.0757 0.153 0.151 0.0728 0.0725 0.149 0.148
(0.118) (0.118) (0.119) (0.119) (0.116) (0.117) (0.118) (0.118)
core50*similar 0.240 0.328 0.211 0.298
(0.447) (0.455) (0.447) (0.455)
fta*core50 0.509 0.862 1.188 0.527 0.880 1.176
(1.781) (1.458) (1.380) (1.770) (1.451) (1.374)
ftanewUSA*core50 -0.227*** -0.227*** -0.226*** -0.226***
(0.0481) (0.0481) (0.0481) (0.0481)
newUSA*similar -0.243*** -0.243*** -0.242*** -0.242***
(0.0398) (0.0398) (0.0397) (0.0397)
fta*similar 1.598*** 1.584*** 1.581*** 1.568***
(0.457) (0.455) (0.459) (0.457)
ftanewUSA*similar -1.086 -1.072 -1.096 -1.084
(0.669) (0.668) (0.669) (0.668)
Firm Size dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 28488 28488 28488 28488 28488 28488 28488 28488
r2 o 0.106 0.106 0.111 0.111 0.107 0.107 0.112 0.113
N clust 1158 1158 1158 1158 1158 1158 1158 1158
Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters in firms.
*Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level;
***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
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Under the same logic, I re-estimated Model 3 on exit, which results are illustrated in
Table 4.8. The patterns identified for the main variables of interest are almost identical to
those in the first results. Hence, less experienced firms are more likely to stop exporting
a product to USA, but trade liberalisation prevents them from making that decision.
When looking at the results for products being a “core competence” in period t, it is
clear that such condition encourages the firm to keep on exporting that product to USA,
given the negative and significant sign for core50. This encouraging effect is shown to
be even larger for the least experienced firms, derived from the negative and significant
coefficients for the interaction with new USAi,t−1 in columns (4)-(6). Nonetheless, when
controlling for the firm size, the exit-preventing effect for both new and expert firms gets
offset the larger the firm is, proving that such effect is more relevant for the smallest ones.
Further similar results are presented in Appendix B.2.
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Table 4.8: Model 3 - Exit (core competence in t), including interactions between core50
and firm size
Dependent Variable Exit ijt
Estimation LPM
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
new USA 0.159*** 0.161*** 0.160*** 0.191*** 0.192*** 0.192***
(0.0248) (0.0249) (0.0249) (0.0175) (0.0175) (0.0175)
fta 0.243 0.242 0.304 -0.221 -0.221 -0.228
(0.263) (0.263) (0.289) (0.172) (0.172) (0.183)
fta*new USA 0.538 0.637 0.574 0.697*** 0.755*** 0.762***
(0.430) (0.453) (0.468) (0.269) (0.281) (0.289)
newUSA*lag1else 0.0101 0.0103 0.0103 -0.0840*** -0.0839*** -0.0839***
(0.0324) (0.0324) (0.0324) (0.0215) (0.0215) (0.0215)
core50 -0.657*** -0.657*** -0.660*** -0.311*** -0.310*** -0.310***
(0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0160) (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0147)
core50*small 0.228*** 0.227*** 0.225*** -0.0362* -0.0370* -0.0368*
(0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0215) (0.0207) (0.0207) (0.0207)
core50*medium 0.290*** 0.288*** 0.288*** -0.0543* -0.0551* -0.0550*
(0.0256) (0.0256) (0.0255) (0.0286) (0.0285) (0.0286)
core50*large 0.383*** 0.382*** 0.382*** -0.119** -0.120** -0.120**
(0.0340) (0.0341) (0.0341) (0.0530) (0.0530) (0.0530)
newUSA*core50 0.0316 0.0229 0.0252 -0.236*** -0.241*** -0.241***
(0.0355) (0.0354) (0.0354) (0.0289) (0.0289) (0.0290)
newUSA*core50*small -0.102*** -0.106*** -0.105*** 0.0490 0.0467 0.0465
(0.0370) (0.0370) (0.0369) (0.0370) (0.0371) (0.0371)
newUSA*core50*medium -0.147*** -0.148*** -0.148*** 0.142*** 0.142*** 0.142***
(0.0420) (0.0417) (0.0417) (0.0411) (0.0411) (0.0411)
newUSA*core50*large -0.156*** -0.156*** -0.156*** 0.342*** 0.342*** 0.342***
(0.0563) (0.0562) (0.0562) (0.0579) (0.0581) (0.0581)
fta*core50 -0.511 0.0548
(0.349) (0.281)
ftanewUSA*core50 -0.992* -0.483 -0.554 -0.609
(0.536) (0.632) (0.454) (0.530)
lag ln real ev 0.0498*** 0.0495*** 0.0498***
(0.00162) (0.00168) (0.00162)
Firm Size dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
ATPDEA and MFN dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes
N 31882 31882 31882 27434 27434 27434
r2 o 0.0418 0.0419 0.0418 0.188 0.188 0.188
N clust 2599 2599 2599 2599 2599 2599
Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters in firms.
*Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level;
***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
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I additionally developed an exercise employing the first lag of core50, displayed in
Appendix B.2, in which the outcome for the main variables of interest do not change
materially. Like in the main results, however, the effect of exporting a product that was
a “core competence” in t − 1 is interpreted in a different way, since that condition is
associated with a higher exit probability, for both new firms and incumbents in the USA
market. But if I control for the firm size, that increase in the exit likelihood gets lower
and even turns into a negative effect on exit the larger the firm is. Therefore, I can argue
that, since the smallest firms are likely to have a brief experience exporting j, the fact that
such a good is currently a core product, encourages them more to remain exporting it to
USA. For larger firms, which presumably have more experience producing a core product,
that past experience seems to be more influential for them to make the decision to stay in
the export business to USA with that product.
4.5.2 Alternative Criteria for Core Products
Throughout the research, I have been considering a product as a core competence for a
firm if its annual export sales accounted for a minimum of 50% of firm i’s total exports to
the world. Such assumption may be judged as very restrictive, leading to a limited amount
of goods treated as core. Hence, as a next experiment, I expand the definition of “core
competence” to a wider range of products, by creating the core25 and core10 dummies.
Thus, I treat product j as core if it accounts for a minimum of 25% and 10% of firm
i’s total annual sales to the rest of the world, respectively. These dummies are included
into the models on their own and interacted with new USAi,t−1 and the liberalisation
variables. Recall that in Models 2 and 3 I control for the level of the core dummies; while
for Model 1 I consider the first lag.
The main results for the experiment with the core25 and core10 dummy can be found
at Appendices B.3 and B.4, respectively. Overall, the findings I obtained from the main
exercise with the core50 variables hold for these alternative definitions of core competence
products; both in terms of sign and significance. In terms of the value of the estimates,
no major changes are perceived either; perhaps a slight reduction in the absolute value of
some estimates when changing the core competence definition from 50% to 25%; and a
subsequent tiny rise of values when moving from 25% to 10%.
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4.5.3 Annual Transactions Greater than US$ 1,000
Diverse studies working with firm-level exports data make use of a lower bound for annual
exports, in order to prevent any distortions or biases probably caused by very small export
transactions, such as sample deliveries. For this research, given the massive presence of
annual exports per firm/product pair lower than US$ 1,000, I employ this value as a lower
bound, so as to compare the subsequent results with the original regressions. By using
that threshold, Model 1’s dataset drops by 33.6%; 43.7% for Model 2 on entry; and 46.5%
for Model 3 on exit.
As in previous robustness checks, the main conclusions on the effects of being a new
exporter, trade liberalisation, and core competence products are not affected, both in
terms of signs and significance of the estimates.
Regarding the values of coefficients, some patterns can be mentioned. In Model 1, the
effect of being a one-year experienced firm in the US market on export growth tends to
be greater, as well as the effect of exporting a product that was not a core competence
in t − 1. In Model 2 on entry, new USAi,t−1 gets lower values; the difference in the
effect of trade liberalisation between new and expert firms (comparing values of ftajt and
fta ∗ new USAijt) turns larger in favour of the incumbents; and the effect of product j
being a core one gets slightly larger. Finally, for Model 3, the positive relation between
being a newcomer and the exit likelihood gets smaller. Also, the exit-preventing role of
trade liberalisation for less expert firms loses strength; while the effect of core competence
products on exit prevention gets larger, especially for more consolidated firms. The details
of these results can be found in Appendix B.5.
4.6 Conclusions
In Chapter 3, I developed a theoretical approach pursuing to illustrate the firms’ export
strategy in a particular destination, with uncertain export profitabilities, assumed to be
correlated across products and over time. Depending on their known costs and expected
profits, a firm may decide to export products sequentially over time, simultaneously, or
not to enter at all to that destination.
From that framework, three predictions were inferred regarding the export dynamics
of new exporters (one-year experience in a destination) in terms of their growth in the
intensive margin, extensive margin and their exit probability from an export business,
77
considering the role of trade liberalisation and the difference between “non-core” and
“core competence” products.
These predictions are empirically tested in this chapter with a very rich dataset of
Peruvian exports to the USA market, at the firm-product level, from 2006 to 2013. Both
theoretical and empirical approaches consider the issue of trade liberalisation and the
difference in dynamics across products, depending on the “core competence” condition of
a product for a firm. This research is one of the first attempts to measure the effects of
the Free Trade Agreement signed by Peru and the United States on the performance of
Peruvian exporters.
Overall, the results from my empirical tests give support to the predictions derived
from the theory. There is a positive association, conditional on survival, between the
“new exporter” condition of a firm in the USA market, compared to more consolidated
ones, and the export growth for the first products it sells to that destination (intensive
margin). A boost is also established at the extensive margin, since newcomers to the USA
are more likely to export a new product to that market in the future than the incumbent
firms. Nevertheless, those newcomers are more likely to stop exporting a product there
than the experts.
From my outcomes, trade liberalisation, expressed as the tariff elimination by USA
on Peruvian products via the Free Trade Agreement in 2009, does not seem to mean an
additional incentive to firms, especially the new entrants, to grow at the intensive margin.
It does represent a boost for more experienced firms to export new products to USA
(extensive margin) compared to newcomers, just like the theoretical model entails. But
the results also confirm that trade liberalisation prevents the least expert Peruvian firms
from exiting the export business of a particular product to USA.
There are differences in the effect of being a new exporter across products. For the
intensive margin, the export growth of a new firm selling to USA is larger for non-core
competence products –not so well-performing goods–, matching the theory’s implications.
Also backing the theoretical predictions, a Peruvian newcomer to USA is more likely to
begin exporting a relatively good product in terms of sales –a core-competence product–,
and even more likely if that product is similar to others previously exported. Besides, if
the product is a core-competence one, that new firm is less likely to stop exporting it.
Moreover, according to my robustness checks, all these mentioned effects are larger for the
smallest firms, measured in terms of mean annual exports. Nonetheless, it is necessary
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to point out that the core-competence effects on the extensive margin tend to be more
important for incumbents than for new exporters.
The analysis implemented is limited by the lack of data, such as firm-specific charac-
teristics to account for heterogeneity or product-specific information on production costs.
There are surely other factors that affect firms’ decision to enter or exit the export
business in the USA market, from both the supply and demand side. One of those is the
economic crisis occurred in 2009, the same year the USA-Peru FTA came into force. I
disentangle the effects of liberalisation from the crisis by considering the tariff reduction
per product. The lack of significance of trade liberalisation in the extensive margin model
might be due to other factors not considered in firms’ decision-making process, such as
the anticipation of the 2009 USA-Peru FTA. This issue can be accounted for in further
stages, as well as the fact that some industries are more credit constrained than others,
affecting their performance in the export market.
Additional experiments to complement the findings of this research can be done, like
the reformulation of the “new exporter” criterion. It would be interesting to consider two,
three-year or even six-month experienced exporters as new to see how the initial results
change.
Future research on the effect of trade liberalisation by USA on Peruvian export dy-
namics may include the geographical spread of trade at the firm level, inspired by a recent
working paper by Borchert (2009a). That is, does the trade liberalisation process between
Peru and the United States boost Peruvian exporters’ decision to enter third markets and
increase their sales to those markets? The effects of this FTA and the previous unilateral
liberalisation by USA under the ATPDEA regime on the duration (survival) of Peruvian
firms’ trade relations with that country may also be an interesting issue of further re-
search.
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5 Experimentation Speed Across Products: Evidence from
Peru in the USA Market
5.1 Introduction
Recent literature on firm export dynamics has found that firms surviving in the export
activity tend to experiment sequentially in the foreign market; but how fast do they
experiment in that activity? And what factors determine that experimentation speed?
Albornoz et al. (2012) is one of the first studies on export sequential strategy, finding
that new Argentinean exporters, despite having a higher probability of exiting the ex-
port business, grow more at the intensive and extensive margin, conditional on survival,
compared to more established exporters. That is, surviving new exporters undertake a
sequential exporting process.
Those described dynamics occur across destinations, leaving as a pending concern
how dynamics in export decisions by firms work within one destination, across products.
Moreover, the way trade liberalisation may affect those decisions remains insufficiently
addressed.
Works like Albornoz et al. (2012) obtain that, by realising their export profitability in
one market, firms may sequentially decide to sell to further destinations in the next period.
However, that is not a real time estimation, either across markets and products within one
destination. How fast do firms introduce a new product to a particular market? What
factors determine the acceleration or delay of that decision? Does trade liberalisation play
a role in this process?
Other studies on firm export dynamics focus on firms’ probability to survive and/or
exit the export activity. Roberts and Tybout (1997) and Eaton et al. (2008) describe the
export entry and exit decision processes for Colombian firms. In the Peruvian context,
Freund and Pierola (2010) theoretically explains the export entry determinants in terms
of costs; while Malca and Rubio (2012) addresses the role of tenure as a driver of firms’
export survival.
In that same line, other researches measure the duration of firms’ permanence in the
export activity and its determinants, by applying conventional methods like the Kaplam-
Meier survival estimator or the Cox proportional hazard model. Indeed, Besedesˇ and
Prusa (2006b) use these approaches to explore the role of product differentiation in the
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duration of USA import relationships. Volpe Martincus and Carballo (2008), with the
same techniques, analyse the effect of product and geographical diversification, along with
firm size, on the survival likelihood of Peruvian firms in the export business.
Even in the literature on multi-product firms, the use of duration models is practic-
ally limited to examining the survival of products in a firm’s export portfolio. To my
knowledge, no previous works on firm export dynamics have applied those methods under
a more positive focus. One in which the event of entering into the export activity, i.e.
a success, is analysed. One example is the decision to introduce a new product into a
particular destination.
There is also a growing literature on experimentation in different areas, whereby the
decision to undertake one particular action may be delayed, by gradually updating agents’
beliefs on the payoff from that action. The use of that approach to illustrate firms’ export
strategies is quite recent, either by the role of learning from neighbour firms, like Fernandes
and Tang (2014), or firms’ previous experience in other markets, like Akhmetova and
Mitaritonna (2012) and Nguyen (2012). Hence, firms’ decision to introduce a new product
to a market of interest by updating their beliefs on the demand for that product, given
their previous experiences with other goods in that destination, is a subject of potential
research under that approach.
Given the described gaps, this chapter contributes to the literature by developing a
theoretical model, empirically tested afterwards, explaining how quickly firms sequentially
export products to a particular destination, incorporating the role of trade liberalisation
and the firms’ experience with other products in the market of interest. That is, what is
the experimentation speed of firms across products in a market? In my approach, such
speed is measured by the number of shipments of product A to market d by firm i required
before deciding to introduce product B to that market. Hence, the fewer shipments of
A prior to introducing B, the quicker the experimentation will be. The role of trade
liberalisation in this scheme is accounted for as the tariff elimination by the market of
interest on products from the country of origin.
I test the prediction from my theoretical model by a survival analysis, using a very rich
dataset of Peruvian firms that exported to the United States between 2006 and 2013. I
exploit the nature of my dataset, at the transaction level with actual dates, by constructing
observations representing the event in which a Peruvian firm introduces one or many new
products to the USA market, henceforth called an experimentation round. The Peru-USA
81
case is an appropriate one for this research, since the two countries signed a Free Trade
Agreement in 2009, and long discussions arose on the new opportunities and potential
threats to the Peruvian manufacturing industry, as it was mentioned in Section 4.2. Yet,
little is known on the effects of this trade liberalisation process on the performance of
Peruvian firms in that market.
By this analysis, not only do I measure the experimentation speed of Peruvian firms
across products in the USA market. I also investigate whether the tariff elimination by
USA on Peruvian products under the USA-Peru FTA plays an accelerating role in firms’
decision to introduce a new product to that destination. This role can be assessed by
comparing (1) firms founded before and after the FTA enactment; (2) experimentation
rounds occurred before and after such enactment; (3) the original tariffs levied on the
products introduced; or (4) the treatment given to the products before the FTA (whether
the products enjoyed a unilateral USA trade preference). Additionally, I examine whether
a firm’s prior experience with other products in USA, measured as the mean export ship-
ments of “old” products, exerts an accelerating effect on the decision to experiment with
a new product.
My empirical approach embraces a Kaplan-Meier survival estimator, as well as a Cox
proportional hazard model, where my time variable is the number of days before the
firm’s experimentation round i in USA, counting from the day round i − 1 occurred, or
firm’s foundation. I also run OLS and panel data regressions at the experimentation
round level, where my dependent variable is the number of shipments of product A before
the introduction of product B to USA by a firm. Overall, the results find that trade
liberalisation is associated with an acceleration of the introduction of new products into
that market. Such acceleration tends to be larger for products with higher pre-FTA
tariffs that were not included in pre-FTA unilateral trade preferences by USA, such as the
ATPDEA regime or the MFN zero tariff. Moreover, in the case of firms founded before the
FTA enactment, trade liberalisation tends to facilitate the introduction of new products
after having sent smaller values of previous products.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 presents the theor-
etical model. Section 5.3 describes the data and offers a descriptive analysis of Peruvian
firms exporting to the USA market, focusing on their experimentation rounds. Section
5.4 presents the Kaplan-Meier survival analysis. Section 5.5 shows the results from my
econometric approach. Section 5.6 concludes.
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5.2 The Model
The basics of my theoretical model are inspired from a previous study by Albornoz et al.
(2012) on sequential exporting across markets.
A producer from country o evaluates whether to export or not to country d, with a
product portfolio consisting of products A and B, in a scenario where the firm is ex ante
uncertain about its export profitability in that market. If the firm decides to enter d, it will
have to pay a sunk entry cost Fd per product, assumed to the identical across products,
meant to reflect distribution channels, marketing strategy and exporting procedures, which
might be specific to each kind of product. I assume other common entry costs across
products within a market, such as information on institutional and policy characteristics
of the foreign country, to be minimal and/or easily accessible to firms.
When exporting products A and B to country d, firms must pay a product-specific
unit trade cost (tariff levied by d) τA and τB.36 Variable costs per product comprise a
unit export cost cx and a firm-specific unit production cost, c
A
p and c
B
p . While production
costs are known to the firm, unit export costs are unknown.
The demand side, on the other hand, is represented by the following function:
qj(pj) = dj − pj , (5.1)
where qj denotes the quantity of product A or B exported; pj is the price of that product;
and dj is an unknown demand component. Hence, uncertainty can be found in both
the supply and demand sides. The calculation of firms’ export profitability for product
j = {A,B}, denoted as µj , will then consider the unknown demand component and the
unknown unit export cost, as well as the known unit production cost:
µj ≡ dj − cx − cjp. (5.2)
The unknown components of that export profitability of product j in destination d,
dj− cx, can be summarised by the term µNj . Hence, to determine the optimal quantity of
product j exported to d at any time, firms maximise their profits –revenues minus costs–,
36I make the assumption that home firm pays the tariff, since I do not have information on importers.
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expressed by:
pij = (µNj − cjp − τ j − qj)qj . (5.3)
Consider an initial scenario where τA + cAp ≤ τB + cBp , meaning that it is cheaper for
the firm to produce and export product A. As this model focuses on a sequential entry
strategy in market d, I present the case in which the firm first introduces the cheapest
product A, subsequently selling the more costly product B.
When deciding to introduce product A to d, the firm maximises profits from Equation
5.3, considering its expected export profitability from selling A, EµNA. If such expected
profitability is greater than the known costs τA + cAp , then the optimal export value for
product A is:
qˆA =

EµNA − cAp − τA
2
if EµNA > τA + cAp ;
ε otherwise.
(5.4)
It must be pointed out, however, that even if the firm’s initial expectations on the
export profitability from product A are pessimistic (EµNA ≤ τA+ cAp ), it may be tempted
to sell an arbitrarily small value ε of product A to d, so as to have a preliminary view of
demand in that market. Returning to the optimistic case, qˆA is plugged into Equation 5.3
to obtain the maximised profits from introducing A to d:
pˆiA =
(
EµNA − cAp − τA
2
)2
. (5.5)
The process described from Equation 5.3 to 5.5 also applies for the introduction of
product B; but the gross maximised profits must be greater than the sunk entry cost
Fd, for the firm to decide to send a first shipment of B to d. Hence, the firm introduces
product B if:
(
EµNB − cBp − τB
2
)2
≥ Fd. (5.6)
Then, Equation 5.6 can be rearranged to obtain a minimum value required for EµNB
to decide to export B:
EµNB ≥ 2F 1/2d + τB + cBp . (5.7)
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One important assumption in this scheme is that export profitabilities are imperfectly
correlated across products. Then, assuming that those profitabilities per product followed
a bivariate normal distribution, with parameters (EµNA, EµNB, σA, σB, ρ), I obtain a
function for the expected export profitability for B, given the realisation of A:
E(µNB | µNA) = EµNB + (µNA − EµNA)ρσ
A
σB
. (5.8)
This outcome implies that E(µNB | µNA) ≥ 2F 1/2d + τB + cBp for the firm to decide to
export B. From Equation 5.8, I could find a cutoff value of µNA above which the sequential
exporting strategy would be undertaken.
However, under the scheme outlined so far, the firm only needs one shipment of product
A to automatically realise the export profitability of that product, and that single piece
of information is sufficient to decide whether to export B or not in the next period.
It is pertinent then to consider the more realistic assumption that the firm requires
further shipments to be more certain about the demand of product A in market d. That
will not only provide a better view of the demand for A; but will also give a tool to update
the firm’s expected export profitability of product B, leading to a better backed export
decision. Furthermore, to simplify the model, I propose to take the uncertain export
profitability as solely a function of the unknown demand of product j from destination d;
namely, the intercept of Equations 5.1 and 5.2, dj , which henceforth is denoted as xj .
The maths and notation presented hereafter are inspired from Nguyen (2012), on
delays in the export decision across destinations. Every shipment of product A provides
one piece of information on the demand of that good, meaning that the firm is gradually
realising the actual demand of A in market d. However, with those shipments, the firm
is also updating its expected demand of product B. I propose that each shipment of A
produces one perceived demand xAi . All these perceived demands may be gathered in
one random vector xA ≡ [xA1 , . . . , xAj , . . . , xAJ ], where J is an arbitrarily large number of
possible shipments.
I assume that demands for A and B in market d (xA and xB) follow a joint bivariate
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distribution. If the firm has not entered d yet, the moments of those demands collapse to:
E[xA] = E[xB] = 0. (5.9a)
V ar[xA] = V ar[xB] = σ20 > 0. (5.9b)
Cov(xA, xB)
σ20
= ρ→ 0 < ρ < 1. (5.9c)
While the firm begins exporting the less costly product A, it will be gradually updating
its realised demand by calculating the mean demand term of that product, considering
IA⊂J , the number of shipments so far:
xA =
Σi∈IAx
A
i
IA
. (5.10)
However, when it comes to decide to export product B to market d, the expected
value and variance of the demand for that product are updated in function of the number
of shipments of A and the correlation coefficient. These values are obtained from the
following functions:37
E[xB | IA] = µBIA =
(
Σi∈IAx
A
i
IA
)(
IAρ
IAρ+ (1− ρ)
)
. (5.11a)
V ar[xB | IA] = σ2IA = σ20
(
1− IAρ
2
IAρ+ (1− ρ)
)
. (5.11b)
Equations 5.11a and 5.11b imply a role for the number of shipments IA. The more the
firm has experimented with product A, the more its expected demand for B approaches
to the sample mean of perceived demand for A. In other words, the firm is trusting more
its own experience in market d with product A. Furthermore, the larger IA, the lower
the variance of B’s demand σ2IA . Hence, the firm is able to predict the demand x
B more
precisely.
Let me go through the implications from extreme cases. When IA = 0, meaning that
firm i has not experimented yet with product A in market d, the expected demand of
both A and B converge to zero, as in Equation 5.9a. When, instead, IA tends to its
maximum value J , the second term in brackets in the right hand side of Equation 5.11a
37See Appendix C.1 for the proof for these functions.
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will converge to unity. Hence, as mentioned above, the firm will practically rely solely on
its own experience in market d with product A to decide on B.
Similar implications can be inferred for the correlation coefficient of products A and
B. When ρ = 0, then µBIA will converge to zero, since experimenting with A does not
provide any information on the demand of B in destination d. Conversely, when ρ = 1, its
maximum value, then the second term in brackets from Equation 5.11a will converge to
unity, meaning that firm i’s own experience with product A provides full information to
decide on product B in market d. Moreover, ρ = 1 makes σ2IA converge to zero, confirming
the earlier statement.
There is an interesting implication when ρ lies between zero and unity, accounting
for imperfect correlation of export profitabilities across products A and B. The second
term in brackets of Equation 5.11a becomes lower than unity, which in turn represents a
sort of penalty against the sample mean of the perceived demand of A –the first term in
brackets–. In other words, the expected demand of B given the experience with A gets
diminished by that second term, implying that what firm i has perceived so far from A
is not sufficient to opt to introduce B into market d, and more information from A is
required, translated into more shipments of A.
With the criteria presented above, I can then continuously compare the expected value
of the demand for product B, given the updated realisations of the demand for A, with
the known costs of B. If that updated expected demand for B equalises or exceeds those
costs, then the firm will be prompted to make a first shipment of B to market d. Thus,
if I replace µNB in Equation 5.7 with the function for µBIA in Equation 5.11a, that yields
the following:
(
Σi∈IAx
A
i
IA
)(
IAρ
IAρ+ (1− ρ)
)
≥ 2F 1/2d + τB + cBp . (5.12)
By rearranging Equation 5.12 and denoting the right hand side of that function as
TCB –total known costs of product B–, I can obtain a cutoff value for the number of
shipments of product A. Taking the first term in brackets of Equation 5.12, the sample
mean of the perceived demand of A, as xA, I obtain the following condition:
I∗A ≥
(1− ρ)TCB
ρ(xA − TCB)
. (5.13)
Equation 5.13 then displays a minimum number of shipments of product A required by
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firm i to decide to send one first shipment of product B to market d. From this condition,
I can infer that cutoff value of IA becomes lower if any of the total known costs of B, such
as the unit trade cost τB, falls or is eliminated. Namely, when tariffs are eliminated under
a trade liberalisation process, the number of shipments of A required to make a decision
on B is reduced; or, the length of the experimentation time with product A in market d
prior to the first shipment of B becomes shorter. Similarly, a higher ρ, the more correlated
the demands of A and B are, the lower the cutoff value of IA will be, since now the firm
will require less information from A, which will be sufficient to make a decision on B.
These findings can be summarised in one single proposition, empirically tested after-
wards.
Proposition 1:There is a cutoff value for IA, inversely related to ρ, the correlation
between the demands of products A and B, as well as xA, the sample mean of the perceived
demand of product A. Such cutoff is also directly related to Fd, the sunk entry cost per
product, τB, the unit trade cost of product B, and cBp , the firm-specific unit production
cost of B.
Let me explore this proposition more deeply by calculating the derivative of the cutoff
number of shipments of product A with respect to the main variables of interest. That
leads to the following results:
∂I∗A
∂τB
=
1
[(1− ρ)(2F 1/2d + τB + cBp )][ρ(xA − 2F 1/2d − τB − cBp )]
> 0. (5.14a)
∂I∗A
∂xA
=
−1
(1− ρ)(2F 1/2d + τB + cBp )(xA − 2F 1/2d − τB − cBp )
< 0. (5.14b)
∂I∗A
∂ρ
=
−xA
[(1− ρ)(2F 1/2d + τB + cBp )][ρ(xA − 2F 1/2d − τB − cBp )]
< 0. (5.14c)
It can be observed that the relation between the variables of interest and I∗A clearly
depends on the initial values of those variables, although the sign of that effect remains
unchanged.38 Let me first focus on xA, the sample mean of the perceived demand of
A. From Equations 5.14a and 5.14b, the size of the slope of I∗A is lower in absolute
value for larger mean perceived demands of A; whereas Equation 5.14c shows a more
negative relation for larger demand perceptions of A. For the correlation coefficient and
38The signs of the effects on I∗A are obtained under the assumption that xA > 2F
1/2
d +τ
B+cBp . Otherwise,
the signs change. However, in a case where xA < 2F
1/2
d + τ
B + cBp , it makes no sense to export B.
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known costs, such as τB, the analysis is more complicated. Indeed, the size of the three
derivatives is larger for extreme high and low values of those variables, meaning that the
slopes are not linear. These dynamics described should be taken into account when it
comes to testing Proposition 1 and interpreting the results.
Given the data availability, I may test the effect of trade liberalisation, as a tariff
elimination by country d on most products, on the firm’s number of shipments of old
products prior to the first shipments of a new product to market d. The number of
shipments may also be proxied by the length of the time spell between the first shipment
of product A and the equivalent of product B. The data also allows me to measure the
impact of the mean export value of product A before the first shipment of B, as a proxy
for the perceived demand of A in market d.
Before moving on to the empirical testing, it is pertinent to point out that the outcome
of my theoretical model, particularly the role of the number of shipments prior to the
introduction of a new product, is somehow related to a recent theoretical approach by
Albornoz et al. (2016). That research highlights the role of export experience on survival
in the export market and its relation with the degree of sunk and fixed costs borne by
a firm in each destination attended. The authors find that export experience raises the
survival probability of a firm in a destination upon entry, by reducing the fixed costs
relative to the sunk entry costs.
Bringing that rationale to my model across products within one market, if I allow
my sunk entry cost per product Fd to vary with experience with previous products –
represented by the number of shipments of product A–, I may work on the relation from
Equation 5.12 and find a function for Fd, negatively related to IA. Such function may be
treated as a cutoff value of the entry cost, below which the introduction of product B is
profitable. Thus, the more the firm ships of product A to market d, the more experience
the firm accumulates from that destination, reducing the entry costs for product B, and
facilitating experimentation with that product. This is an issue for potential further
research in future studies on the matter.
Let me also relate my theory with another previous work by Araujo et al. (2016). In
a model where producers from a country aim to build a trade relationship with a reliable
distributor from the destination country to export to that market in an environment with
incomplete information, these authors predict that producers selling to countries with
good contracting institutions, or similar to other markets previously served, start with
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higher volumes. Additionally, producers are more likely to keep serving those markets in
the future, although this latter effect may vanish.
It is true that my model does not investigate on the volume with which a firm starts
selling product B in market d. But the mean perceived demand from product A may be
taken as an equivalent of firm’s previous experience. Hence, the more experience accumu-
lated in market d prompts the firm to keep on experimenting in that market by introducing
a new product, strengthening the trade relation built and making it more durable over
time. Moreover, a tariff elimination can be considered a proxy for an improvement in the
contracting institutions of a country, since it contributes to facilitate the export activity.
Hence, it makes sense to argue that better institutions accelerates the introduction of
product B in d after experimenting with product A, also consolidating the trade relation.
5.3 Data and Summary Statistics
5.3.1 The Data
5.3.1.1 Data Processing
For the research in this chapter, I departed from the same Peruvian export transaction-
level data described in chapter 4, covering the same eight manufacturing sectors, as well
as the USA tariff information at the 8-digit level and Peruvian firms’ dates of foundation
and closure.
For the purposes of this chapter, however, the data processing implemented was on a
daily basis and, to some extent, on a monthly basis as well. Hence, the first descriptive
variables, such as exports per firm and destination, number of products and destinations
and categorical variables per market, were constructed on those bases.
As I did in the previous chapter, I initially kept in my dataset the information from
1998 to 2013; but for the subsequent survival analysis and econometrics I reduced the time
period to 2006-2013, considering only firms starting their business within that lapse.
My main interest in this research is the event of a firm introducing one or more new
8-digit tariff lines into a particular market, which henceforth is called an experimentation
round. In that sense, I processed my firm-daily data in such a way to capture those dates
in which the firm exports for the first time one or more products to USA, as well as the
time spell between experimentation rounds by a firm. The intended outcome is a dataset
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in which each observation represents an experimentation round.
One basic feature of my theoretical approach is the number of shipments prior to the
introduction of a new product by a firm. For such reason, from my large combined daily
dataset I was able to capture the number of days a Peruvian firm has shipped one or
more products both to USA and all other destinations. Here, I am assuming that one
shipment is equivalent to one product/destination/day, given the initial data collapsed
at the daily level, i.e. shipments are summed to a daily basis. This process has also
allowed me to calculate the mean value of those shipments before a new experimentation
round, featured in my theoretical model. It is shown afterwards that I utilise both the
mean exports to USA and to all destinations. It is pertinent to point out that for firms’
first experimentation round in the USA market, the shipments and mean export values
reported are only those to other destinations, and the time spell is measured from firms’
date of establishment.
It was particularly important for the dataset to capture, apart from the dates each
experimentation round took place, the sequential order of these rounds. Hence, I allocated
a number to each round per firm according to its order, so as to undertake further separate
analyses across firms, in terms of their first experimentation round, as well as their second
and subsequent introduction of new products to USA.
Another issue to take into account is that on a day an experimentation round occurs, a
firm may export both new products and other goods introduced earlier. Then, by this data
processing I managed to distinguish for each observation between those types of products.
Such distinction is very important for the next stage: the incorporation of the pre-FTA
USA tariff and and trade preference information.
At that stage, from the large combined dataset, I calculated for every day on which an
experimentation round takes place a weighted average pre-FTA tariff, in which the weight
is the US $ export value of each product. I obtained two weighted averages: one taking
all products sold on a day, and another one considering only the new products introduced,
which is more relevant for my analysis. Under the same rationale, I computed another
indicator controlling for the pre−FTA unilateral trade preferential treatment by USA to
some Peruvian products, i.e. the ATPDEA and zero-MFN tariff regimes. This measure
informs how much of the export value of a Peruvian firm in an experimentation round
to USA is accounted for by products affected by either of the mentioned regimes. Again,
I got this measure for all products sold and another one for only the new products, my
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attention being focused on the latter.
For the effects of the subsequent survival analysis and econometric approach, I con-
struct several categorical variables to control for some relevant distinctions. For instance,
I create a dummy to classify firms as founded after the enactment of the USA-Peru Free
Trade Agreement (post − FTA firms); another one capturing experimentation rounds
comprising the introduction of more than one product (the many dummy); a variable
for firms’ experience in other markets prior to a new experimentation round in USA, de-
noted as elsewhere; and categorical variables for the sector the products exported in an
experimentation round belong to.39
One last important issue to mention is that, since my empirical approach comprises a
survival analysis and duration econometric models, I had to be able to control for right-
censoring at the firm level. In other words, I had to consider those firms which never
exported to USA within my sample, as well as those which, after experimenting in that
market, no longer do it until the end of 2013 or simply close down. I control for this feature
by adding extra observations into the experimentation round dataset. For firms that never
exported to USA, I make use of a 3-year cutoff, whereby, after 3 years of existence, the
firm is dropped from my sample. Hence, for an observation of a firm that never entered
the USA market, the time spell considered ranges from its foundation date to either its
closing date or its last shipment to any other destination, within that 3-year established
period. For firms that no longer experiment in USA after their last round, I add an extra
observation where the time spell goes from the date of their last experimentation round
to either their closing date or their last shipment to any other market.
All these steps led to the final experimentation round dataset, comprising a total of
33,254 observations in USA by Peruvian firms starting their experience in that market
between 1998 and 2013. For the econometric approach and descriptive analysis in this
chapter, the sample is restricted to firms starting to export to USA from 2006, leading to
15,338 observations.
This resulting daily dataset of new exports consists of a total of 2,426 firms that sold
to USA, also including those firms that never exported to USA up to three years since
founded, raising the number to 7,806 firms. The sample embraces both firms starting to
export to USA with one single products and those starting with more than one good.
39For the construction of the elsewhere dummy, I made use of the collapsed monthly data on firms’
exports to other destinations.
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5.3.2 Summary Statistics
5.3.2.1 Firms and Rounds of New Exports
Table 5.1 displays the 7,806 firms considered, according to their year of foundation,
regardless of whether they ever exported or not to USA. In some statistics, I distinguish
between firms starting before (pre − FTA firms) and from 2009 (post − FTA firms),
intending to identify a potential influence of the USA-Peru FTA on firms’ experimentation
decisions. Hence, I end up with approximately 60% of firms that are post− FTA.
Table 5.1: Peru-USA - Exporters per Starting Year 2006-2013
Year Freq. Percent Cum.
2006 1009 12.93 12.93
2007 992 12.71 25.63
2008 1052 13.48 39.11
2009 1149 14.72 53.83
2010 1044 13.37 67.2
2011 1055 13.52 80.72
2012 973 12.46 93.18
2013 532 6.82 100
Total 7806 100
Source: COMEXPERU´ - SUNAT
Table 5.2 groups the experimentation rounds according to the sector product j belongs
to. Agriculture and Textile and Apparel are those accounting for the largest amount of
firm export transactions involving new products –experimentation rounds–. Hence, for
further analyses I gather the six remaining sectors into the group “OTHERS”. The upper
part considers only the first experimentation round by each firm that ever exported to
USA; whereas the lower part includes all rounds registered, leading to a total of 7,532
experimentation rounds by those 2,426 firms. 40
40Products sold in one round may belong to more than one sector. However, the raw daily data shows
that products from secondary sectors are mostly sold at minimum unit and transaction values compared
to firms’ core sectors. Also, the grouping made, which considers exports from six sectors into one category,
helps control for this issue, assuming that an experimentation round consists of products from only one of
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Table 5.2: Peru-USA - Exporters per Sector 2006-2013
Sector (first
exports)
Freq. Percent Cum.
Agriculture 792 32.65 32.65
Textile-Apparel 789 32.52 65.17
Others 845 34.83 100
Total 2426 100
Sector (all
new exports)
Freq. Percent Cum.
Agriculture 1782 23.66 23.66
Textile-Apparel 3624 48.11 71.77
Others 2126 28.23 100
Total 7532 100
Source: COMEXPERU´ - SUNAT
Although the focus is the USA market, it is also relevant to take into account firms’
experience in other destinations. Nevertheless, the daily basis and the nature of my
dataset make it more difficult to control for that experience. As an approximation, I
constructed the dummy elsewhere, taking value 1 if, between the firm’s experimentation
round i − 1 and i in USA, that firm exported to any other destination. In Table 5.3 I
distinguish the new export rounds according to that criterion, and it is evident from first
experimentation rounds in USA that most Peruvian firms have previous experience in
other markets. However, as firms subsequently experiment with more products in USA, it
seems they become more focused in that destination, as results for all new exports show.
these three groups.
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Table 5.3: Peru-USA - Exporters to USA Only vs. Elsewhere 2006-2013
Elsewhere
(first exports)
Freq. Percent Cum.
No 298 12.28 12.28
Yes 2128 87.72 100
Total 2426 100
Elsewhere (all
new exports)
Freq. Percent Cum.
No 3534 46.92 46.92
Yes 3998 53.08 100
Total 7532 100
Source: COMEXPERU´ - SUNAT
5.3.2.2 Number of Products Exported
The following tables are concentrated on the number of 8-digit tariff lines exported by
a Peruvian firm to USA. Table 5.4 groups firms according to the maximum number of new
products introduced by firms in one single experimentation round. The figures show that
most firms in the sample (55.15%) experiment with only one new product, followed by a
14.88% of firms exporting up to two new products in a round.
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Table 5.4: Peru-USA - Maximum Number of New Products
Introduced by a Firm to USA on Day t 2006-2013
N◦ Freq. Percent Cum.
1 1338 55.15 55.15
2 361 14.88 70.03
3 187 7.71 77.74
4 138 5.69 83.43
5 93 3.83 87.26
6 74 3.05 90.31
7 60 2.47 92.79
8 32 1.32 94.11
9 33 1.36 95.47
10 22 0.91 96.37
11 - 20 65 2.65 99.02
21 - 94 23 0.92 100
Total 2426 100
Source: COMEXPERU´ - SUNAT
It is equally striking to find that, throughout the 2006-2013 period, slightly more than
40% of firms have only exported one product to USA in total, as Table 5.5 states. Indeed,
more than a half of the 2,426 firms that exported to USA during that period, have only
introduced up to two products into that market.
To have a clearer view of firms’ performance in terms of product experimentation in
USA, in Table 5.6 I take all the 7,532 experimentation rounds counted to see how many
products these rounds comprise. As expected from the previous numbers, over 64% of
these rounds are composed by only one new product.
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Table 5.5: Peru-USA - Total Number of New Products
Introduced per Firm to USA 2006-2013
N◦ Freq. Percent Cum.
1 980 40.40 40.40
2 331 13.64 54.04
3 200 8.24 62.28
4 122 5.03 67.31
5 98 4.04 71.35
6 83 3.42 74.77
7 69 2.84 77.62
8 56 2.31 79.93
9 50 2.06 81.99
10 46 1.9 83.88
11 - 20 223 9.2 93.08
21 - 30 89 3.67 95.88
31 - 60 61 2.47 99.26
61 - 256 18 0.72 100
Total 2426 100
Source: COMEXPERU´ - SUNAT
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Table 5.6: Peru-USA - Number of New Products
Introduced to USA per Experimentation Round
2006-2013
N◦ Freq. Percent Cum.
1 4866 64.60 64.60
2 1210 16.06 80.67
3 548 7.28 87.94
4 313 4.16 92.1
5 168 2.23 94.33
6 126 1.67 96.00
7 82 1.09 97.09
8 45 0.60 97.69
9 44 0.58 98.27
10 25 0.33 98.61
11 - 20 80 1.06 99.67
21 - 94 25 0.31 100
Total 7532 100
Source: COMEXPERU´ - SUNAT
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5.3.2.3 Experimentation Rounds per Firm
In the next stage of my descriptive analysis, I am interested in knowing how many
rounds of new exports each firm has done to USA in the time period of study. Additionally,
how many firms no longer introduce any new products after a particular round of new
exports. That exercise is done in Table 5.7, initially for all firms in the sample.
Table 5.7: Peru-USA - Number of Experimentation Rounds by Firm i to USA
All Firms 2006-2013
N◦ Rounds Experimenting
Firms
%
Non-Exp.
Firms
%
1 2426 100.00% 0 0.00%
2 1118 46.08% 1308 53.92%
3 720 29.68% 1706 70.32%
4 533 21.97% 1893 78.03%
5 415 17.11% 2011 82.89%
6 335 13.81% 2091 86.19%
7 280 11.54% 2146 88.46%
8 223 9.19% 2203 90.81%
9 188 7.75% 2238 92.25%
10 160 6.60% 2266 93.40%
11 134 5.52% 2292 94.48%
12 112 4.62% 2314 95.38%
13 105 4.33% 2321 95.67%
14 85 3.50% 2341 96.50%
15 74 3.05% 2352 96.95%
16 65 2.68% 2361 97.32%
17 55 2.27% 2371 97.73%
18 50 2.06% 2376 97.94%
19 44 1.81% 2382 98.19%
20 37 1.53% 2389 98.47%
21 32 1.32% 2394 98.68%
22 28 1.15% 2398 98.85%
23 24 0.99% 2402 99.01%
24 22 0.91% 2404 99.09%
26 20 0.82% 2406 99.18%
27 19 0.78% 2407 99.22%
28 18 0.74% 2408 99.26%
30 16 0.66% 2410 99.34%
32 13 0.54% 2413 99.46%
33 11 0.45% 2415 99.55%
36 9 0.37% 2417 99.63%
38 7 0.29% 2419 99.71%
39 6 0.25% 2420 99.75%
43 4 0.16% 2422 99.84%
55 3 0.12% 2423 99.88%
65 2 0.08% 2424 99.92%
67 1 0.04% 2425 99.96%
Source: COMEXPERU´ - SUNAT
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The way to read these results is as follows: from the 2,426 firms that exported one first
set of new products to USA, 1,118 firms (46.08%) move one step forward, undertaking a
second experimentation round; while the other 1,308 (53.92%) firms never experimented
with another new product again. Hence, for the effects of the survival analysis made
afterwards, those 1,308 firms are considered as right censored. In a similar way, the next
rows can be interpreted, so that only one firm managed to have up to 67 experimentation
rounds; leaving the other 2,425 firms as right censored.
For the sake of that survival analysis, it is also necessary to establish differences in
performance between pre−FTA and post−FTA firms. Hence, under the same previous
rationale, Table 5.8 presents the equivalent exercise separately for both types of firms. It
can be seen that the level of experimentation and right censoring across the two groups
is very similar. Indeed, 45.47% of pre − FTA firms jumped from the first to the second
experimentation round; while that was the case for 46.71% of post− FTA firms. Figures
remain similar across the subsequent rounds, with the exception that the most experi-
menting post − FTA firm has come to 39 rounds of new products, compared to the 67
rounds of one pre− FTA firm.
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Table 5.8: Peru-USA - Number of Experimentation Rounds per Firm to USA
(a) Pre-FTA Firms 2006-2008 (b) Post-FTA firms 2009-2013
N◦
Rounds
Experimenting
Firms
%
Non-Exp.
Firms
%
N◦
Rounds
Experimenting
Firms
%
Non-Exp.
Firms
%
1 1225 100.00% 0 0.00% 1 1201 100.00% 0 0.00%
2 557 45.47% 668 54.53% 2 561 45.80% 640 52.24%
3 360 29.39% 865 70.61% 3 360 29.39% 841 68.65%
4 273 22.29% 952 77.71% 4 260 21.22% 941 76.82%
5 214 17.47% 1011 82.53% 5 201 16.41% 1000 81.63%
6 174 14.20% 1051 85.80% 6 161 13.14% 1040 84.90%
7 145 11.84% 1080 88.16% 7 135 11.02% 1066 87.02%
8 112 9.14% 1113 90.86% 8 111 9.06% 1090 88.98%
9 100 8.16% 1125 91.84% 9 88 7.18% 1113 90.86%
10 88 7.18% 1137 92.82% 10 72 5.88% 1129 92.16%
11 76 6.20% 1149 93.80% 11 58 4.73% 1143 93.31%
12 65 5.31% 1160 94.69% 12 47 3.84% 1154 94.20%
13 64 5.22% 1161 94.78% 13 41 3.35% 1160 94.69%
14 54 4.41% 1171 95.59% 14 31 2.53% 1170 95.51%
15 45 3.67% 1180 96.33% 15 29 2.37% 1172 95.67%
16 39 3.18% 1186 96.82% 16 26 2.12% 1175 95.92%
17 35 2.86% 1190 97.14% 17 20 1.63% 1181 96.41%
18 31 2.53% 1194 97.47% 18 19 1.55% 1182 96.49%
19 28 2.29% 1197 97.71% 19 16 1.31% 1185 96.73%
20 25 2.04% 1200 97.96% 20 12 0.98% 1189 97.06%
21 22 1.80% 1203 98.20% 21 10 0.82% 1191 97.22%
22 20 1.63% 1205 98.37% 22 8 0.65% 1193 97.39%
23 17 1.39% 1208 98.61% 23 7 0.57% 1194 97.47%
24 16 1.31% 1209 98.69% 28 6 0.49% 1195 97.55%
26 14 1.14% 1211 98.86% 30 5 0.41% 1196 97.63%
28 12 0.98% 1213 99.02% 32 3 0.24% 1198 97.80%
30 11 0.90% 1214 99.10% 39 1 0.08% 1200 97.96%
33 10 0.82% 1215 99.18% Source: COMEXPERU´ - SUNAT
36 8 0.65% 1217 99.35%
39 5 0.41% 1220 99.59%
43 4 0.33% 1221 99.67%
55 3 0.24% 1222 99.76%
65 2 0.16% 1223 99.84%
67 1 0.08% 1224 99.92%
Source: COMEXPERU´ - SUNAT
101
5.3.2.4 Number of Shipments prior to An Experimentation Round
Recall from Section 5.2 that my measure of experimentation speed is expressed as the
number of shipments of product A necessary for a firm to decide to introduce product B
into destination d. Besides, in my empirical approach shown afterwards, I am interested in
evaluating how this measure responds to determinants such as trade liberalisation. Hence,
in this stage I present some preliminary statistics on the number of shipments prior to
each experimentation round occurred within my 2006-2013 sample.
Table 5.9 summarises the average number of shipments prior to the first ten experiment-
ation rounds by a Peruvian firm in the USA market, joined by their respective frequencies,
distinguishing between shipments to all destinations (Table 5.9(a)) and shipments to USA
only (Table 5.9(b)). More importantly, I obtain for each subtable statistics for pre−FTA
and post − FTA firms, as a first attempt to identify an effect of trade liberalisation on
experimentation speed. It is convenient to stress that for experimentation round i by a
firm, I consider the shipments the firm has made from round i − 1 inclusively; while, in
the case of the firm’s first experimentation round, I take the shipments made everywhere
since its foundation. This rule applies for the subsequent empirical approach as well.
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Table 5.9: Peru-USA - Number of shipments prior to an experimentation round
2006-2013
pre-FTA vs. post-FTA firms (means and frequencies)
(a) Shipments to everywhere (b) Shipments to USA
Experimentation
Round
Pre-FTA
Firms
Post-FTA
Firms
Total
Experimentation
Round
Pre-FTA
Firms
Post-FTA
Firms
Total
1 13.38 11.46 12.43 2 9.16 6.16 7.65
1225 1201 2426 557 561 1118
2 25.3 14.34 19.8 3 14.83 5.97 10.41
557 561 1118 360 360 720
3 28.7 20.06 24.38 4 9.01 6.15 7.62
360 360 720 273 260 533
4 26.7 15.92 21.45 5 10.84 7.33 9.14
273 260 533 214 201 415
5 22.41 15.36 19 6 10.38 7.88 9.18
214 201 415 174 161 335
6 23.73 21.12 22.48 7 10.57 7.29 8.99
174 161 335 145 135 280
7 23.74 19.84 21.86 8 12.15 7.32 9.74
145 135 280 112 111 223
8 27.09 14.69 20.92 9 11.39 10.24 10.85
112 111 223 100 88 188
9 23.92 21.01 22.56 10 11.97 9.19 10.72
100 88 188 88 72 160
10 19.39 18.15 18.83 Total 9.25 5.17 7.34
88 72 160 4005 3527 7532
Total 22.52 15.42 19.2 Source: COMEXPERU´ - SUNAT
4005 3527 7532
Source: COMEXPERU´ - SUNAT
From my model’s prediction, a tariff elimination on product B by market d should
lead to a faster experimentation speed, expressed as fewer shipments of product A prior to
experimenting with product B. Figures in Table 5.9 show that post− FTA firms tend to
introduce a new product into the USA market precisely after fewer shipments of their old
products than pre − FTA firms. This pattern is present across experimentation rounds,
regardless of the order. Thus, post − FTA firms tend to experiment faster than older
firms in the USA market. This outcome may be taken as a first sign of the effect of trade
liberalisation on experimentation speed.
However, the figures for pre−FTA firms also embrace experimentation rounds occur-
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ring after the enactment of the Free Trade Agreement in 2009. Hence, in order to have a
more transparent comparison, in Table 5.10 I remove those rounds from the analysis, end-
ing up only with rounds by pre−FTA firms occurring between 2006 and 2008, compared
to rounds by post− FTA firms. This exercise only considers the shipments to USA prior
to an experimentation round to more closely replicate my theory.
Table 5.10: Peru-USA - Number of shipments to USA prior to an experimentation round
by time of occurrence 2006-2013
pre-FTA vs. post-FTA (means and frequencies)
Experimentation
Round
Pre-FTA Post-FTA
2 6.27 6.16
277 561
3 6.44 5.97
166 360
4 5.01 6.15
108 260
5 8.26 7.33
73 201
6 8.61 7.88
54 161
7 7.53 7.29
43 135
8 9.66 7.32
32 111
9 7.44 10.24
27 88
10 5.05 9.19
19 72
Total 4.64 5.17
1605 3527
Source: COMEXPERU´ - SUNAT
The difference in terms of number of shipments gets narrower between pre−FTA and
post − FTA firms, but there is still a tendency of faster experimentation speed for the
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latter. Note that for further rounds, that difference is reversed in favour of pre − FTA
firms. This preliminary outcome may imply that the boost on experimentation speed
by trade liberalisation takes place mostly at the initial stages of firms’ experimentation
process in the USA market; and, before moving further by introducing new products,
post−FTA firms opt for taking advantage of the realised demand from the USA market,
by shipping more of their already introduced goods.
5.3.2.5 Export Values and Preference Regimes
It is important to point out that, prior to the enactment of the USA-Peru Free Trade
Agreement, several Peruvian 8-digit lines had tariff-free access to the USA market by uni-
lateral trade preferences from that country, under the ATPDEA and zero-MFN schemes.
The next two tables group the rounds of new exports according to their inclusion or not
of at least one product favoured by either of those regimes. Table 5.11 exclusively fo-
cuses on the first exports by each of the 2,426 firms; while Table 5.12 covers all the 7,532
experimentation rounds in the sample.
The figures in Table 5.11 reveal that 63.27% of firms in the sample have started their
experience in the USA market with either an ATPDEA or zero-MFN product. However,
the amount of experimentation rounds comprising only products with no pre-FTA uni-
lateral trade preference is also remarkable. In my whole sample, as shown in Table 5.10,
51.35% of experimentation rounds by firms include at least one product affected by one
of the aforementioned regimes before the FTA was effective.
Table 5.11: Peru-USA - Firms’ First Experimentation Rounds per
Preference Regime 2006-2013
New ATPDEA product
to USA on day t
New MFN product to USA on
day t
No Yes Total
No 891 534 1425
Yes 668 333 1001
Total 1559 867 2426
Source: WITS - World Bank
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Table 5.12: Peru-USA - Experimentation Rounds per Preference Regime 2006-2013
At least one new ATPDEA
product to USA on day t
At least one new MFN product to
USA on day t
No Yes Total
No 3664 1206 4870
Yes 1622 1040 2662
Total 5286 2246 7532
Source: WITS - World Bank
Briefly looking at daily exports by Peruvian firms to USA during 2006-2013, I con-
structed some Kernel densities of the log of a firm’s total exports to that market on day
t, considering only those days in which firms undertook an experimentation round, also
taking into account that in those days –except for the first exports– firms may have ex-
ported both new products and other goods the firm previously sold to USA. Figures 5.1
and 5.2 display those densities for all the 7,532 experimentation rounds in the sample, and
only the 2,426 first new exports, respectively. This exercise shows that export values by
post − FTA firms tend to be larger than those by older firms. Furthermore, focusing on
Figure 5.2, the initial value with which post − FTA firms jump into the USA market is
usually larger than for pre − FTA firms. While the latter on average start with a US $
21,568 shipment, the former do it with a mean value of US $ 28,530.
Figure 5.1 Figure 5.2
As a complement to the numbers in Tables 5.11 and 5.12, Figure 5.3 plots the Kernel
densities of the pre-FTA weighted average tariff rate on a firm’s exports to USA on day
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t, again only considering the days an experimentation round occurs on.41 The histogram
refers to the mean tariffs for all products sold by a firm on an experimentation round
(both new and old products); whereas the black line takes the mean for only the new
products sold on that day. The two weighted averages are very similar, with an overall
mean between 7.9% and 8.6% per firm/day; but 14.04% of the experimentation rounds
comprise only zero-tariff new products, under the zero-MFN scheme.
Figure 5.3 Figure 5.4
That last information makes it pertinent to analyse the share, in terms of export values,
of products under a USA pre-FTA trade preference –be it ATPDEA or zero-MFN– on a
day a firm experiments with new products. Figure 5.4 plots the densities of the weight
of those preferences in firm i’s exports to USA on day t, showing the vast majority of
experimentation rounds comprise only new products with no preference at all (48.80%) or
only fully liberalised products (34.39%). These preliminary findings must be taken into
account for the survival analysis presented in the next section.
41Tariff rates are weighted by the export value of each product sold on day t.
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5.4 Survival Analysis
My main interest is to test the main prediction from my theoretical model: whether trade
liberalisation, in the shape of the tariff elimination on Peruvian goods exported to USA
under the 2009 Free Trade Agreement, plays a facilitating role for experimentation. I am
also interested in assessing a potential role of the size of export shipments prior to firms’
experimentation rounds. One convenient approach is to characterise how long it takes for
a Peruvian firm to introduce one or more new products into the USA market; namely,
Peruvian firms’ experimentation speed in that destination; and the main determinants of
that speed.
To attain that outcome, I undertook a survival analysis which calculates the well-
known Kaplan-Meier Survival Function. The innovation in this analysis, as opposed to
most studies that consider as a failure the event of a firm leaving an export market or even
dropping out of the export activity, is that the “failure” I assess is the event in which a
Peruvian firm sells one or many new products to the USA market, i.e. the occurrence of
an experimentation round. It should be kept in mind that a product is taken as “new” at
the firm-destination level. That is, a product is new if The firm has never exported it to
USA before.
Econometrics textbooks like Cleves et al. (2010) report that the Kaplan-Meier Estim-
ator is a nonparametric estimate of the survival function, denoted as S(t). That estimate,
also known as the product limit estimate of S(t) at any time t is defined as:
Sˆ(t) = Πj|tj≤t(
nj − dj
nj
), (5.15)
where nj is the number of observations at risk at time tj , and dj is the number of failures
at such tj . This function is a product considering all j times there is a failure, both before
and at time t. As a result, the estimate of the failure function is the complement of the
estimated survival function: 1− Sˆ(t).
The basic way to interpret the Kaplan-Meier Estimator is: at day t, what is the prob-
ability for firms to introduce one or more new products into USA (failure)? Alternatively,
at day t, what is the probability for firms not to experiment in USA with any other new
product (survival)? The time span is measured in days, depending on the order of the
experimentation round. For instance, for the first new exports by a firm to USA, I count
the number of days since the firm was established. For the second experimentation round,
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in contrast, I count how many days have elapsed since the firm’s first products sold to
USA. That latter rationale is applied for the subsequent rounds. Note that the analysis
considers the right censored firms lost in each round, as well as those that never exported
to USA during the 2006-2013 period.
5.4.1 Pre-FTA vs. Post-FTA Firms
For the first Kaplan-Meier analysis, I split the sample of 7,806 firms according to their
year of foundation, leading to 3,053 firms starting between 2006 and 2008 –pre − FTA
firms– and 4,753 founded between 2009 and 2013 –post− FTA firms–. The outcomes are
striking.
Figure 5.5 provides an overall comparison of the Kaplan-Meier Survival Function
between both types of firms, considering the pool of experimentation rounds, regardless of
the order and the firm. The observations “at risk” are the number of days elapsed since
the previous experimentation round of a firm. The dashed line shows the function for the
experimentation rounds by pre − FTA firms; whereas the solid line is the equivalent for
post− FTA firms.
This figure shows that, overall, experimentation rounds by pre−FTA firms take shorter
periods to effectively occur than by post−FTA firms. More precisely, the probability for
pre − FTA firms of introducing one or more new products into the USA market rises to
50% 423 days after their previous experimentation round; while that probability is reached
at 646 days for post− FTA firms. Similarly, the “failure” probability becomes 25% at 79
days for pre−FTA firms; while for post−FTA firms, that likelihood is reached at 95 days.
This might indicate that pre − FTA firms tend to experiment faster than post − FTA
firms; however, after 1,500 days approximately, the survival probability for post − FTA
firms becomes lower.42 The results also indicate that there is one post−FTA firm which,
1,718 days after its last experimentation round, has not introduced any other products up
to the end of the sample, leading to a final survival probability of 2.86%. As for pre−FTA
firms, the survival probability becomes zero after 2,862 days, meaning that all the time
spells “at risk” concluded with an experimentation round in the USA market, with many
42This is likely to be explained by two factors: (1) the longer existence of pre− FTA firms; and (2) the
imposed 3-year threshold for firms that never exported to USA. The latter is more relevant for post−FTA
firms as we can only observe them between 2009 and 2013. Hence, fewer post− FTA firms remain in the
sample after removing those never selling to USA, affecting the probability function.
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other time spells became right-censored in between.43
Figure 5.5
However, I consider it much more informative to estimate the survival probability
separately for each experimentation round, so that the interpretation can be done at the
firm level, i.e. what is the probability for a firm to undertake a first experimentation
round in the USA market, a second one and so forth. Thus, Figure 5.6 presents the results
for each of the first four rounds of new exports. The pattern observed in Figure 5.5 is
exhibited in Figure 5.6(a) for first experimentation rounds. This time, both estimates of
the survival function follow the same path; but the survival probability for post − FTA
firms drops at a faster pace from day 1,424. For post − FTA firms, the probability of
experimenting for the first time in USA becomes 50% at 1,419 days after the firm was
founded, while that length was 1,391 days for pre − FTA firms. For the reason exposed
earlier, the survival probability becomes zero –the probability of exporting for the first
time to USA becomes one– after 1,682 days for post − FTA firms and 2,862 days for
pre− FTA firms.
In the next three graphs, a trend in favour of post − FTA firms becomes evident.
Figure 5.6(b), only considering firms that exported for a first time to USA, indicates that
the probability of experimenting with a second consignment of new products in the USA
market becomes 50% for post−FTA firms 226 days since their first export; whereas that
length for older firms is 339. Another way to interpret those results is: at day 500 since
43A time spell becomes right-censored if a firm never exports to USA or no longer sells any other new
product to USA. The date considered to close that time spell is either the day the firm closed down or the
last date the firm sold any product to any other destination in my sample.
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their first export to USA, the probability of having experimented for a second time there
is about 57% for pre − FTA firms; and almost 65% for newer firms. Moreover, there is
a maximum 83.12% probability for post − FTA firms to experiment for a second time,
attained at 1,718 days; while that maximum likelihood is just 79.98% for incumbents,
at 2,628 days. Even though both types of firms take less time to undertake a third or
fourth experimentation rounds, Figures 5.6(c) and 5.6(d) confirm that post− FTA firms
are faster. The contrast with Figure 5.5 is arguably explained by the longer existence of
pre − FTA firms, which were able to make up to 67 experimentation rounds, compared
to the maximum of 39 for new firms.
111
Figure 5.6: Kaplan-Meier Survival Analysis Pre- vs. Post-FTA Firms: 1st to 4th Experimentation Rounds
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
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5.4.2 Analysis Across Sectors
Another survival analysis distinguishes between the sectors the 8-digit lines exported be-
long to. Figure 5.7 presents the Kaplan-Meier estimator for all experimentation rounds
in the sample, according to the three sectoral groups constructed earlier. Overall, sets of
new exports embracing textile and apparel products –solid line– take place faster than ag-
ricultural exports –dashed line–, and other manufacturing industries –dotted line–. Note
that, since I compare the span lengths between sectors –how long it takes to introduce
products from a particular sector–, it is impossible to control for right-censored firms in
this estimation.
Figure 5.7
When looking at each round separately, Kaplan-Meier estimations –not reported in
this chapter– reveal that agricultural first exports tend to be faster than those from other
sectors; but from the second round onwards, textile and apparel new exports take fewer
days than the rest.
In order to better assess the findings from this exercise, I combined the analysis across
sectors with the pre-FTA vs. post-FTA criterion. But I consider it more informative to
split the experimentation rounds by pre − FTA firms between rounds before and after
2009, so as to identify a clearer role of trade liberalisation. Figure 5.8 presents a set of
nine graphs with the results from the criteria combination. The first row shows the overall
analysis for all experimentation rounds; the second one, only the first exports; and the
third one, the second round. The first column considers the new exports by pre − FTA
firms done before 2009; the second column takes those made by such firms since the FTA;
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and the third one works with all post− FTA firms.
The dynamics previously described of experimentation across sectors are still evident in
this estimation. What is most remarkable, looking at the second row of first exports, is that
the argued faster experimentation speed by agricultural exports is mostly explained by pre-
FTA transactions (Figure 5.8(d)) and, to a much lesser extent, transactions by post−FTA
firms (Figure 5.8(f)). In the case of post-FTA transactions by pre − FTA firms (Figure
5.8(e)), it is textile exports that are effectively faster, just like in subsequent rounds. This
outcome may imply a particular boost for textile exports by the Free Trade Agreement,
especially for firms that, prior to the FTA, depended on the ATPDEA trade preferences
given by USA to many textile exports, and were not certain about the renewal of those
preferences. Also, some textile products were levied with very high tariffs, meaning that,
with the elimination of those tariffs since 2009, it is much easier to export these products,
in a shorter time span, which matches my theoretical approach.
1
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Figure 5.8: Kaplan-Meier Survival Analysis Pre- vs. Post-FTA Firms: Analysis Across Sectors
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
(g) (h) (i)
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5.4.3 Exporting One or Many New Products
One approach to address the role of firm size and experience in the dynamics of exper-
imentation by Peruvian firms in USA market is to compare the experimentation speed
between rounds composed by one single new product and those comprising sets of many
new products. Recall from the summary statistics that 64.6% of experimentation rounds
comprise only one single product.44
Figure 5.9 portrays the overall results of this exercise, showing that the time lapsed
to experiment with more than one new product to USA tends to be shorter. In fact, the
survival probability for experimentation rounds involving many products becomes 50% at
82 days after the firm’s previous experimentation; whereas that number is 107 for one-
product rounds. These results might entail qualitative differences between firms able to
introduce many products at once and those only able to introduce one, meaning that the
former tend to be stronger and better-performing than the latter.
Figure 5.9
Figure 5.10, like in the analysis across sectors, distinguishes between pre − FTA and
post − FTA transactions. The trend described earlier is almost omnipresent. However,
two striking features can be identified. Firstly, for post−FTA transactions by pre−FTA
firms –the second column– the speed difference in favour of many-product experimentation
rounds gets much larger, compared to the first column, where speeds are fairly similar
between both groups. Secondly, for post − FTA firms, the speed difference tends to be
44Like in the analysis across sectors, this exercise cannot control for right-censored firms: there is no
chance for censoring across products.
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smaller, and even gets reversed in the third experimentation round, in favour of one-
product rounds. Further experimentation rounds by post − FTA firms, not presented
herein, have quite similar speeds across both categories.
I can interpret these findings as follows: trade liberalisation plays a determinant role
for both pre−FTA and post−FTA firms, which are encouraged to take more advantage
of this condition by exporting more new products to USA more rapidly, presumably their
core competence products; and the fact that such effect is stronger for pre − FTA firms
may be a sign of the role of size and experience in the USA market and, more importantly,
an additional incentive for those firms to more easily experiment with more products,
previously levied with a tariff.
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Figure 5.10: Kaplan-Meier Survival Analysis Pre- vs. Post-FTA Firms: One vs. Many Products Exported
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
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Figure 5.10 (Cont.): Kaplan-Meier Survival Analysis Pre- vs. Post-FTA Firms: One vs. Many Products Exported
(g) (h) (i)
(j) (k) (l)
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5.4.4 Analysis Across Mean Export Values
My theoretical model predicts that the number of shipments of product A by a firm
to country d prior to the introduction of B is inversely related to the firm’s mean of
the perceived demand of product A. Thus, I test this prediction with a Kaplan-Meier
survival analysis on the experimentation speed across quintiles of the mean export value
of shipments by a Peruvian firm prior to a new experimentation round in the USA market,
as a proxy for the mean perceived demand of products previously introduced. The exercise
separately utilises shipments to USA only and to all destinations.
5.4.4.1 Mean Exports to USA
In this first estimation, I obtain quintiles of the mean values of shipments by Peruvian
firms to USA, from its first shipment of product A inclusively, to the last one before
the introduction of product B. The same rule applies for all subsequent experimentation
rounds. The mean export quintiles are as follows:
• First quintile: mean export value of up to US $ 662.
• Second quintile: above US $ 662 and up to US $ 2,379.
• Third quintile: above US $ 2,379 and up to US $ 6,542.35.
• Fourth quintile: above US $ 6,542.35 and up to US $ 20,625.50.
• Fifth quintile: above US $ 20,625.50.
Each graph elaborated in this analysis shows five step lines, each of them representing
one of the mentioned quintiles.
Figure 5.11 compiles all experimentation rounds, regardless of the firm; while Figure
5.12 focuses on the second new products exported to USA per firm. Recall that, since I
work with the previous shipments to USA, the first experimentation rounds are excluded
from this exercise.
Figure 5.11 shows that introductions of new products to USA preceded by small mean
shipment values tend to occur faster than experimentations following larger mean export
values. Thus, for the first quintile function –the solid grey line– the experimentation
probability becomes 50% at day 56 since last experimentation round. Conversely, for the
last quintile function –the solid black line–, that probability is attained at day 254.
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Figure 5.12 on the introduction of the second new products to USA portrays a common
pattern that will be more clearly seen in the forthcoming graphs: there is a growing differ-
ence in survival/failure probabilities between experimentation rounds from the first three
quintiles and the last two, embracing mean exports above US $ 6,542.35. Introduction
of second new exports preceded by average shipments up to US $ 6,542.35 take a shorter
span than experimentation rounds occurring after mean exports above that value.
These findings appear to go against my theoretical prediction. However, differences
between pre− FTA and post− FTA transactions may provide further information.
Figure 5.11 Figure 5.12
Indeed, when observing the Kaplan-Meier estimations in Figure 5.13 and comparing
the trends of the functions between pre − FTA transactions –the first column– versus
post − FTA experimentation rounds –the next two columns–, it is evident that the gap
between the first three quintiles and the last two is much larger for post−FTA transactions.
The first column shows that the survival functions for all quintiles are closer to each
other, at least at value 0.5 in the vertical axis, especially in Figure 5.13(g) for the third
round of new exports. Conversely, when looking at post− FTA transactions, principally
Figures 5.13(h) and 5.13(i) for third new exports, the probability of experimentation for
the first three quintiles becomes increasingly larger than for the last two. This finding may
provide a valuable implication on the role of trade liberalisation. Since 2009, when most
tariffs were eliminated, Peruvian firms, especially the smallest ones, may have a chance
to realise the USA demand for their products more easily, by shipping smaller values of
their products, i.e. starting small. I can also relate these estimation results with Equation
5.14b of my theoretical model, which indicates a flatter negative slope of the cutoff number
of shipments for larger mean export values. This may be translated into relatively lower
experimentation speed for larger sales, which is the general tendency of my estimates.
1
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Figure 5.13: Kaplan-Meier Survival Analysis per Quintiles of Mean Exports to USA Before Experimentation on Day t
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
(g) (h) (i)
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5.4.4.2 Mean Exports to All Destinations
I also prepared a similar exercise, but working with the firm’s mean value of shipments
to everywhere, including USA. This may provide valuable information on experimentation
speed by Peruvian firms, especially for the introduction of their first new products to that
market.
Similarly, I constructed quintile values for firms’ mean shipments to any destination,
obtaining the following numbers:
• First quintile: mean export value of up to US $ 308.23. This group includes exper-
imentation rounds in USA with no previous exports anywhere (zero mean export
value).
• Second quintile: above US $ 308.23 and up to US $ 2,148.74.
• Third quintile: above US $ 2,148.74 and up to US $ 6,954.26.
• Fourth quintile: above US $ 6,954.26 and up to US $ 22,452.89.
• Fifth quintile: above US $ 22,452.89.
This analysis gives as interesting results as the previous one. Figures 5.14 and 5.15 show
the overall results for all experimentation rounds and the first new exports, respectively. I
am particularly interested in the outcome from Figure 5.15. On the one hand, it is evident
that the introduction of a first product to USA preceded by tiny or no shipments to any
other destination –the solid grey line– takes place in a much shorter time span since the
firm’s foundation than the first experimentations from the other quintiles. This is a sign
of the existence of Peruvian firms exclusively focused on the USA market. Indeed, most
de´buts in USA from the first quintile correspond to firms without any export experience
elsewhere.
On the other hand, after the first quintile, the group with the highest experimentation
speed is the fifth quintile –the solid black line–, embracing firms with the largest mean
export values. This last pattern can be more clearly observed when distinguishing between
pre− FTA and post− FTA transactions.
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Figure 5.14 Figure 5.15
That exercise, performed in Figure 5.16, effectively confirms in the second row that
the experimentation speed, measured in days since the firm was established, is highest for
firms with almost exclusive focus on the USA market. That speed gap between the first
quintile and the rest gets exacerbated for post− FTA firms, as Figure 5.16(f) shows.
The second pattern identified, the particularly high probability of experimenting for
the first time in USA by firms from the last quintile of mean exports everywhere, is more
evident for pre− FTA rounds in Figure 5.16(d). And that difference between the largest
exporters and the 2nd-4th quintiles fades for post− FTA transactions, shown in Figures
5.16(e) and 5.16(f). The gap in experimentation speed at post−FTA transactions between
quintiles 1-3 and quintiles 4-5, identified in the previous subsection, is evident for second
experimentation rounds, exhibited in Figures 5.16(h) and 5.16(i).
With the results obtained from this survival analysis across mean export values prior
to the introduction of new products to USA, I can extract some stylised facts on experi-
mentation speed and the role of trade liberalisation.
1. For the first experimentation rounds in USA, except for Peruvian exporters exclus-
ively focused on the USA market, there is a negative relation between experimenta-
tion speed and the mean value of shipments everywhere, especially before the FTA
enactment. That advantage in favour of larger exporters is diminished once the FTA
comes into effect.
2. For subsequent experimentation rounds, Peruvian firms that previously sold smal-
ler values of products either to USA only or everywhere, tend to introduce new
products to USA at a faster speed than those exporting larger previous shipments.
That difference gets much larger after the enactment of the USA-Peru Free Trade
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Agreement. This implies that trade liberalisation is associated with quicker experi-
mentation by firms in the USA market after sending smaller shipments, which now
provide information on the perceived demand for their products more effectively.
These two stylised facts identified can be summarised into one main finding from this
survival analysis: the USA-Peru FTA enhances experimentation, making smaller Peruvian
exporters introduce products faster into the USA market.
1
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Figure 5.16: Kaplan-Meier Survival Analysis per Quintiles of Mean Exports Everywhere Before Experimentation on Day t
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
(g) (h) (i)
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5.4.5 Analysis Across Tariff Rates and Preference Regimes
In this next stage of the survival analysis, I am interested in knowing the number of days
taken by firms to experiment in the USA market, depending on the mean pre-FTA tariff
rate levied by that country and whether these products enjoyed a USA trade preference
regime prior to the enactment of the Free Trade Agreement. The trade preferences regimes
addressed are the Andean Trade Preference and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA) and
the zero tariff rates under the WTO Most Favoured Nation (MFN) regime.
5.4.5.1 Analysis Across Weighted Average Tariffs
As we know, since 2009 the vast majority of products were automatically liberalised
(zero tariff). Hence, for the tariff-based analysis to be done, I decided to calculate for
each experimentation round a pre-FTA weighted average tariff rate, where the weight is
the US $ export value of each product, defined at the 8-digit level.
I constructed two types of weighted average tariffs: 1) one for all the products sold by
a firm on day t; and 2) another one for only the new products introduced by the firm on
day t. In this paper, I present the results from the second type, as my main focus is on
the new exports.
For the effects of the calculation of the Kaplan-Meier survival estimator, I obtained
the quintiles of the weighted average tariffs, which are as follows:
• First quintile: up to 0.279%, mostly accounting for new products with zero MFN
tariff.
• Second quintile: above 0.279% and up to 3.07%.
• Third quintile: above 3.07% and up to 7.34%.
• Fourth quintile: above 7.34% and up to 14.9%.
• Fifth quintile: above 14.9%.
Similar to the mean export analysis, all graphs provided show five step lines, each
representing one quintile.
Figure 5.17 displays the outcome from this exercise, including all experimentation
rounds, regardless of the order and the firm. It is clear from this figure that it usually
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takes a shorter time spell for firms to experiment in USA with products which pre-FTA
weighted average tariff belongs to the 4th –the dashed black line– and, especially, the 5th
quintile –the solid black line–. In numbers, firms are faster to export new goods with
an over 7.34% pre-FTA weighted average rate. On the contrary, firms take much longer
to export new products from the 1st quintile, namely, those with zero MFN tariffs. A
potential explanation for this is that experimentation with those liberalised products had
already occurred before the start of my sample. It must be pointed out, nevertheless, that
products from such 1st quintile are more quickly exported by firms in further rounds, even
quicker than products from the top quintiles.
This first finding may imply an opposite result compared to the basics of my sequen-
tial exporting theory, which stated that, between two types of products, the firm would
experiment with the one with the lowest trade cost. However, it might be the case that
firms have already experimented with products with the lowest tariffs much earlier than
the start of my sample. Moreover, recall that some of the tariff lines exported before
the 2009 FTA, from either the lowest or highest quintiles, enjoyed a zero tariff under the
ATPDEA regime by USA.
Figure 5.17
Additionally, the export behaviour by firms may vary between pre− FTA and post−
FTA firms. Figure 5.18 compiles that analysis, across pre-FTA tariff quintiles and distin-
guishing between transactions done before and from 2009.
The first row confirms the findings from the previous figure, in that new products
belonging to the 4th and 5th pre-FTA tariff rate quintiles tend to wait less to be introduced
than products with lower trade costs. This tendency for pre − FTA firms, however, is
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more evident for the post-FTA new exports (Figure 5.18(b)), in which nearly all tariffs
become zero. Clearly, in that case new exports of the furthest quintiles are more dynamic
than exports of the 2nd –the dashed grey line– and 3rd quintiles –the dashed and dotted
grey line–, and even more dynamic than those of the 1st quintile –the solid grey line
representing the zero MFN tariff group–. In Figure 5.18(b), the probability of introducing
new products to USA becomes 50% at 123 days since the firm’s last experimentation round
for transactions from the 4th quintile by pre− FTA firms done since 2009; while for the
5th quintile, that probability is achieved 22 days later. Relatively longer spells are taken
by new exports of products with lower weighted average tariffs.
When looking at the first and second experimentation rounds, the finding described
earlier also holds. Products with the highest pre-FTA tariffs tend to take less time to be
exported after the FTA by more experienced firms. Particularly, the second experiment-
ation round of products from the top quintile (Figure 5.18(h)) are by far more dynamic
than the rest. Such tendency was also found for the second rounds by post− FTA firms
(Figure 5.18(i)). It must be pointed out though that for further rounds, the duration
difference between low and high tariff products diminishes considerably. Hence, it can be
argued that there is an experimentation peak for the most costly products at the second
round of post-FTA transactions, followed by more experimentation with products with
lower pre-FTA tariffs in further rounds. Relating these results with Equation 5.14a of my
theoretical model, I highlight that for post− FTA experimentation rounds by both types
of firms, the gap between the top two tariff quintiles and the rest becomes larger, meaning
that trade liberalisation’s experimentation accelerating role is more relevant for products
with highest pre− FTA tariffs.
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Figure 5.18: Kaplan-Meier Survival Analysis per Weighted Average Pre-FTA Tariffs (new exports)
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
(g) (h) (i)
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5.4.5.2 Analysis Across Trade Preference Regimes
As pointed out earlier, prior to the FTA, many Peruvian products, regardless of the
official USA tariff rate, enjoyed a special trade preference under the ATPDEA regime,
which guaranteed a zero tariff entry into that market to several tariff lines, subject to a
periodical unilateral renewal by the USA government.
In the following analysis, I construct survival functions for experimentation rounds,
depending on how much of the total export value by a firm to USA on day t was accounted
for by products benefited from a special trade preference, be either ATPDEA or the zero
MFN tariff. I allocate experimentation rounds into four groups according to the share in
the export value of new products that enjoyed a pre-FTA trade preference. The groups
are as follows:
• Group 1: rounds not involving any new product with a pre-FTA trade preference
(0%).
• Group 2: rounds in which up to 50% of the total value of new exports involve
products with a pre-FTA trade preference (>0%-50%).
• Group 3: rounds in which over 50% but below 100% of the total value of new exports
involve products with a pre-FTA trade preference (>50%-<100%).
• Group 4: rounds in which all new products enjoyed a pre-FTA trade preference
(100%).
Figure 5.19 presents the outcome from this analysis, gathering all experimentation
rounds from all firms in the sample. What this first graph implies is that the fastest
rounds of new exports involve either no trade preference –the solid grey line– or at least
a little share of products enjoying any pre-FTA zero tariff –the dashed grey line–. More
days are taken for new exports from Group 3 –the dashed black line–, and even more days
for new exports with full special treatment –the solid black line–.
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Figure 5.19
In the last stage of this survival analysis, I present in Figure 5.20 the results distin-
guishing between pre− FTA and post− FTA experimentation rounds.
From another exercise, not reported in this paper, where I simply distinguished between
pre− FTA and post− FTA firms, it was surprisingly obtained that, even for pre− FTA
firms, new exports with few or null trade preferences were quicker to occur than goods
with large or full USA preference. One reason for this outcome may be that, since the
USA trade preferences under ATPDEA date back to the early 1990s –formerly known as
ATPA– that acceleration for liberalised products might have taken place before the start of
my sample. However, one important issue to take into account in this analysis, apart from
the spell length, is the number of firms/experimentation rounds per preference category.
In fact, when looking into the numbers behind Figure 5.20, in the overall results from
the first row, we see that for pre − FTA firms, rounds from the two extreme preference
categories (0% and 100%) account for more than 80% of the total experimentation events
analysed. That share is even greater for post − FTA firms. Therefore, I should focus on
those two extreme categories for further analyses.
Having that in mind, the results from the second row, on the first experimentation
rounds, show that for pre − FTA firms, both before and after the agreement, products
with no trade preference tend to be sold at a faster rhythm than those fully liberalised.
That gap between these two categories gets narrower for post− FTA firms.
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All this apparently contradicts the basics of my sequential exporting theory, which
states that firms enter a market with the product with lowest trade costs. However, for
pre−FTA experimentation rounds, 334 (49.55%) firms begin their experience in the USA
market by exporting only liberalised products; while only 221 (32.79%) sold only non-
liberalised ones. As for post − FTA experimentations by pre − FTA firms, I obtain 276
vs. 187 firms (51.02% vs. 34.57%); and for the post−FTA firms case, the difference clearly
diminishes: 517 (43.23%) vs. 483 firms (40.38%). Hence, it can be seen that in general,
more firms tend to experiment with a less costly product in terms of trade preferences;
but since the enactment of the FTA, there is more incentive for firms to experiment with
previously non-liberalised (more costly) products.
When moving further to the second round of new exports in the third row of Figure
5.20, it can be spotted that, in terms of spell length, non-pre-FTA-liberalised products get
exported even more quickly, especially in post − FTA experimentation rounds. In terms
of number of firms, that higher frequency for experimenting with fully liberalised products
observed in the first round is reversed, especially for post − FTA firms. In other words,
more firms tend to experiment with non-liberalised new products in the USA market at
their second experimentation round. Moreover, for further rounds, the difference in favour
of non-pre-FTA-liberalised products gets larger, again especially for post− FTA firms.
In summary, three stylised facts can be extracted from this analysis across mean pre-
FTA tariffs and trade preference regimes.
1. Products which used to enjoy no pre-FTA trade preference tend to more rapid ex-
perimentation than pre-FTA liberalised products.
2. Most firms, however, tend to start their experience in the USA market with pre-FTA
liberalised products, obviously cheaper to export.
3. The USA-Peru FTA seems to encourage firms to experiment more with products
that did not enjoy any prior trade preference, usually with the highest pre-FTA
tariffs. The latter can be seen both in terms of experimentation speed and number
of firms.
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Figure 5.20: Kaplan-Meier Survival Analysis per Weight of USA Pre-FTA Preferential Regimes (new exports)
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
(g) (h) (i)
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5.5 Econometric Approach
After the first testing attempt by a Kaplan-Meier survival analysis, in this section I present
the main results from the econometric models, aiming to provide an alternative approach
to test some of the main predictions from the theory.
5.5.1 Number of Shipments
I start by running an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) identification strategy, in which each
observation represents the event of the introduction of one or many products, defined at the
8-digit level, by a Peruvian firm into the USA market, i.e. experimentation round. As in
the previous analyses, these estimations consider Peruvian firms starting to export to USA
between 2006 and 2013. Since my purpose is to assess the influence of trade liberalisation
and the perceived demand for previous products on the number of shipments prior to an
experimentation round, I propose the following basic specification:
num shipments USAi = α0 + α1postftai + α2mean export USAi+
α3postfta ∗ export USAi + α4new wmean tariffi+
α5postfta ∗ tariffi + µi.
(5.16)
This first approach takes every experimentation round independently, regardless of the
firm, because a panel fixed effects model at the firm level, shown afterwards, omits some
relevant variables I am interested in.
The dependent variable is the log of the number of shipments to USA by a Peruvian
firm before experimentation round i, from experimentation round i− 1 inclusively. That
variable is regressed on postfta, a dummy variable taking value 1 if the firm making
experimentation round i was founded between 2009 and 2013, when the USA-Peru Free
Trade Agreement becomes effective. mean export USA stands for the log of the firm’s
mean export value of shipments to USA from experimentation round i − 1 to the last
shipment before experimentation round i. These first two variables are interacted to see
if there is a combined effect. Aiming to find a more specific effect of trade liberalisation
at the product level, I include new wmean tariff , the log of one plus the average pre-
FTA tariffs levied on the new products exported in experimentation round i, weighted by
the export value per product. Thus, tariffs levied on products accounting for the largest
shares of the full experimentation shipment are given more weight. That variable is also
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interacted with the postfta dummy.
Further additions and modifications are made to that basic specification. Firstly, I
incorporate the pre postfta dummy, taking value 1 if experimentation round i was done by
a pre−FTA firm after the enactment of the FTA. By adding this dummy, and keeping the
postfta variable, pre−FTA experimentation rounds by pre−FTA firms become now the
base category. pre postfta is afterwards interacted with the export and tariff variables.
Secondly, I replace the tariff regressor by new wpref , standing for the proportion, in
terms of export value, of new products exported in experimentation round i eligible for a
pre−FTA trade preferential regime, either ATPDEA or zero-MFN tariffs. I interact this
variable with the postfta and pre postfta dummies.
This first approach and the subsequent ones all include year and sector fixed effects, as
well as other controllers used in the survival analysis, such as dummies for many products
per round, the elsewhere experience, and others for first and second experimentation
rounds per firm. As for the sector fixed effects, they are also interacted with the mean
export value variable, since the effect of the latter might be stronger for some sectors. It
must be emphasised as well that, since the dependent variable is the previous number of
shipments to USA, this initial estimation does not include as observations the firms’ first
experimentation rounds.
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Table 5.13: N◦ Shipments by Peruvian Firms to USA Before Introduction of New
Exports to That Market
Dependent Variable num shipments USA
Estimation OLS
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
postfta -0.271*** 0.251* -0.116*** -0.123 -0.273*** 0.0616 -0.112*** -0.266
(0.0325) (0.132) (0.0428) (0.196) (0.0325) (0.132) (0.0428) (0.194)
mean export USA 0.0961*** 0.133*** 0.0923*** 0.0632*** 0.0950*** 0.128*** 0.0910*** 0.0584***
(0.0152) (0.0166) (0.0153) (0.0208) (0.0153) (0.0166) (0.0153) (0.0207)
postfta*export USA -0.0644*** 0.00915 -0.0587*** 0.0144
(0.0159) (0.0209) (0.0159) (0.0209)
new wmean tariff 0.140 -0.158
(0.425) (0.614)
postfta*tariff -0.975** -0.685
(0.484) (0.660)
new wpref 0.174*** 0.0981* 0.182*** 0.0912
(0.0480) (0.0584) (0.0479) (0.0836)
postfta*pref 0.190*** 0.196**
(0.0719) (0.0924)
pre postfta 0.232*** -0.631*** 0.241*** -0.570***
(0.0460) (0.203) (0.0462) (0.200)
pre postfta*export USA 0.106*** 0.105***
(0.0222) (0.0221)
pre postfta*tariff 0.470
(0.734)
pre postfta*pref 0.00258
(0.0994)
Sector FE / Other Regressors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 5036 5009 5036 5009 5028 5028 5028 5028
r2 o 0.0573 0.0919 0.0620 0.0966 0.0600 0.0945 0.0650 0.0992
F 36.63 24.19 34.58 21.70 33.62 25.12 32.10 22.55
Robust standard errors controlling for heteroskedasticity.
These estimations do not consider firms’ first experimentation rounds in the USA market.
*Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level;
***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
Table 5.13 presents the results from this exercise. This and the next tables are divided
in two sections of four specifications. The first section –Columns (1)-(4)– controls for the
role of pre-FTA tariffs; whereas the last one –Columns (5)-(8)– addresses the effect of pre-
FTA unilateral trade preferences. The odd columns present the results from specifications
using only the main variables of interest, without interactions, as a first approach to
test the main prediction of my theory. The even columns incorporate interactions of the
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postfta dummy to more clearly distinguish effects between pre − FTA and post − FTA
firms. Those even columns also include year fixed effects to assess how the main covariates
change with their inclusion. The last two columns of each section control for post-FTA
rounds by pre− FTA firms, by including the pre postfta dummy and its interactions.
From the theory and the survival analysis, I would expect a negative coefficient for
postfta. This is the case for the odd columns of the table, meaning that Peruvian firms
founded after the enactment of the USA-Peru Free Trade Agreement tend to have fewer
shipments to USA with old products before introducing new exports into that market.
However, the even columns show a change in the sign when adding further covariates.
That issue is discussed later.
I would also expect from the theory a negative sign for the mean export value of
shipments to USA prior to an experimentation round. Instead, all specifications give a
positive coefficient for mean export USA, i.e. a slow-down effect, which rather matches
the outcome from the survival analysis. However, this might give support to Equation
5.14b of my theory, which states that the accelerating effect of mean export values of
previous shipments is lower for larger means.
Something interesting occurs when controlling for the postfta∗export USA interaction,
though. Its negative and significant coefficient in Columns (2) and (6) indicates that the
slow-down effect of mean export values is lower for post − FTA firms. This also implies
an increasingly accelerating postfta effect for higher mean exports. Focusing on Column
(2), let me explore the net effects. Assuming a zero pre − FTA tariff, the net effect
of a 1% increase in the mean export value on the number of shipments is 0.133% for a
pre − FTA firm, and 0.0683% for a post − FTA firm. More interestingly, taking the
median value of the mean export USA variable for post − FTA firms (US $ 4,077.33),
the net effect of the postfta dummy on the number of shipments is approximately -25%,
being only US $ 49.28 the mean export value at which the postfta effect cancels out. The
pattern described remains consistent across most specifications and methods I present in
this chapter, and may be interpreted as follows: the effect of being a post − FTA firm
on experimentation speed is mostly positive, expressed in fewer shipments to USA prior
to a new experimentation round compared to pre − FTA firms, turning negative only
for rounds preceded by very small consignments of products previously introduced. This
outcome may be compared with the findings from Araujo et al. (2016), in the sense that
better institutions makes exporters start with higher volumes. My results convey that
trade liberalisation, as a proxy for an improvement in contract institutions, is associated
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with quicker experimentation with new products after starting with larger volumes of old
products.
As for the weighted mean pre− FTA tariff, my theory’s proposition make me expect
a positive coefficient; but Columns (2) and (4) do not give significant numbers. These
two columns also include the interaction with postfta, which obtains a negative and
significant value in Column (2). This sign is consistent across further estimations shown
afterwards, and is reasonable to expect, as after the FTA enactment most tariffs are
eliminated, facilitating the decision to experiment in USA, especially for products with
higher pre−FTA tariffs. Moreover, going back to the change in the sign of postfta from
Column (1) to (2), for instance, I can argue that the effect of being a post−FTA firm on
experimentation speed is an accelerating effect for most products, except for those with
zero or a minimum pre− FTA tariff.
But what is the effect on number of shipments for pre−FTA firms experimenting after
the FTA enactment? To address this concern, in Columns (3) and (4) I add the pre postfta
dummy. Column (3) shows a positive and significant coefficient for that dummy, meaning
that experimentation rounds after the FTA by pre − FTA firms are preceded by more
shipments than rounds before the FTA by those firms. This outcome may reflect cases
where, for instance, firms founded in 2006 try to experiment in 2013, long after the FTA
enactment. Hence, such experimentation round may be preceded by more shipments than
an equivalent event by another pre− FTA firm before the agreement came into effect.
When adding the interactions in Column (4), the sign for pre postfta becomes instead
negative, with the previous positive effect being transferred to the interaction with the
mean export values. Again, let me go through the net effects, assuming zero tariffs. The
positive effect of a 1% increase of mean export USA on the number of shipments to USA
is 0.0632% for both pre − FTA experimentation rounds and those done by post − FTA
firms; whereas it is 0.2161% for post−FTA rounds by pre−FTA firms. As for the effect of
the pre postfta dummy, taking the 10th percentile of mean export USA for post− FTA
rounds by pre − FTA firms (US $ 215.29), that effect is approximately -6%, and turns
positive when the mean export value exceeds US$ 384.84, which lies far below the median
and average of that variable.
The described outcome can be interpreted as follows: the effect of being a pre− FTA
firm experimenting after the FTA enactment is mostly a slow-down effect, compared to
experimenting before the agreement; but it is an accelerating one for rounds preceded by
139
very small shipments of products already introduced, i.e. after starting small with those
products. This result is consistent with the outcome from Equation 5.14a of my theoretical
model, in that the effect of a tariff change on experimentation speed is lower the larger
the mean value of previous shipments is. No significant effect is found for the interaction
of pre postfta with tariffs.
Columns (5)-(8) replicate the analysis, but replacing the tariff variable by the new wpref
regressor, accounting for the pre − FTA unilateral trade preference share of the new ex-
ports in an experimentation round. From the Kaplan-Meier survival analysis, I would
expect a positive coefficient for that variable, which actually occurs. That means, ex-
perimentations mostly embracing products with a trade preference tend to be postponed
–more previous shipments of old products– longer than rounds comprising non-preference
products. That effect is more evident for post− FTA firms, given the positive coefficient
of the postfta ∗ pref interaction, which is also an expected outcome, since products not
enjoying any preferential treatment before the FTA, now can be more easily exported,
leading to a lower waiting time.
140
Table 5.14: N◦ Shipments by Peruvian Firms Abroad Before Introduction of New Export
to the USA Market
Dependent Variable num shipments total
Estimation OLS
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
postfta -0.300*** 0.164 0.00574 0.0558 -0.301*** -0.0123 0.00800 -0.170
(0.0354) (0.165) (0.0458) (0.231) (0.0354) (0.165) (0.0459) (0.224)
mean export total 0.0962*** 0.137*** 0.0904*** 0.0488** 0.0964*** 0.134*** 0.0904*** 0.0462**
(0.0167) (0.0179) (0.0166) (0.0230) (0.0168) (0.0179) (0.0167) (0.0229)
postfta*export total -0.0682*** 0.0240 -0.0645*** 0.0265
(0.0190) (0.0242) (0.0191) (0.0241)
new wmean tariff 0.891** 1.240*
(0.453) (0.666)
postfta*tariff -1.224** -1.591**
(0.547) (0.735)
new wpref 0.0264 -0.00565 0.0455 -0.0791
(0.0514) (0.0615) (0.0510) (0.0883)
postfta*pref 0.148* 0.224**
(0.0774) (0.0990)
pre postfta 0.466*** -0.496** 0.472*** -0.573**
(0.0494) (0.239) (0.0495) (0.230)
pre postfta*export total 0.140*** 0.139***
(0.0256) (0.0255)
pre postfta*tariff -0.487
(0.796)
pre postfta*pref 0.116
(0.105)
Sector FE / Other Regressors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 5859 5826 5859 5826 5847 5847 5847 5847
r2 o 0.0977 0.135 0.111 0.139 0.0981 0.135 0.111 0.139
F 78.12 42.88 79.90 37.12 69.55 43.21 72.18 37.41
Robust standard errors controlling for heteroskedasticity.
These estimations consider all firms’ experimentation rounds in the USA market.
*Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level;
***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
Table 5.14 presents a complementary exercise, now including the first experimentation
rounds.45 For that purpose, I replace the dependent variable by num shipments total, the
log of the number of shipments by a firm to all destinations before experimentation round i,
from round i−1 inclusively. It was also pertinent to employ instead the mean export total
45This exercise does not include first experimentation rounds not preceded by any shipment elsewhere.
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regressor, the log of mean value of exports to all markets before the round of interest.
Figures are fairly similar to Table 5.13; but I remark the loss of significance for the
postfta dummy. Conversely, there is a significance gain by the tariff variable, showing
the expected positive sign in Columns (2) and (4). The postfta ∗ tariff interaction also
gains significance, showing a stronger negative effect, as expected. The significance loss
of the postfta dummy reflects the lack of explanatory power over the total number of
shipments prior to an experimentation round, given the inclusion of other controllers,
such as firms’ experience in other markets. In fact, the elsewhere dummy, not reported
in this table, always shows highly significant positive coefficients, implying that focusing
on other markets may prompt firms to postpone the decision to export a new product to
USA, especially for the first experimentation.
Appendix C.2 shows replications of this OLS approach, considering either only the
first experimentation round per firm, using the shipments to all destinations, or only the
second round. For the latter, I run regressions for both types of dependent variables. On
first experimentation rounds, it is striking that postfta is positive in all specifications,
and significant when adding the pre postfta dummy. That may be explained by the
aforementioned time difference between an experimentation round made in 2013 by a
post − FTA firm founded early in 2009, compared to a round produced in 2008 by a
pre−FTA firm founded in 2006. Additionally, the new wpref variable on USA unilateral
trade preferences always gives negative and significant coefficients, which makes sense,
since firms starting their export activity in USA before 2009, tend to do it with fully
liberalised products, as discussed in the survival analysis.
When it comes to analysing the second experimentation rounds, taking num shipments USA
as dependent variable, it is remarkable that postfta keeps its negative and significant value
even when controlling for post− FTA rounds by pre− FTA firms. This may imply that
trade liberalisation exerts a trigger to grow in the USA market at the early extensive
margin for post − FTA firms. That effect does not seem to come from the tariff elimin-
ation, given the insignificant coefficients for the tariff variables. I did the same exercise
for num shipments total, and no major differences from the main outcomes in Table 5.14
are found.
Appendix C.3 presents a panel data model with fixed effects at the firm level. This
strategy does not allow us to distinguish the effect of being a post − FTA firm per se,
since that dummy gets omitted; but we can interact it. The mean exports to USA or
all destinations keeps its positive and significant effect; but the interaction with postfta
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loses significance in most specifications. Tariff variables are not significant, but they show
consistency in the signs across columns. In fact, higher tariffs are associated with a longer
delay in experimentation; but the interaction for post− FTA firms is linked to an accel-
eration. All this gives support to the main findings presented earlier. Equal consistency
is shown by the trade preference variables. Positive values, although insignificant, for
new wpref ; but negative and significant coefficient for the interaction with postfta, im-
plying an experimentation acceleration for post−FTA firms exporting products not sub-
ject to any pre−FTA preference. No relevant changes for the pre postfta combinations,
confirming the tendency for pre− FTA firms to experiment quicker since the enactment
of the FTA after starting small in the USA market. Although not reported, the many
dummy, on experimentation rounds with more than one product, is consistently negat-
ive and significant, presumably providing a sign of the relaitve ease to introduce similar
products in one shipment.
Overall, the results described show an apparent incompatibility between my theory’s
prediction and the empirical finding on the role of mean export values. That outcome leads
me to think about the limitations of my approach. The observed delay in the introduction
of a new product associated with larger shipments of previous goods might be due to
a firm-specific decision to sufficiently enjoy the profitability in market d generated by
exporting product A, which is not contemplated in my theory. Additionally, my empirical
approach accounts in a preliminary way for firms’ experience in other markets, by including
a dummy taking value 1 if, between experimentation rounds i − 1 and i, the firm has
exported elsewhere. Clearly, further attempts can be made to account for that experience.
I am aware as well that the number of shipments of a product is not a perfect indicator
of experimentation speed, since few shipments may occur within a long period of time,
and the shipment frequency may also depend on the industry the product belongs to. This
is to some extent tackled here by controlling for sector fixed effects of the new product
introduced; but it would also be relevant to control for the industry of the old products;
although most old and new products belong to the same industry.
5.5.2 Duration Model
Aiming to offer a closer complement to the earlier Kaplan-Meier survival analysis, I run
a Cox Proportional Hazard Model, a continuous-time duration model proposed by Cox
(1972), which estimates the hazard function for every individual from a sample, in the
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following general shape:
h(t) = h0(t)exp(β1x1 + . . .+ βkxk), (5.17)
where h(t) is the hazard at time t for an observation; h0(t) is the baseline hazard, not
estimated in this model; and the rest of the right hand side stands for the covariates
considered. The Cox Model calculates the probability of a failure to occur to an individual
at time t. I opted for a continuous-time model like Cox given the nature of the time spells
constructed.
As in my earlier approach, observations are at the experimentation round level; and the
time spell considered is the number of days prior to the event of a firm’s experimentation
round i since the day of firm’s round i − 1 inclusively. Hence, the event of a Peruvian
firm introducing a new export to the USA market is the “failure” in this analysis, and
I measure the probability of that “failure” occurring at day t since the firm’s previous
“failure”, or since the firm’s foundation date, in case of its first experimentation round.
It is important to point out that, as many of my covariates are at the product level,
this exercise does not include censored observations. And, more importantly, given the
likely existence of risk heterogeneity at the firm level, I run a Cox model with shared
frailty at that level.
Tables 5.15 and 5.16 report the hazard ratios (exp(βk)) using the same regressors as the
OLS analysis. Hazard ratios above unity mean that the covariate increases the probability
of introducing new exports to USA; whereas ratios below unity represent a fall in that
likelihood.
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Table 5.15: Peruvian Firms’ Probability of Introducing New Exports to USA (Hazard
Ratios)
Excluding First Experimentation Rounds
Time Spell Days After Firm i’s Last Experimentation Round in USA
Estimation Cox Proportional Hazard Model - Shared Frailty at Firm Level
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
postfta 1.629*** 1.796*** 0.985 0.293*** 1.626*** 2.199*** 0.982 0.345***
(0.0857) (0.329) (0.0608) (0.0742) (0.0853) (0.401) (0.0603) (0.0864)
mean export USA 0.846*** 0.861*** 0.849*** 0.857*** 0.846*** 0.863*** 0.849*** 0.860***
(0.0146) (0.0160) (0.0147) (0.0217) (0.0146) (0.0161) (0.0147) (0.0217)
postfta*export USA 1.022 1.026 1.019 1.021
(0.0208) (0.0273) (0.0208) (0.0271)
new wmean tariff 1.908** 0.649 1.784* 1.023
(0.582) (0.263) (0.546) (0.671)
postfta*tariff 4.327*** 2.759
(2.272) (2.037)
new wpref 0.901** 0.967 0.886** 1.032
(0.0431) (0.0559) (0.0425) (0.0919)
postfta*pref 0.851** 0.795**
(0.0678) (0.0833)
pre postfta 0.477*** 0.171*** 0.474*** 0.162***
(0.0245) (0.0407) (0.0242) (0.0380)
pre postfta*export USA 1.003 1.003
(0.0249) (0.0248)
pre postfta*tariff 0.475
(0.353)
pre postfta*pref 0.911
(0.0922)
FE 2009 0.283*** 2.023*** 0.275*** 2.009***
(0.0372) (0.134) (0.0356) (0.133)
FE 2010 0.219*** 1.542*** 0.213*** 1.548***
(0.0290) (0.0910) (0.0279) (0.0913)
FE 2011 0.169*** 1.187*** 0.165*** 1.192***
(0.0225) (0.0637) (0.0216) (0.0638)
Sector FE / Other Regressors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 5025 5025 5025 5025 5044 5044 5044 5044
chi2 340.4 764.1 539.3 766.9 341.2 772.4 545.9 774.4
theta 0.350 0.282 0.339 0.282 0.349 0.283 0.338 0.283
Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters in firms.
*Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level;
***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
Table 5.15 shows the results excluding the first experimentation round per firm, in
order to see the effect of the mean exports to USA only. To understand the interpretation
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of hazard ratios, let me focus on Column (1). Being a post−FTA firm increases in 62.9%
a Peruvian firm’s probability of introducing a new set of products to the USA market at
time t, compared to a pre− FTA firm. For covariates in natural logs, the interpretation
is different: an e-fold rise in a firm’s mean export value to USA (multiplied by e =
2.718) since its last experimentation round reduces the new experimentation likelihood
by 15% approximately; and an e-fold rise in the pre − FTA tariff on products raises the
experimentation probability by about 91%.
As in the OLS approach, the postfta dummy changes sign when including the pre postfta
regressors; and the mean export value keeps its hazard-reducing function across all specific-
ations. Regarding the tariff variable, when including its interaction with postfta, it loses
significance and even gets its role reversed; while the interaction turns out to be highly
significant, with a clear role of increasing the experimentation probability in Column (2),
meaning that post− FTA firms tend to experiment faster in the USA market with goods
previously charged with high tariffs. The figures for the new wpref variables are con-
sistent with the outcome from the previous analyses: firms tend to experiment earlier in
the USA market with products with no pre − FTA unilateral trade preference by USA,
especially in the case of firms founded after 2009.
An important difference with respect to the OLS estimates occurs with the variables
accounting for post− FTA experimentation rounds by pre− FTA firms. The significant
coefficients below unity for pre postfta in all specifications imply that this category of
experimentation tends to take more days to occur than experimentation rounds made
before the FTA enactment, which makes sense given the time comparisons mentioned
earlier between pre and post−FTA experimentation rounds by pre−FTA firms. However,
interactions, especially that with the mean export value, are all insignificant. This differs
from the previous analysis, where pre postfta experimentation rounds preceded by small
shipments tended to occur faster.
Apparently, the inclusion of the pre postfta covariates discards any accelerating effect
of trade liberalisation. Nevertheless, Columns (4) and (8) control for year fixed effects,
which hazard ratios are worth referring to. While 2007 and 2008 dummies –not reported in
this chapter– have a slow-down effect on experimentation, that effect dramatically reverses
into acceleration for 2009, the year of the FTA enactment. In fact, the experimentation
probability increases by more than 100% in that year with respect to 2006, the base year.
In other words, a Peruvian firm in 2009 is over 100% more likely to experiment in USA
t days after its last experimentation round than a firm in 2006. That effect decreases to
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around 54% for 2010 and 19% for 2011. Hence, these results confirm that there is an effect
from trade liberalisation in favour of faster export experimentation by Peruvian firms in
the USA market.46
Table 5.16 incorporates the first experimentation rounds into the sample to measure
the effect of mean export values to all destinations. No major changes to the results in
Table 5.15 occur. Perhaps, I may highlight that in the first four columns the accelerating
role of the postfta variables is stronger, since the interaction with export values recovers
its significance, as in the OLS approach; and the interaction with tariffs provides a more
evident effect in favour of experimentation. That means, postfta firms experiment faster
with products with higher pre − FTA tariffs after having shipped large export values
abroad.
Very similar results are obtained for Cox estimations without shared frailty, with stand-
ard errors clustered at the firm level, presented in Appendix C.4. I also present in Appendix
C.5 separate Cox estimations for first and second experimentation rounds. The results do
not differ from the shared frailty exercise nor the OLS estimations; but I can remark that
the aforementioned acceleration effects arising from the year fixed effects after the FTA
enactment get dramatically inflated for these first two experimentation rounds, especially
the first one. The 2009 dummy provides a 2,000% jump in the probability to send a first
shipment to USA; while a 660% and 350% probability rise are given by the 2010 and 2011
dummies, respectively.
46The estimations from the Cox Proportional Hazard approach control for year fixed effects from 2007
to 2013; but only coefficients for 2009-2011 dummies are reported in this chapter.
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Table 5.16: Peruvian Firms’ Probability of Introducing New Exports to USA (Hazard
Ratios)
Including First Experimentation Rounds
Time Spell Days After Firm i’s Last Experimentation Round in USA or Entry into Business (1st Round)
Estimation Cox Proportional Hazard Model - Shared Frailty at Firm Level
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
postfta 1.710*** 1.576** 1.090 0.211*** 1.524*** 1.808*** 1.141** 0.288***
(0.0849) (0.297) (0.0615) (0.0529) (0.0867) (0.373) (0.0736) (0.0780)
mean export total 0.820*** 0.856*** 0.823*** 0.865*** 0.802*** 0.838*** 0.805*** 0.835***
(0.0143) (0.0155) (0.0143) (0.0210) (0.0151) (0.0168) (0.0151) (0.0228)
postfta*export total 1.052** 1.035 1.043* 1.047
(0.0216) (0.0270) (0.0238) (0.0305)
new wmean tariff 1.396 0.658 1.230 0.628
(0.415) (0.249) (0.367) (0.377)
postfta*tariff 5.255*** 5.309**
(2.533) (3.575)
new wpref 0.893** 0.964 0.886** 1.045
(0.0433) (0.0556) (0.0430) (0.0927)
postfta*pref 0.841** 0.773**
(0.0670) (0.0808)
pre postfta 0.501*** 0.157*** 0.641*** 0.166***
(0.0238) (0.0371) (0.0325) (0.0417)
pre postfta*export total 0.973 1.004
(0.0238) (0.0272)
pre postfta*tariff 0.883
(0.601)
pre postfta*pref 0.890
(0.0899)
FE 2009 0.225*** 2.577*** 0.276*** 1.986***
(0.0263) (0.162) (0.0358) (0.132)
FE 2010 0.159*** 1.810*** 0.218*** 1.556***
(0.0189) (0.100) (0.0286) (0.0917)
FE 2011 0.120*** 1.337*** 0.168*** 1.193***
(0.0143) (0.0677) (0.0221) (0.0639)
Sector FE / Other Regressors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 5832 5832 5832 5832 5853 5853 5853 5853
chi2 498.6 1808.4 708.7 1786.1 595.2 795.0 673.9 797.3
theta 0.473 0.245 0.438 0.263 0.665 0.287 0.642 0.287
Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters in firms.
*Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level;
***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
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5.6 Conclusions
Previous research has found that firms surviving in the export activity tend to experiment
sequentially, but no study has so far investigated what is the speed of that experimentation
and what factors determine that speed. This chapter bridges that gap by investigating the
strategy firms undertake to penetrate into one particular destination, by exporting new
products sequentially. More precisely, I am interested in how quickly firms experiment
with a new product in that market, after having done so with other previous products.
For that purpose, I develop a theoretical model where product demands follow a
joint bivariate distribution, imperfectly correlated. By sending shipments of the cheaper
product A to market d, thereby realising the demand for A, a firm gradually updates its
expected demand for the more costly product B. Thus, the expected demand for B is
in function of the number of shipments of A, as well as the demand correlation of both
products, and the mean value of those shipments.
As a result, my model predicts that experimentation speed in a sequential exporting
strategy is greater (i.e. fewer shipments of A before introduction of B) with (i) lower
trade costs of product B; (ii) larger mean export values of A to market d; and (iii) higher
correlation between the two products’ demand in d. The magnitude of these effects clearly
depend on the initial values of those variables.
This prediction is empirically tested with a survival analysis, comprising a Kaplan-
Meier survival estimation and a Cox proportional hazard model, along with an OLS and
panel data approach, using a very rich dataset of Peruvian exports to the USA market,
covering the 2006-2013 period. The data was processed to obtain a set of observations,
each representing the event in which a Peruvian firm introduces one or more new products
to the USA market, known in this paper as an experimentation round. I give special
emphasis on the role of trade liberalisation, expressed as the tariff elimination by the
United States on Peruvian products, under the Free Trade Agreement signed by both
countries in 2009. Thus, this paper is one of the first attempts to measure the effects of
this FTA on Peruvian exporters’ experimentation in the USA market.
Overall, the prediction from my theoretical approach finds empirical support regarding
the effect of trade liberalisation on experimentation speed. This can be observed in several
ways. Firstly, post − FTA firms, founded between 2009 and 2013, tend to introduce
new products to USA faster than pre − FTA firms, expressed in either fewer previous
shipments of other products to that market or fewer days since the introduction of the
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previous product. Secondly, that process is even quicker if the product used to face a high
tariff prior to the FTA enactment and/or was not subject to a pre−FTA unilateral trade
preference regime by USA, such as ATPDEA or MFN zero tariff. Thirdly, the probability
of a firm experimenting in USA (the hazard ratio) dramatically jumps if the round takes
place in 2009, the year of the FTA enactment, and in 2010, to a lesser extent.
The effect of the mean export value of old products on experimentation speed appears
to be opposite to my theory’s prediction. Indeed, higher mean shipments of product A are
associated with a delay in the introduction of product B, expressed in more prior shipments
of A or more days since the first shipment of A. This outcome may be related with the
dynamics of my prediction, in that the negative association between mean export values
of A and the number of prior shipments is smaller for larger mean exports. Moreover,
when linking this factor with trade liberalisation, I find interesting results. Post − FTA
firms, compared to pre−FTA firms, are boosted to experiment faster in the USA market
after shipping larger values of old products. However, since 2009, pre − FTA firms are
prompted to experiment faster with a new product after shipping lower amounts of other
products (i.e. after starting small with them).
There are clearly several issues to be addressed in the future. The role of correlation
between the products demand in the market of interest is yet to be tested empirically.
Hence, for further research I may control for that by, for instance, including a variable
controlling for the degree of similarity between products A and B; although that aim gets
more complicated for further experimentation rounds, and if those rounds comprise more
than one product. Moreover, it can be argued that firms’ better performing products
–core competencies– tend to be exported more rapidly and earlier than worse performing
ones. In terms of the theoretical approach, I may allow in further studies the entry costs
per product to vary with firms’ export experience in the market of interest and assess how
this affects firms’s decision to introduce a new product to that destination. Besides, this
chapter is focused on the act of introducing a product into a market, without addressing
the actual volume of that introduction. That is also a pertinent issue for further research.
Finally, more data availability on firm-specific characteristics to account for heterogen-
eity, as well as product-specific information on costs, or information on the buyer side, are
other important inputs to better investigate these export dynamics. To my knowledge, this
is the first attempt to analyse the determinants of experimentation speed across products
in a market, and surely future researches may arise for other contexts.
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6 Conclusions
The research in this thesis addresses the dynamics undergone by firms in one particu-
lar export market, introducing new products into that destination sequentially, and the
determinants of these dynamics. The thesis places emphasis on the role of trade liber-
alisation and differences across products in terms of production efficiency. It also gives
special consideration to firms’ experience in the market of interest. All this analysis is
implemented in the context of Peruvian firms in the USA market.
This thesis bridges several gaps in the literature on firm export dynamics. Despite
the fact that recent studies have addressed the firm entry and exit dynamics in export
participation, as well as across destinations, little has been written on how firms evolve
in the exploration of one particular destination, and factors such as trade liberalisation
have not been sufficiently regarded. Moreover, the case of Peru-USA trade relations is
an interesting one, since the enactment of the Free Trade Agreement in 2009 by both
countries is a recent event, not so analysed yet, from which various research questions
can be addressed. The availability of a unique dataset of export transactions by Peruvian
firms on a daily basis allows me to make as a detailed analysis as possible across products
in Peru’s main trading partner, which is the United States.
This research has explored, both theoretically and empirically, the decisions made by
a firm on entering, experimenting and exiting from a particular destination, and the main
determinants of those decisions.
The strategy followed in Chapters 3 and 4 was to implement a two-period analysis,
whereby I evaluated firms’ decisions of introducing a into a destination, assessing their
performance with that product in that market, and stopping their business with that
good in such destination.
I illustrated these decisions theoretically in Chapter 3. A firm from country o producing
two products A and B evaluates whether to enter or not into destination d in t = 1 and
t = 2. I explore an initial scenario, with no trade liberalisation, in which it is cheaper to
export A, but it is cheaper to produce B, i.e. product B is the core competence. My main
assumption is that export profitabilities in market d is perfectly correlated over time and
across products, but initially uncertain. Thus, a firm can only realise the profitability in
the market of interest by introducing a product into that country.
As a result, by ex ante maximising gross and net profits at both periods, the firm can
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opt for an entry strategy and how much from each product to export to d in each period.
Three entry strategies are possible: (1) no entry, whereby the market export profitability
is not realised; (2) simultaneous entry, with both products A and B sold in t = 1; and
(3) sequential entry, exporting the cheapest product A in t = 1, and selling both goods in
t = 2.
From that framework, three predictions arise on the export dynamics undergone by
firms, distinguishing between the performances of new exporters (one-year experience in
a destination) and more experienced firms in the market of interest, considering the role
of trade liberalisation –expressed as an unanticipated tariff elimination by country d in
t = 2– and the difference between “non-core” and “core competence” products.
Overall, new exporters, conditional on survival, tend to grow faster in both the intens-
ive margin (export growth of one product) and extensive margin (introduction of a new
product) in the market of interest than more consolidated exporters. The rational behind
this outcome is that, when a firm enters into a market for the first time, it realises the
export profitability of that market, and is tempted to explore that market even more, by
increasing its sales of a product and/or selling other products there; whereas the expert
firm might have already made that exploration in the past. Nevertheless, new exporters
are also more likely to stop exporting a product to d in t = 2 than the experts. Trade
liberalisation represents a boost for the intensive margin growth and to reduce the exit
probability of new exporters. It also contributes to raise the likelihood to introduce a
new product, but this boost is larger for the experts. That entry likelihood is greater for
“core competence” products; whereas the intensive margin growth and exit probability
are larger for “non-core” products.
The predictions from that theoretical model were tested empirically in Chapter 4, using
the aforementioned wide dataset of Peruvian export transactions to the USA market,
covering the 2006-2013 period, collapsing the original data to an annual basis. I propose
one identification strategy per prediction, running a panel data model with firm fixed
effects for the intensive margin, and linear probability models for the extensive margin
and exit probability.
Most of the features predicted by my theory in Chapter 3 are empirically supported.
Peruvian firms with only one-year experience in the USA market are more likely than more
consolidated firms to grow faster at the intensive and extensive margin, across products,
from one year to the other. However, those newcomers are also more likely than the experts
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to stop exporting a good to USA one year later. Trade liberalisation is accounted for by
the change in the tariff levied by USA on a Peruvian product between t − 1 and t (most
tariffs are eliminated in 2009). That factor does not significantly affect firms’ decisions
in the intensive margin; but it contributes to increase the likelihood of introducing a new
product to USA, especially for the expert firms. That event also helps to reduce the
probability of stopping the sales of a product in USA, being this effect more important
for the newest exporters. The larger intensive margin growth found for new exporters
is even greater for “non-core” products; whereas the increase of the entry likelihood and
exit prevention for new firms are more evident for “core competence” products. These
dynamics of “core” products are more pronounced for the smallest firms. Finally, the
described extensive margin probability tends to be larger if the product introduced is
similar to those exported earlier to USA.
In Chapter 5, I went deeper into the sequential exporting strategy, and explore how
quickly firms experiment with a product in a particular market, after having done so with
other previous products there, and the determinants of that speed. This undertakes a very
innovative approach, with little previous literature done on trade.
I develop a theoretical model with two products, the demands for which follow a
joint bivariate distribution, imperfectly correlated. By sending shipments of the cheapest
product A to market d, thereby realising the demand of A, the firm gradually updates
its expected demand of the more costly product B. Thus, the expected demand of B is
a function of the number of shipments of A, the correlation of the two demands and the
mean value of those shipments. One prediction is derived from this scheme, stating that
experimentation speed in a sequential exporting strategy is greater (i.e. fewer shipments
of A before introduction of B) with (i) lower trade costs of B; (ii) larger mean export
values of A to d; and (iii) larger correlation between both products’ demands in d. The
magnitude of these effects depends on the initial values of those variables.
This prediction was empirically tested with a survival analysis, consisting of a Kaplan-
Meier survival estimation and a Cox proportional hazard model, along with OLS and panel
data approaches. I exploit the daily transaction-level of my data of Peruvian exports to
USA, constructing an innovative dataset, in which each observation represents the event
in which a Peruvian firm introduces a new product into the USA market, known as an
experimentation round. Like in Chapter 4, I cover the 2006-2013 period and give emphasis
to the role of trade liberalisation, consolidated by the enactment of the USA-Peru Free
Trade Agreement in 2009.
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From those empirical exercises, I obtain that trade liberalisation effectively encour-
ages experimentation, by accelerating firms’ Peruvian firms’ decision to introduce a new
product into the USA market. Indeed, the predicted effect of trade liberalisation finds sup-
port in my empirical approach in several ways. (1) Post − FTA firms, founded between
2009 and 2013, tend to introduce new products faster in USA than pre − FTA firms,
expressed as either fewer shipments of other products to that market, or fewer days since
the introduction of the previous product. (2) Experimentation is even quicker when the
product used to be levied a high tariff before the FTA and/or was not subject to any pre-
FTA unilateral trade preference regime by USA (ATPDEA or MFN zero tariff). (3) The
probability of a firm experimenting in USA (hazard ratio) dramatically jumps in 2009, the
year of the FTA enactment, and 2010, to a minor extent.
As for the effect of the mean export value of old products on experimentation speed,
higher mean shipments of product A is associated with a delay in the introduction of
product B, apparently contradicting my theoretical prediction. However, this outcome
may be related to the dynamics of my prediction, in that the accelerating effect of mean
export values of A is smaller for larger mean export values. Moreover, when linking this
factor with trade liberalisation, I find that post − FTA firms are boosted to experiment
faster in the USA market after shipping larger values of old products. On the contrary,
since the FTA enactment, pre−FTA firms tend to experiment faster with a new product
after smaller shipments of other products, i.e. after starting small with them.
In conclusion, my thesis shows that there is a huge potential for evolution within
an export market by firms that are in the initial stage of their experimentation process,
despite their tendency to stop their business with a particular product in that destination.
Moreover, trade liberalisation, although it may have a little effect on prices, acts as a factor
encouraging experimentation, providing more security to novel firms, prompting them to
remain selling a good in the market, as well as an accelerating motor in the decision to
introduce new products into that destination.
However, there remains plenty of scope for further research to be done on experiment-
ation in an export market, despite the fact I cover several strands in my thesis. In Chapter
3, for instance, I do not contemplate the experience a firm might have had in any other
destination. Besides, trade liberalisation was taken as an unanticipated shock. Hence,
further research could extend this model by considering the firm’s possibility of exporting
a good into a third market prior to the market of interest, as well as allowing firms to
anticipate a trade liberalisation process, and see how this affects their export decisions.
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Anticipation of tariff elimination may also enrich the empirical results of Chapter 4,
where the analysis was limited by the lack of data, such as firm-specific characteristics to
account for firm heterogeneity or product-specific information, such as production costs.
Information from the buyer side may also be useful to better illustrate firms’ entry and
exit decisions in the USA market. Furthermore, I have been relying on the “one-year
experience” criterion to label an exporter as “new”. Surely, that criterion can be reformu-
lated and see how the results change by taking as “new” firms with two or three years, or
even six months, of experience. My data availability also allows me to think of a further
step, which is how likely are firms to experiment with a product in another destination,
right after having an experience in the USA.
Finally, in Chapter 5 the role of demand correlation across products in the market
of interest is yet to be tested empirically. One way to deal with that is by controlling
for product similarity between experimentation rounds, although this objective gets more
complicated with rounds comprising more than one product. It may also be argued that
better performing products –“core competence”– tend to be exported more rapidly and
earlier than worse performing ones. That is another issue to address in the future. The
trade relation between Peru and the United States is a scenario in which plenty of further
research questions can be addressed.
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A Appendix to Chapter 3
A.1 Proof of the Model Predictions
A.1.1 Prediction 1: Intensive Margin
A.1.1.1 Without Trade Liberalisation
In a scenario without trade liberalisation, firms choose their optimal export values of
their first product A to destination d in t=1,2 as follows:
1. At t=1, qA1 = 1{EµN>τA+cAp }
(
EµN−τA−cAp
2
)
+ 1{EµN≤τA+cAp }ε.
2. At t=2, if µN > τA + cAp , q
A
2 =
µN−τA−cAp
2 .
For t = 2, I can make an ex ante calculation of the expected value of qA2 , conditional
on survival; namely, if the discovered export profitability is greater than the known costs
(µN > τA + cAp ):
Ex ante E(qA2 | µN > τA + cAp ) =
∫ µN
τA+cAp
µN − τA − cAp
2
dG(µN | µN > τA + cAp )
=
∫ µN
τA+cAp
µN−τA−cAp
2 dG(µ
N )
1−G(τA + cAp )
=
E(µN | µN > τA + cAp )− τA − cAp
2
> 0.
(A.1)
Using this ex ante value for qA2 , I am now able to calculate the firm’s export growth of
product A to d, denoted as δA, depending on its initial expectations:
If EµN ≤ τA + cAp , δA ≡
E(µN | µN > τA + cAp )− τA − cAp
2
− ε > 0. (A.2)
If EµN > τA + cAp , δ
A =
E(µN | µN > τA + cAp )− τA − cAp
2
− Eµ
N − τA − cAp
2
=
1
2
[E(µN | µN > τA + cAp )− EµN ] > 0.
(A.3)
Hence, regardless of the initial expectations by the firm on the export profitability, it
will experience a positive export growth at the intensive margin in t = 2, conditional on
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having survived in t = 1. In order to clarify the outcome in Equation A.3, I can prove
that the last term in squared brackets is positive. E(µN | µN > τA+ cAp ) can be expressed
as:
E(µN | µN > τA + cAp ) =
∫ µN
τA+cAp
µNdG(µN | µN > τA + cAp )
=
∫ µN
τA+cAp
µN
1−G(τA + cAp )
dG(µN )
=
1
1−G(τA + cAp )
{µN −
∫ µN
τA+cAp
G(µN )dµN}.
(A.4)
The last term in curly brackets was obtained through integration by parts. Considering
that EµN = µN − ∫ τA+cAp
µN
G(µN )dµN − ∫ µN
τA+cAp
G(µN )dµN , I can rewrite Equation A.4 as:
E(µN | µN > τA + cAp ) =
1
1−G(τA + cAp )
{EµN +
∫ τA+cAp
µN
G(µN )dµN}. (A.5)
This result, along with the fact that G(τA + cAp ) > 0 if τ
A + cpA ∈ (µN , µN ) –making
1
1−G(τA+cAp ) > 1–, proves that E(µ
N | µN > τA + cAp ) > E(µN ) and, hence, the export
growth δA for new exporters in destination d, conditional on survival, is positive.
For the next periods, no export growth is expected for product A, δA = 0, since
the further export values also depend on the already realised export profitability, which
exceeds the known trade and production costs. In other words, for all t > 1, E(qAt | µN >
τA + cAp ) =
E(µN |µN>τA+cAp )−τA−cAp
2 .
As for the rest of products j 6= A, recall that the firm starts exporting that product
to d in period t only if µN > 2F
1/2
d + τ
j + cjp. Since the uncertain export profitabilities
are correlated over time and output decisions are based on them once realised, I do not
expect any positive export growth for product j from t to t + 1. Therefore, I expect the
export values for product j to d to be the same over time:
E(qjt+1) = E(q
j
t ) =
E(µN | µN > 2F 1/2d + τ j + cjp)− τ j − cjp
2
,∀t > 1, (A.6)
which means that I also expect δj to be zero for products other than A. Hence, overall I
expect a higher export growth for firm’s first product sold in d, product A, between t = 1
and t = 2.
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A.1.1.2 With Trade Liberalisation at t=2
Without trade liberalisation, it is cheaper to export product A to d (τA+cAp ≤ τB+cBp ).
But if we assume that trade liberalisation, expressed as a tariff elimination, occurs in t = 2,
it will be less costly to export product B since then, as cAp > c
B
p . This will have an effect
on the firm’s output decision from t = 2 onwards.
If the firm opts for a sequential entry strategy, it will experiment with product A in
t = 1, because at that period it is still more efficient producing A. Hence, the calculation
of qA1 will be identical to the case of no liberalisation, with the small value ε for pessimistic
expectations. However, at t = 2, when τA is eliminated, the firm will only consider the
existing production cost cAp in its export decisions. Hence, at t = 2, if µ
N > cAp , q
A
2 =
µN−cAp
2 .
When taking the ex ante expected value of qA2 , now the “conditional on survival”
constraint is limited to µN > cAp , leading to:
Ex ante E(qA2 | µN > cAp ) =
∫ µN
cAp
µN − cAp
2
dG(µN | µN > cAp )
=
∫ µN
cAp
µN−cAp
2 dG(µ
N )
1−G(cAp )
=
E(µN | µN > cAp )− cAp
2
> 0.
(A.7)
After this calculation above, I can again obtain the export growth δA, depending on
the firm’s initial expectations:
If EµN ≤ τA + cAp , δA ≡
E(µN | µN > cAp )− cAp
2
− ε > 0. (A.8)
If EµN > τA + cAp , δ
A =
E(µN | µN > cAp )− cAp
2
− Eµ
N − τA − cAp
2
=
1
2
[E(µN | µN > cAp ) + τA − EµN ] > 0.
(A.9)
Working on the last term in squared brackets in Equation A.9, as I did in the case of
no liberalisation, I can conclude that δA when EµN > τA+cAp is positive and greater than
the export growth rate without the tariff elimination. This can be seen if I operate that
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term in squared brackets and obtain the following expression:
If EµN > τA + cAp , δ
A =
1
2
[
1
1−G(cAp )
{EµN +
∫ cAp
µN
G(µN )dµN}+ τA − EµN ], (A.10)
which will be greater the larger the initial tariff and production costs are. This outcome
means that the firm just entering destination d in t = 1, in spite of tending to experiment
with cheaper products, will experience a greater export growth at t = 2 with products
that are more costly to produce (non-core competence products) and/or initially more
expensive to export.
If the firm decides to apply a simultaneous entry strategy in a context of trade liber-
alisation, it will also export product B in t = 1 because it expects that EµN > τB + cBp .
Hence, in that case, the definition of its optimal export values in both periods and the
correspondent export growth will be identical to what was done for product A at the
sequential entry strategy. Thus, the outcomes from Equations A.7 and A.10 can be gen-
eralised to every product j with which the firm enters destination d simultaneously.
As for an expert firm, which was exporting to d before t = 1, there is also an effect on
its intensive margin from trade liberalisation. Since it has already discovered its export
profitability in that market, its export growth for product j from t = 1 to t = 2 will be
expressed as:
δj for an expert firm =
µN − cjp
2
− µ
N − τ j − cjp
2
=
τ j
2
. (A.11)
This means that, while new firms in market d obtain their intensive margin growth
based on their initial expectations and the trade and production costs, for expert firms
that export growth will only be determined by the eliminated tariff, which makes sense
since both µN and cjp are already known to them. Comparing Equations A.10 and A.11, I
can argue that the export growth for new firms is greater than for the incumbent; namely,
trade liberalisation has a greater positive effect at the intensive margin for the newcomers.
Once the tariff elimination took place, for all t > 2, new firms will define their export
values basing only on their expected µN and the production costs. Since in that scenario,
cBp < c
A
p , they will begin experimenting with the less costly product B instead. Again,
the export growth for new exporters one period later will be greater than the zero growth
for the incumbents; and no positive export growth is expected for other products these
newcomers might export in the future. Even though new firms tend to start experimenting
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with the cheapest products, their initial export growth will be greater the more costly
those products are, since after trade liberalisation, the export growth δj in the optimistic
scenario is expressed as follows:
If EµN > cjp, δ
j =
1
2
[E(µN | µN > cjp)− EµN ]
=
1
2
[
1
1−G(cjp)
{EµN +
∫ cjp
µN
G(µN )dµN} − EµN ].
(A.12)
A.1.2 Prediction 2: Extensive Margin
A.1.2.1 Without Trade Liberalisation
Let me denote as Pr(ej2 = 1 | eA1 = 1&ej1 = 0) the probability that a firm which has just
started to export to destination d in t = 1 with the cheapest product A will export product
j in the next period. Likewise, let me denote as Pr(ejt = 1 | pit−1i=1eAt−i = 1&ejt−1 = 0) the
probability that a firm which has been exporting the cheap product A to destination d for
longer will start to export product j to d in t ≥ 2.
Since the new surviving firm has just discovered the export profitability µN by export-
ing A to market d, it will export any product j in the next period if µN ≥ 2F 1/2d + τ j + cjp;
namely, if its maximised profits from exporting j are greater than j’s sunk entry costs.
And, if µN follows a cumulative distribution function G(.), I can argue that Pr(ej2 = 1 |
eA1 = 1&e
j
1 = 0) = 1−G(2F 1/2d + τ j + cjp).
Conversely, incumbent firms in destination d have already discovered that µN longer
ago, and have made their entry decision by comparing maximised profits with entry costs
much earlier. Hence, under this framework there is no reason to expect any positive
likelihood for these firms to start exporting a new product j in t = 2 or in the future.
This implies that Pr(ejt = 1 | pit−1i=1eAt−i = 1&ejt−1 = 0) = 0.
In summary, the proof of Prediction 2 on the extensive margin without trade liberal-
isation can be stated as follows:
Pr(ej2 = 1 | eA1 = 1&ej1 = 0) = 1−G(2F 1/2d +τ j+cjp) > 0 = Pr(ejt = 1 | pit−1i=1eAt−i = 1&ejt−1 = 0).
(A.13)
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A.1.2.2 With Trade Liberalisation in t=2
When tariffs are eliminated in t = 2 by d for country o’s products, both new and
expert firms will have to re-evaluate their profit analysis, since now it is less costly to
export to that market. In that sense, new firms will decide to export a new product j
to d in t = 2 if µN ≥ 2F 1/2d + cjp. In other words, the calculation of their maximised
profits will no longer consider the tariff, which is now zero. Thus, the probability that
the firm will export product j to d after having exported A previously will be expressed
as Pr(ej2 = 1 | eA1 = 1&ej1 = 0) = 1 − G(2F 1/2d + cjp). This likelihood is clearly greater
than in the case of no liberalisation. Note that this entry probability is decreasing in the
production cost cjp. Hence, it will be larger in the case of core competence products.
As for incumbent firms, given that their cost structure also changes with trade liber-
alisation, they will also have to re-evaluate their entry decisions at destination d in t = 2.
They will have to compare their maximised profits from exporting j with the sunk entry
cost for that product, in order to decide whether to export it or not. Hence, like newcomers,
the expert firms will export a new product j to d in t = 2 if µN ≥ 2F 1/2d + cjp; and that
entry probability can also be expressed as Pr(ej2 = 1 | eA1 = 1&ej1 = 0) = 1−G(2F 1/2d +cjp).
However, a crucial difference takes place between new and expert firms when comparing
the scenarios with and without trade liberalisation; specifically, in the growth of their
entry probabilities. While for newcomers, that probability growth is G(2F
1/2
d + τ
j + cjp)−
G(2F
1/2
d +c
j
p); for incumbents, it will be 1−G(2F 1/2d +cjp), since without liberalisation the
entry probability was zero. Thus, experts have a greater entry probability growth than
new firms in a context of trade liberalisation.
For further time periods, with tariffs eliminated, since now cBp < c
A
p , new firms will
tend to enter d with product B. Experts, on the other hand, will have already learnt the
new scenario post-liberalisation. Hence, the entry probability with a new product j for a
newcomer, expressed as 1−G(2F 1/2d + cjp), will be again greater than the zero probability
for incumbents.
A.1.3 Prediction 3: Exit
A.1.3.1 Without Trade Liberalisation
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Let me denote as Pr(eA2 = 0 | eA1 = 1) the probability that a firm stops exporting its
first product A to d right after starting exporting it. Let me also denote as Pr(ejt+1 = 0 |
ejt = 1&e
j
t−1 = 1) the probability that a firm stops exporting any product j to d, after
exporting it for more than one period.
It is known from the basic model that a firm will exit the export business of product
A in market d if the realised export profitability does not cover the trade and production
costs –µN < τA+cAp –. Given that µ
N follows a cumulative distribution function G(.), and
that new firms are much more likely to discover that such business might not be profitable,
I can express that exit probability for a new firm as Pr(eA2 = 0 | eA1 = 1) = G(τA + cAp ).
As for more expert firms, as they have already realised µN by experimenting with
product A longer ago, they know how large or small such profitability is with respect to
the costs of A and many other products. Hence, under this framework, there is no reason
to expect an exit by the incumbents from the export business of a particular product to
d. Thus, their exit probability can be expressed as Pr(ejt+1 = 0 | ejt = 1&ejt−1 = 1) = 0.
In summary, the proof of Prediction 3 without trade liberalisation can be stated as
follows:
Pr(eA2 = 0 | eA1 = 1) = G(τA + cAp ) > 0 = Pr(ejt+1 = 0 | ejt = 1&ejt−1 = 1). (A.14)
A.1.3.2 With Trade Liberalisation in t=2
When trade liberalisation occurs in t = 2, τA becomes zero, which means that the
new firm will compare the realised µN with the production cost cpA to decide whether to
continue exporting A to d or to walk away. Therefore, the exit probability for the newcomer
that entered into d with productA will be reduced to Pr(eA2 = 0 | eA1 = 1) = G(cAp ). Hence,
trade liberalisation makes new firms more likely to stay exporting to destination d. For
expert firms, such exit probability remains in zero, since again the production costs for A
and other products were already compared with the previously realised µN .
After trade liberalisation, newcomers will tend to enter market d with product B,
which is now cheaper than A. Hence, in further time periods, the exit probability for new
exporters will be even more reduced to G(cBp ); but still greater than the zero probability
for incumbents. Thus, exit probability for newcomers will be lower as long as they enter
market d with products in which they are more efficient, i.e. “core competence” products.
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B Appendix to Chapter 4
B.1 Models 2 and 3 - Additional Estimations
Table B.1.1: Model 2 - Extensive Margin (Entry) - including fixed effects and firm i’s past
performance
Dependent Variable Entry ijt
Estimation LPM
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
new USA 0.0334 0.0329 0.0214 0.0214 0.0337 0.0332 0.0215 0.0216 0.114*** 0.114*** 0.107*** 0.107***
(0.0316) (0.0316) (0.0313) (0.0313) (0.0318) (0.0318) (0.0315) (0.0315) (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0203)
fta -0.261 -0.243 -0.279 -0.293 -0.250 -0.233 -0.268 -0.282 -0.430** -0.401* -0.437* -0.463**
(0.210) (0.212) (0.229) (0.226) (0.211) (0.213) (0.230) (0.227) (0.214) (0.217) (0.232) (0.229)
fta*new USA 0.232 0.198 0.0845 0.0987 0.228 0.195 0.0816 0.0955 0.354 0.307 0.160 0.187
(0.342) (0.346) (0.385) (0.382) (0.341) (0.345) (0.384) (0.381) (0.347) (0.351) (0.390) (0.387)
similar prod 0.0123 0.0122 0.00850 0.00857 0.0119 0.0118 0.00768 0.00775 0.0525*** 0.0524*** 0.0577** 0.0578**
(0.0138) (0.0139) (0.0182) (0.0182) (0.0138) (0.0139) (0.0182) (0.0182) (0.0182) (0.0182) (0.0261) (0.0261)
ln lag n sec exp USA 0.104 0.104 0.108 0.108
(0.0746) (0.0746) (0.0745) (0.0745)
gr ln real sector USA exports 0.0115 0.0114 0.0111 0.0112
(0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0138)
newUSA*lag1else 0.0891*** 0.0896*** 0.0867** 0.0867** 0.0887*** 0.0892*** 0.0862** 0.0861** 0.0695** 0.0700** 0.0692** 0.0692**
(0.0338) (0.0338) (0.0338) (0.0338) (0.0338) (0.0338) (0.0339) (0.0339) (0.0337) (0.0337) (0.0337) (0.0337)
core50 0.441*** 0.439*** 0.456*** 0.458*** 0.441*** 0.439*** 0.456*** 0.457*** 0.426*** 0.422*** 0.436*** 0.439***
(0.0206) (0.0212) (0.0202) (0.0197) (0.0206) (0.0211) (0.0201) (0.0196) (0.0181) (0.0187) (0.0175) (0.0170)
newUSA*core50 -0.0711** -0.0634* -0.0143 -0.0157 -0.0707** -0.0631* -0.0141 -0.0155 -0.0621* -0.0530 -0.00205 -0.00449
(0.0329) (0.0333) (0.0368) (0.0365) (0.0329) (0.0333) (0.0368) (0.0365) (0.0326) (0.0333) (0.0370) (0.0368)
fta*core50 -0.342 -0.262 -0.338 -0.258 -0.533 -0.464
(0.478) (0.482) (0.477) (0.481) (0.449) (0.452)
ftanewUSA*core50 1.188 1.238 0.975 1.175 1.223 0.965 1.465 1.519 1.055
(1.498) (1.369) (1.284) (1.496) (1.367) (1.282) (1.510) (1.363) (1.283)
core50*similar -0.253*** -0.253*** -0.253*** -0.253*** -0.240*** -0.241***
(0.0634) (0.0635) (0.0635) (0.0636) (0.0592) (0.0594)
newUSA*similar 0.0607** 0.0608** 0.0618** 0.0618** 0.0413 0.0413
(0.0285) (0.0285) (0.0285) (0.0285) (0.0323) (0.0323)
fta*similar 0.257 0.268 0.259 0.270 0.296 0.316
(0.437) (0.436) (0.436) (0.436) (0.433) (0.432)
ftanewUSA*similar 0.405 0.395 0.405 0.395 0.472 0.452
(0.611) (0.610) (0.611) (0.610) (0.619) (0.618)
lag ln real ev USA tot 0.00700* 0.00700* 0.00750* 0.00750* 0.00690 0.00690 0.00741* 0.00740*
(0.00424) (0.00424) (0.00422) (0.00422) (0.00424) (0.00424) (0.00421) (0.00421)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ATPDEA and MFN dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 24530 24530 24530 24530 24530 24530 24530 24530 28488 28488 28488 28488
r2 o 0.197 0.197 0.199 0.199 0.197 0.197 0.199 0.199 0.220 0.220 0.221 0.221
N clust 1158 1158 1158 1158 1158 1158 1158 1158 1158 1158 1158 1158
Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters in firms.
*Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level;
***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
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Table B.1.2: Model 3 - Exit (core competence in t) - additional regressions
Dependent Variable Exit ijt
Estimation LPM
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
new USA 0.114*** 0.115*** 0.114*** 0.113*** 0.114*** 0.114***
(0.0245) (0.0246) (0.0246) (0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0179)
fta 0.0778 0.0778 0.133 0.0295 0.0289 0.0455
(0.270) (0.270) (0.290) (0.165) (0.165) (0.181)
fta*new USA -0.0950 0.00361 -0.0519 0.540* 0.591** 0.574*
(0.426) (0.451) (0.464) (0.276) (0.289) (0.298)
newUSA*lag1else 0.0228 0.0230 0.0230 -0.0881*** -0.0880*** -0.0880***
(0.0307) (0.0307) (0.0307) (0.0223) (0.0223) (0.0223)
core50 -0.483*** -0.483*** -0.486*** -0.392*** -0.392*** -0.393***
(0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0123)
newUSA*core50 -0.0507* -0.0606** -0.0583** -0.153*** -0.157*** -0.157***
(0.0273) (0.0276) (0.0275) (0.0237) (0.0242) (0.0243)
fta*core50 -0.447 -0.139
(0.349) (0.299)
ftanewUSA*core50 -0.985* -0.539 -0.483 -0.345
(0.519) (0.618) (0.442) (0.530)
lag ln real ev 0.0591*** 0.0591*** 0.0591***
(0.00168) (0.00168) (0.00168)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes No No No
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes No No No
ATPDEA and MFN dummies Yes Yes Yes No No No
N 31882 31882 31882 27434 27434 27434
r2 o 0.126 0.126 0.126 0.263 0.263 0.263
N clust 2599 2599 2599 2599 2599 2599
Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters in firms.
*Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level;
***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
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Table B.1.3: Model 3 - Exit - controlling for core products in year t-1
Dependent Variable Exit ijt
Estimation LPM
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
new USA 0.210*** 0.208*** 0.208*** 0.214*** 0.212*** 0.212***
(0.0272) (0.0273) (0.0273) (0.0169) (0.0170) (0.0170)
newUSA*lag1else -0.102*** -0.102*** -0.101*** -0.151*** -0.150*** -0.150***
(0.0288) (0.0288) (0.0288) (0.0200) (0.0200) (0.0200)
lag1*core50 0.194*** 0.194*** 0.198*** -0.167*** -0.166*** -0.165***
(0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0184) (0.0176) (0.0176) (0.0179)
newUSA*lag1core50 0.0507 0.0605* 0.0570* 0.0758*** 0.0832*** 0.0823***
(0.0309) (0.0315) (0.0316) (0.0218) (0.0222) (0.0224)
fta -0.0468 -0.0440 -0.0971 -0.181 -0.180 -0.194
(0.245) (0.245) (0.258) (0.170) (0.170) (0.173)
fta*new USA 0.991** 0.807* 0.862* 0.785*** 0.645** 0.659**
(0.412) (0.445) (0.452) (0.262) (0.280) (0.282)
fta*lag1core50 0.569 0.141
(0.469) (0.407)
ftanewUSA*lag1core50 1.252** 0.682 0.952** 0.811
(0.531) (0.706) (0.419) (0.587)
lag ln real ev 0.0530*** 0.0530*** 0.0530***
(0.00192) (0.00192) (0.00192)
Year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
ATPDEA and MFN dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes
N 27547 27547 27547 27434 27434 27434
r2 o 0.0637 0.0637 0.0637 0.192 0.192 0.192
N clust 2599 2599 2599 2599 2599 2599
Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters in firms.
*Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level;
***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
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Table B.1.4: Model 3 - Exit (core competence in t-1) - additional regressions
Dependent Variable Exit ijt
Estimation LPM
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
new USA 0.318*** 0.316*** 0.316*** 0.141*** 0.139*** 0.139***
(0.0206) (0.0207) (0.0207) (0.0179) (0.0180) (0.0180)
fta -0.385* -0.385* -0.427* 0.0648 0.0672 0.0603
(0.221) (0.221) (0.230) (0.162) (0.162) (0.166)
fta*new USA 1.123*** 0.993*** 1.036*** 0.652** 0.488* 0.496*
(0.348) (0.378) (0.384) (0.270) (0.287) (0.289)
newUSA*lag1else -0.0889*** -0.0886*** -0.0885*** -0.176*** -0.176*** -0.176***
(0.0244) (0.0244) (0.0244) (0.0212) (0.0212) (0.0212)
lag1*core50 0.0619*** 0.0623*** 0.0652*** -0.165*** -0.164*** -0.164***
(0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0162) (0.0182) (0.0182) (0.0184)
newUSA*lag1core50 0.0896*** 0.0965*** 0.0937*** 0.0590** 0.0677*** 0.0672***
(0.0248) (0.0251) (0.0252) (0.0240) (0.0246) (0.0248)
fta*lag1core50 0.447 0.0750
(0.405) (0.442)
ftanewUSA*lag1core50 0.882* 0.435 1.110** 1.035*
(0.479) (0.623) (0.431) (0.622)
lag ln real ev 0.0651*** 0.0651*** 0.0651***
(0.00202) (0.00202) (0.00202)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes No No No
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes No No No
ATPDEA and MFN dummies Yes Yes Yes No No No
N 27547 27547 27547 27434 27434 27434
r2 o 0.0672 0.0673 0.0673 0.204 0.204 0.204
N clust 2599 2599 2599 2599 2599 2599
Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters in firms.
*Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level;
***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
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B.2 Models 2 and 3 Including Interactions Between Core50 Dummies and
Firm Size - Additional Estimations
Table B.2.1: Model 2 - Extensive Margin (Entry) - including interactions between core50 and
firm size - additional estimations
Dependent Variable Entry ijt
Estimation LPM
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
new USA 0.0310 0.0309 0.0206 0.0206 0.0314 0.0312 0.0207 0.0208 0.113*** 0.113*** 0.107*** 0.107***
(0.0315) (0.0315) (0.0313) (0.0313) (0.0317) (0.0317) (0.0315) (0.0315) (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0204) (0.0203)
fta -0.254 -0.241 -0.279 -0.289 -0.242 -0.230 -0.268 -0.278 -0.423** -0.401* -0.439* -0.460**
(0.209) (0.212) (0.229) (0.226) (0.210) (0.213) (0.230) (0.227) (0.214) (0.217) (0.232) (0.228)
fta*new USA 0.228 0.214 0.0937 0.104 0.224 0.211 0.0906 0.100 0.351 0.324 0.171 0.192
(0.340) (0.345) (0.385) (0.381) (0.339) (0.345) (0.384) (0.380) (0.345) (0.351) (0.390) (0.387)
similar prod 0.0158 0.0158 0.0106 0.0106 0.0154 0.0154 0.00969 0.00974 0.0562*** 0.0562*** 0.0602** 0.0603**
(0.0137) (0.0137) (0.0182) (0.0182) (0.0137) (0.0137) (0.0182) (0.0182) (0.0180) (0.0181) (0.0261) (0.0261)
ln lag n sec exp USA 0.110 0.110 0.113 0.113
(0.0747) (0.0747) (0.0746) (0.0745)
gr ln real sector USA exports 0.0112 0.0112 0.0109 0.0109
(0.0137) (0.0137) (0.0137) (0.0137)
newUSA*lag1else 0.0991*** 0.0992*** 0.0950*** 0.0949*** 0.0988*** 0.0988*** 0.0945*** 0.0945*** 0.0771** 0.0771** 0.0748** 0.0748**
(0.0344) (0.0344) (0.0345) (0.0345) (0.0345) (0.0344) (0.0345) (0.0345) (0.0344) (0.0344) (0.0344) (0.0344)
core50 0.568*** 0.566*** 0.573*** 0.574*** 0.568*** 0.566*** 0.573*** 0.574*** 0.563*** 0.560*** 0.565*** 0.568***
(0.0240) (0.0244) (0.0245) (0.0241) (0.0239) (0.0243) (0.0245) (0.0240) (0.0215) (0.0220) (0.0220) (0.0216)
core50*small -0.149*** -0.149*** -0.141*** -0.141*** -0.149*** -0.149*** -0.142*** -0.142*** -0.156*** -0.155*** -0.149*** -0.149***
(0.0365) (0.0365) (0.0351) (0.0351) (0.0365) (0.0365) (0.0351) (0.0351) (0.0354) (0.0353) (0.0339) (0.0340)
core50*medium -0.248*** -0.249*** -0.236*** -0.236*** -0.248*** -0.249*** -0.237*** -0.236*** -0.268*** -0.268*** -0.260*** -0.259***
(0.0432) (0.0432) (0.0421) (0.0422) (0.0432) (0.0433) (0.0422) (0.0422) (0.0386) (0.0386) (0.0375) (0.0376)
core50*large -0.440*** -0.438*** -0.409*** -0.410*** -0.441*** -0.439*** -0.410*** -0.411*** -0.440*** -0.438*** -0.415*** -0.417***
(0.0732) (0.0733) (0.0666) (0.0664) (0.0733) (0.0734) (0.0666) (0.0665) (0.0645) (0.0646) (0.0590) (0.0588)
newUSA*core50 -0.0954** -0.0937** -0.0665* -0.0676* -0.0945** -0.0928** -0.0657 -0.0668* -0.113*** -0.110*** -0.0819** -0.0841**
(0.0370) (0.0376) (0.0400) (0.0397) (0.0370) (0.0376) (0.0400) (0.0397) (0.0364) (0.0370) (0.0395) (0.0392)
newUSA*core50*small 0.0666 0.0669 0.105 0.105 0.0661 0.0662 0.104 0.104 0.0837 0.0849 0.121* 0.121*
(0.0712) (0.0710) (0.0691) (0.0691) (0.0712) (0.0710) (0.0691) (0.0691) (0.0682) (0.0682) (0.0654) (0.0653)
newUSA*core50*medium -0.0990 -0.0977 -0.0862 -0.0864 -0.101 -0.0995 -0.0882 -0.0883 -0.0232 -0.0192 -0.00376 -0.00368
(0.0895) (0.0908) (0.0902) (0.0902) (0.0893) (0.0905) (0.0899) (0.0899) (0.0873) (0.0890) (0.0890) (0.0890)
newUSA*core50*large 0.167 0.166 0.175 0.176 0.166 0.165 0.174 0.175 0.196* 0.194* 0.214* 0.216*
(0.122) (0.122) (0.124) (0.124) (0.122) (0.122) (0.123) (0.123) (0.116) (0.116) (0.118) (0.118)
core50*similar -0.247 -0.184 -0.242 -0.179 -0.412 -0.358
(0.460) (0.466) (0.460) (0.466) (0.437) (0.442)
fta*core50 0.317 0.411 0.228 0.299 0.390 0.211 0.689 0.788 0.432
(1.586) (1.427) (1.354) (1.583) (1.425) (1.352) (1.596) (1.417) (1.348)
ftanewUSA*core50 -0.200*** -0.201*** -0.200*** -0.200*** -0.193*** -0.194***
(0.0551) (0.0551) (0.0552) (0.0552) (0.0510) (0.0511)
newUSA*similar 0.0568** 0.0568** 0.0580** 0.0580** 0.0370 0.0370
(0.0285) (0.0285) (0.0285) (0.0285) (0.0322) (0.0322)
fta*similar 0.280 0.287 0.282 0.289 0.320 0.336
(0.437) (0.436) (0.437) (0.436) (0.433) (0.432)
ftanewUSA*similar 0.401 0.394 0.402 0.395 0.462 0.447
(0.613) (0.613) (0.614) (0.613) (0.622) (0.621)
lag ln real ev USA tot 0.00710* 0.00710* 0.00754* 0.00754* 0.00699* 0.00699* 0.00743* 0.00743*
(0.00423) (0.00423) (0.00421) (0.00421) (0.00422) (0.00422) (0.00420) (0.00420)
Firm Size dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ATPDEA and MFN dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 24530 24530 24530 24530 24530 24530 24530 24530 28488 28488 28488 28488
r2 o 0.208 0.208 0.210 0.210 0.208 0.208 0.210 0.210 0.229 0.229 0.230 0.230
N clust 1158 1158 1158 1158 1158 1158 1158 1158 1158 1158 1158 1158
Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters in firms.
*Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level;
***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
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Table B.2.2: Model 3 - Exit (core competence in t) - including interactions between
core50 and firm size - additional estimations
Dependent Variable Exit ijt
Estimation LPM
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
new USA 0.103*** 0.104*** 0.103*** 0.116*** 0.116*** 0.116***
(0.0249) (0.0249) (0.0249) (0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0181)
fta 0.0917 0.0917 0.135 0.0332 0.0324 0.0456
(0.270) (0.270) (0.291) (0.164) (0.164) (0.181)
fta*new USA -0.139 -0.0608 -0.104 0.530* 0.588** 0.574*
(0.425) (0.450) (0.463) (0.276) (0.288) (0.298)
newUSA*lag1else 0.0288 0.0290 0.0290 -0.0951*** -0.0950*** -0.0950***
(0.0317) (0.0317) (0.0317) (0.0230) (0.0230) (0.0230)
core50 -0.616*** -0.616*** -0.618*** -0.371*** -0.371*** -0.371***
(0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0158) (0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0152)
core50*small 0.204*** 0.203*** 0.202*** -0.00243 -0.00317 -0.00358
(0.0212) (0.0212) (0.0211) (0.0205) (0.0205) (0.0204)
core50*medium 0.264*** 0.263*** 0.263*** -0.0425 -0.0433 -0.0434
(0.0257) (0.0258) (0.0257) (0.0310) (0.0310) (0.0310)
core50*large 0.363*** 0.362*** 0.362*** -0.145** -0.146** -0.146**
(0.0350) (0.0351) (0.0351) (0.0568) (0.0568) (0.0568)
newUSA*core50 0.0139 0.00712 0.00872 -0.174*** -0.179*** -0.178***
(0.0347) (0.0347) (0.0347) (0.0304) (0.0306) (0.0306)
newUSA*core50*small -0.0854** -0.0883** -0.0877** -0.0303 -0.0326 -0.0324
(0.0369) (0.0370) (0.0369) (0.0366) (0.0367) (0.0366)
newUSA*core50*medium -0.122*** -0.122*** -0.122*** 0.0481 0.0478 0.0478
(0.0423) (0.0421) (0.0422) (0.0410) (0.0409) (0.0409)
newUSA*core50*large -0.104* -0.103* -0.104* 0.228*** 0.228*** 0.228***
(0.0582) (0.0582) (0.0582) (0.0567) (0.0568) (0.0568)
fta*core50 -0.352 -0.110
(0.340) (0.294)
ftanewUSA*core50 -0.778 -0.427 -0.550 -0.441
(0.530) (0.620) (0.444) (0.529)
lag ln real ev 0.0596*** 0.0596*** 0.0596***
(0.00174) (0.00174) (0.00174)
Firm Size dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes No No No
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes No No No
ATPDEA and MFN dummies Yes Yes Yes No No No
N 31882 31882 31882 27434 27434 27434
r2 o 0.0559 0.0560 0.0559 0.200 0.200 0.200
N clust 2599 2599 2599 2599 2599 2599
Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters in firms.
*Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level;
***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
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Table B.2.3: Model 3: Exit (core competence in t-1) - including interactions between
core50 and firm size
Dependent Variable Exit ijt
Estimation LPM
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
new USA 0.201*** 0.200*** 0.200*** 0.203*** 0.203*** 0.203***
(0.0273) (0.0274) (0.0275) (0.0170) (0.0171) (0.0171)
fta -0.0509 -0.0499 -0.0996 -0.156 -0.156 -0.169
(0.245) (0.245) (0.258) (0.169) (0.169) (0.173)
fta*new USA 0.974** 0.895** 0.946** 0.736*** 0.692** 0.705**
(0.410) (0.446) (0.453) (0.261) (0.278) (0.281)
newUSA*lag1else -0.0369 -0.0370 -0.0369 -0.109*** -0.109*** -0.109***
(0.0310) (0.0310) (0.0310) (0.0210) (0.0211) (0.0210)
lag1*core50 0.489*** 0.489*** 0.492*** 0.123*** 0.123*** 0.124***
(0.0279) (0.0279) (0.0281) (0.0256) (0.0256) (0.0257)
lag1core50*small -0.365*** -0.365*** -0.362*** -0.349*** -0.349*** -0.348***
(0.0372) (0.0372) (0.0373) (0.0328) (0.0328) (0.0328)
lag1core50*medium -0.520*** -0.519*** -0.519*** -0.510*** -0.510*** -0.510***
(0.0365) (0.0365) (0.0365) (0.0360) (0.0361) (0.0361)
lag1core50*large -0.659*** -0.658*** -0.659*** -0.631*** -0.631*** -0.631***
(0.0379) (0.0380) (0.0381) (0.0532) (0.0532) (0.0532)
newUSA*lag1core50 -0.0226 -0.0192 -0.0221 -0.0393 -0.0375 -0.0382
(0.0393) (0.0396) (0.0398) (0.0287) (0.0288) (0.0290)
newUSA*lag1core50*small -0.146*** -0.142*** -0.144*** -0.0890** -0.0870** -0.0875**
(0.0454) (0.0455) (0.0455) (0.0398) (0.0400) (0.0400)
newUSA*lag1core50*medium -0.0978** -0.0963* -0.0958* 0.0262 0.0270 0.0272
(0.0495) (0.0496) (0.0496) (0.0440) (0.0440) (0.0440)
newUSA*lag1core50*large -0.116* -0.117* -0.116* 0.177*** 0.177*** 0.177***
(0.0607) (0.0608) (0.0609) (0.0610) (0.0610) (0.0610)
fta*lag1core50 0.536 0.134
(0.449) (0.389)
ftanewUSA*lag1core50 0.539 0.00254 0.300 0.166
(0.502) (0.666) (0.393) (0.555)
lag ln real ev 0.0540*** 0.0540*** 0.0540***
(0.00193) (0.00193) (0.00193)
Firm Size dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
ATPDEA and MFN dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes
N 27547 27547 27547 27434 27434 27434
r2 o 0.0846 0.0846 0.0845 0.195 0.195 0.195
N clust 2599 2599 2599 2599 2599 2599
Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters in firms.
*Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level;
***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
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Table B.2.4: Model 3 - Exit (core competence in t-1) - including interactions between
core50 and firm size - additional estimations
Dependent Variable Exit ijt
Estimation LPM
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
new USA 0.309*** 0.309*** 0.309*** 0.133*** 0.133*** 0.133***
(0.0209) (0.0209) (0.0209) (0.0180) (0.0180) (0.0180)
fta -0.370* -0.370* -0.409* 0.0676 0.0683 0.0602
(0.222) (0.222) (0.231) (0.161) (0.161) (0.165)
fta*new USA 1.094*** 1.047*** 1.086*** 0.613** 0.560** 0.569**
(0.349) (0.379) (0.385) (0.269) (0.285) (0.288)
newUSA*lag1else -0.0495* -0.0496* -0.0495* -0.120*** -0.120*** -0.120***
(0.0260) (0.0260) (0.0260) (0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0225)
lag1*core50 0.326*** 0.326*** 0.328*** 0.151*** 0.151*** 0.151***
(0.0256) (0.0256) (0.0257) (0.0262) (0.0262) (0.0263)
lag1core50*small -0.327*** -0.327*** -0.325*** -0.373*** -0.373*** -0.372***
(0.0348) (0.0349) (0.0349) (0.0340) (0.0340) (0.0340)
lag1core50*medium -0.459*** -0.459*** -0.459*** -0.557*** -0.557*** -0.557***
(0.0335) (0.0336) (0.0336) (0.0392) (0.0392) (0.0392)
lag1core50*large -0.527*** -0.527*** -0.527*** -0.728*** -0.728*** -0.728***
(0.0421) (0.0421) (0.0421) (0.0559) (0.0559) (0.0560)
newUSA*lag1core50 -0.0154 -0.0134 -0.0156 -0.0450 -0.0428 -0.0432
(0.0328) (0.0329) (0.0331) (0.0305) (0.0307) (0.0309)
newUSA*lag1core50*small -0.0584 -0.0563 -0.0578 -0.137*** -0.134*** -0.135***
(0.0426) (0.0427) (0.0427) (0.0404) (0.0406) (0.0406)
newUSA*lag1core50*medium 0.0279 0.0287 0.0291 -0.0297 -0.0287 -0.0286
(0.0463) (0.0464) (0.0464) (0.0445) (0.0445) (0.0445)
newUSA*lag1core50*large 0.0968 0.0962 0.0972 0.0949 0.0942 0.0944
(0.0623) (0.0622) (0.0623) (0.0615) (0.0615) (0.0615)
fta*lag1core50 0.412 0.0878
(0.396) (0.414)
ftanewUSA*lag1core50 0.321 -0.0919 0.361 0.273
(0.460) (0.600) (0.398) (0.579)
lag ln real ev 0.0652*** 0.0652*** 0.0652***
(0.00203) (0.00203) (0.00203)
Firm Size dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes No No No
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes No No No
ATPDEA and MFN dummies Yes Yes Yes No No No
N 27547 27547 27547 27434 27434 27434
r2 o 0.0909 0.0910 0.0910 0.222 0.222 0.222
N clust 2599 2599 2599 2599 2599 2599
Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters in firms.
*Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level;
***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
175
B.3 Estimations Including Core25 Variables
Table B.3.1: Model 1 - Intensive Margin - including core25 variables
Dependent Variable ∆ln real ev
Estimation Firm FE Robust
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
new USA 2.327*** 2.382*** 2.228*** 2.227*** 1.247*** 1.282*** 1.208*** 1.208***
(0.273) (0.271) (0.270) (0.269) (0.237) (0.233) (0.229) (0.230)
fta -5.236** -5.256** -5.208* -5.010* -3.188 -3.193 -3.128 -3.085
(2.665) (2.665) (2.676) (2.934) (2.400) (2.400) (2.402) (2.553)
fta*new USA 6.809 10.30* 11.04* 10.84* 2.688 4.796 4.972 4.930
(4.754) (5.876) (5.932) (6.022) (4.054) (5.062) (5.038) (5.117)
newUSA*lag2else -2.373*** -2.367*** -0.888** -0.885**
(0.429) (0.428) (0.357) (0.356)
lag1 core25 -3.941*** -3.948*** -3.882*** -3.888*** -2.276*** -2.281*** -2.253*** -2.255***
(0.180) (0.180) (0.179) (0.181) (0.137) (0.137) (0.136) (0.137)
newUSA*lag1core25 0.311 0.153 -0.222 -0.216 0.0549 -0.0400 -0.177 -0.176
(0.316) (0.318) (0.334) (0.333) (0.273) (0.274) (0.272) (0.274)
fta*lag1core25 -0.956 -0.197
(4.239) (3.372)
ftanewUSA*lag1core25 -10.82* -11.12** -10.16 -6.497 -6.573 -6.376
(5.597) (5.592) (6.878) (5.090) (5.080) (6.083)
lag ln real ev USA tot -0.540*** -0.540*** -0.540*** -0.540***
(0.0204) (0.0204) (0.0205) (0.0205)
Year FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
ATPDEA and MFN dummies No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 17077 17077 17077 17077 17077 17077 17077 17077
r2 o 0.0421 0.0420 0.0417 0.0417 0.172 0.172 0.172 0.172
N clust 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters in firms.
*Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level;
***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
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Table B.3.2: Model 2 - Extensive Margin (Entry) - including core25 variables
Dependent Variable Entry ijt
Estimation LPM
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
new USA 0.170*** 0.170*** 0.191*** 0.190*** 0.167*** 0.167*** 0.188*** 0.187***
(0.0360) (0.0362) (0.0378) (0.0378) (0.0360) (0.0362) (0.0379) (0.0378)
fta -0.655*** -0.721*** -0.839*** -0.766*** -0.553*** -0.618*** -0.735*** -0.663***
(0.214) (0.216) (0.232) (0.230) (0.213) (0.215) (0.232) (0.230)
fta*new USA 1.283*** 1.344*** 1.258** 1.183** 1.256*** 1.317*** 1.235** 1.162**
(0.442) (0.456) (0.501) (0.498) (0.440) (0.454) (0.499) (0.496)
similar prod 0.204*** 0.204*** 0.331*** 0.332*** 0.202*** 0.201*** 0.329*** 0.329***
(0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0277) (0.0277) (0.0207) (0.0208) (0.0278) (0.0278)
ln lag n sec exp USA 0.0409*** 0.0407*** 0.0390*** 0.0392***
(0.00684) (0.00684) (0.00689) (0.00689)
gr ln real sector USA exports -0.0314** -0.0313** -0.0320** -0.0321**
(0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0150)
newUSA*lag1else 0.0680* 0.0681* 0.0884** 0.0884** 0.0685* 0.0685* 0.0888** 0.0888**
(0.0387) (0.0387) (0.0379) (0.0379) (0.0386) (0.0386) (0.0379) (0.0379)
core25 0.522*** 0.528*** 0.540*** 0.534*** 0.520*** 0.525*** 0.537*** 0.532***
(0.0181) (0.0186) (0.0178) (0.0174) (0.0182) (0.0186) (0.0178) (0.0174)
newUSA*core25 -0.0868** -0.0911** 0.000960 0.00654 -0.0859** -0.0903** 0.00186 0.00728
(0.0403) (0.0424) (0.0422) (0.0418) (0.0402) (0.0423) (0.0422) (0.0418)
fta*core25 0.779 0.814 0.755 0.789
(0.516) (0.517) (0.516) (0.518)
ftanewUSA*core25 -0.664 -0.619 0.199 -0.663 -0.615 0.179
(1.125) (0.975) (0.812) (1.121) (0.973) (0.810)
core25*similar -0.282*** -0.282*** -0.283*** -0.283***
(0.0501) (0.0499) (0.0502) (0.0499)
newUSA*similar -0.241*** -0.241*** -0.240*** -0.240***
(0.0398) (0.0398) (0.0398) (0.0398)
fta*similar 1.561*** 1.522*** 1.547*** 1.510***
(0.454) (0.457) (0.457) (0.459)
ftanewUSA*similar -1.123* -1.085 -1.132* -1.095
(0.670) (0.671) (0.670) (0.671)
N 28488 28488 28488 28488 28488 28488 28488 28488
r2 o 0.120 0.120 0.127 0.127 0.121 0.121 0.128 0.128
N clust 1158 1158 1158 1158 1158 1158 1158 1158
Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters in firms.
*Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level;
***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
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Table B.3.3: Model 3 - Exit (core competence in t) - including core25 variables
Dependent Variable Exit ijt
Estimation LPM
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
new USA 0.165*** 0.167*** 0.166*** 0.176*** 0.176*** 0.177***
(0.0248) (0.0249) (0.0249) (0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0177)
fta 0.154 0.153 0.252 -0.255 -0.255 -0.271
(0.257) (0.257) (0.303) (0.170) (0.170) (0.190)
fta*new USA 0.662 0.802* 0.700 0.681*** 0.711** 0.727**
(0.415) (0.457) (0.483) (0.261) (0.283) (0.296)
newUSA*lag1else 0.0426 0.0424 0.0423 -0.0366* -0.0367* -0.0367*
(0.0307) (0.0307) (0.0307) (0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0205)
core25 -0.502*** -0.502*** -0.506*** -0.356*** -0.356*** -0.356***
(0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0114) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0108)
newUSA*core25 -0.0675** -0.0768*** -0.0739*** -0.147*** -0.149*** -0.149***
(0.0280) (0.0280) (0.0280) (0.0210) (0.0212) (0.0212)
fta*core25 -0.484 0.0762
(0.324) (0.234)
ftanewUSA*core25 -0.801* -0.317 -0.163 -0.239
(0.471) (0.563) (0.380) (0.439)
lag ln real ev 0.0496*** 0.0495*** 0.0495***
(0.00157) (0.00157) (0.00157)
Year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
ATPDEA and MFN dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes
N 31882 31882 31882 27434 27434 27434
r2 o 0.0986 0.131 0.0986 0.275 0.275 0.275
N clust 2599 2599 2599 2599 2599 2599
Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters in firms.
*Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level;
***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
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B.4 Estimations Including Core10 Variables
Table B.4.1: Model 1 - Intensive Margin - including core10 variables
Dependent Variable ∆ln real ev
Estimation Firm FE Robust
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
new USA 2.574*** 2.615*** 2.493*** 2.495*** 1.391*** 1.413*** 1.354*** 1.358***
(0.290) (0.289) (0.289) (0.288) (0.245) (0.239) (0.235) (0.236)
fta -6.812*** -6.820*** -6.739*** -7.000** -4.213* -4.216* -4.148* -4.623*
(2.510) (2.510) (2.522) (2.892) (2.320) (2.320) (2.323) (2.661)
fta*new USA 9.128** 11.67* 12.21** 12.47** 3.733 5.016 5.112 5.578
(4.608) (6.153) (6.163) (6.259) (4.008) (5.416) (5.395) (5.548)
newUSA*lag2else -2.271*** -2.272*** -0.814** -0.815**
(0.439) (0.439) (0.363) (0.362)
lag1 core10 -3.994*** -3.997*** -3.942*** -3.936*** -2.412*** -2.413*** -2.390*** -2.379***
(0.179) (0.179) (0.178) (0.178) (0.135) (0.135) (0.134) (0.135)
newUSA*lag1core10 0.0335 -0.0550 -0.393 -0.398 -0.211 -0.255 -0.373 -0.383
(0.305) (0.307) (0.321) (0.320) (0.251) (0.247) (0.247) (0.249)
fta*lag1core10 0.780 1.368
(3.772) (2.932)
ftanewUSA*lag1core10 -5.846 -5.814 -6.595 -2.929 -2.885 -4.253
(5.479) (5.346) (6.450) (5.015) (4.975) (5.784)
lag ln real ev USA tot -0.518*** -0.518*** -0.519*** -0.519***
(0.0199) (0.0199) (0.0199) (0.0199)
Year FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
ATPDEA and MFN dummies No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 17077 17077 17077 17077 17077 17077 17077 17077
r2 o 0.0644 0.0643 0.0650 0.0651 0.182 0.182 0.182 0.182
N clust 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters in firms.
*Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level;
***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
179
Table B.4.2: Model 2 - Extensive Margin (Entry) - including core10 variables
Dependent Variable Entry ijt
Estimation LPM
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
new USA 0.164*** 0.164*** 0.182*** 0.182*** 0.161*** 0.161*** 0.179*** 0.179***
(0.0370) (0.0373) (0.0389) (0.0388) (0.0370) (0.0373) (0.0389) (0.0389)
fta -0.484** -0.543*** -0.644*** -0.582*** -0.392** -0.448** -0.549** -0.490**
(0.200) (0.202) (0.215) (0.214) (0.199) (0.201) (0.216) (0.214)
fta*new USA 1.074** 1.125** 1.051** 0.988** 1.049** 1.099** 1.029** 0.969*
(0.432) (0.461) (0.504) (0.500) (0.430) (0.460) (0.503) (0.499)
similar prod 0.190*** 0.189*** 0.325*** 0.325*** 0.188*** 0.187*** 0.323*** 0.323***
(0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0279) (0.0279) (0.0208) (0.0208) (0.0280) (0.0280)
ln lag n sec exp USA 0.0356*** 0.0356*** 0.0339*** 0.0340***
(0.00655) (0.00655) (0.00663) (0.00664)
gr ln real sector USA exports -0.0293** -0.0292** -0.0299** -0.0300**
(0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0145)
newUSA*lag1else 0.0442 0.0443 0.0652* 0.0652* 0.0446 0.0446 0.0656* 0.0655*
(0.0399) (0.0400) (0.0392) (0.0392) (0.0398) (0.0399) (0.0391) (0.0391)
core10 0.550*** 0.553*** 0.565*** 0.562*** 0.548*** 0.551*** 0.563*** 0.560***
(0.0168) (0.0170) (0.0164) (0.0161) (0.0168) (0.0171) (0.0164) (0.0161)
newUSA*core10 -0.0646* -0.0669 0.00955 0.0128 -0.0631* -0.0653 0.0111 0.0142
(0.0382) (0.0409) (0.0403) (0.0399) (0.0381) (0.0408) (0.0402) (0.0398)
fta*core10 0.375 0.380 0.356 0.362
(0.395) (0.391) (0.395) (0.391)
ftanewUSA*core10 -0.290 -0.174 0.208 -0.285 -0.166 0.197
(0.822) (0.727) (0.593) (0.820) (0.725) (0.591)
core10*similar -0.270*** -0.270*** -0.270*** -0.270***
(0.0418) (0.0418) (0.0418) (0.0418)
newUSA*similar -0.232*** -0.232*** -0.231*** -0.231***
(0.0396) (0.0396) (0.0396) (0.0396)
fta*similar 1.416*** 1.395*** 1.404*** 1.384***
(0.440) (0.444) (0.442) (0.446)
ftanewUSA*similar -1.062 -1.041 -1.071 -1.051
(0.653) (0.656) (0.654) (0.656)
N 28488 28488 28488 28488 28488 28488 28488 28488
r2 o 0.162 0.162 0.170 0.170 0.163 0.163 0.171 0.171
N clust 1158 1158 1158 1158 1158 1158 1158 1158
Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters in firms.
*Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level;
***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
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Table B.4.3: Model 3 - Exit (core competence in t) - including core10 variables
Dependent Variable Exit ijt
Estimation LPM
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
new USA 0.150*** 0.152*** 0.151*** 0.160*** 0.160*** 0.160***
(0.0251) (0.0252) (0.0253) (0.0185) (0.0185) (0.0185)
fta 0.0481 0.0477 0.112 -0.295* -0.295* -0.301
(0.238) (0.238) (0.319) (0.164) (0.164) (0.202)
fta*new USA 0.719* 0.877* 0.812* 0.685*** 0.712** 0.718**
(0.381) (0.448) (0.493) (0.242) (0.276) (0.301)
newUSA*lag1else 0.0721** 0.0720** 0.0719** -0.0144 -0.0144 -0.0144
(0.0298) (0.0298) (0.0298) (0.0201) (0.0201) (0.0201)
core10 -0.527*** -0.527*** -0.528*** -0.387*** -0.387*** -0.387***
(0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0105)
newUSA*core10 -0.0619** -0.0693** -0.0680** -0.124*** -0.125*** -0.125***
(0.0271) (0.0271) (0.0271) (0.0209) (0.0210) (0.0210)
fta*core10 -0.203 0.0188
(0.315) (0.223)
ftanewUSA*core10 -0.609 -0.406 -0.0984 -0.117
(0.440) (0.531) (0.342) (0.398)
lag ln real ev 0.0493*** 0.0493*** 0.0493***
(0.00146) (0.00146) (0.00146)
Year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
ATPDEA and MFN dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes
N 31882 31882 31882 27434 27434 27434
r2 o 0.182 0.182 0.182 0.314 0.314 0.314
N clust 2599 2599 2599 2599 2599 2599
Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters in firms.
*Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level;
***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
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B.5 Estimations Considering Transactions Greater than US$ 1,000
Table B.5.1: Model 1 - Intensive Margin - transactions greater than US$ 1,000
Dependent Variable ∆ln real ev
Estimation Firm FE Robust
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
new USA 2.606*** 2.654*** 2.380*** 2.376*** 1.365*** 1.363*** 1.225*** 1.226***
(0.332) (0.335) (0.334) (0.334) (0.293) (0.295) (0.289) (0.289)
fta -6.575* -6.599* -6.518* -6.007 -2.376 -2.375 -2.294 -2.382
(3.455) (3.456) (3.468) (3.831) (2.935) (2.935) (2.941) (3.145)
fta*new USA 10.07* 12.70* 14.07** 13.55* 4.972 4.849 5.295 5.387
(5.876) (6.944) (7.016) (7.194) (4.742) (5.760) (5.681) (5.789)
newUSA*lag2else -2.951*** -2.925*** -1.231*** -1.232***
(0.498) (0.502) (0.415) (0.417)
lag1 core50 -4.522*** -4.528*** -4.436*** -4.455*** -2.186*** -2.185*** -2.141*** -2.138***
(0.220) (0.220) (0.220) (0.224) (0.175) (0.176) (0.174) (0.178)
newUSA*lag1core50 0.412 0.281 -0.117 -0.0981 -0.00775 -0.00158 -0.165 -0.168
(0.399) (0.410) (0.428) (0.428) (0.352) (0.361) (0.360) (0.362)
fta*lag1core50 -3.131 0.538
(6.026) (4.613)
ftanewUSA*lag1core50 -9.855 -11.96 -8.813 0.462 -0.361 -0.902
(7.453) (7.636) (9.554) (6.872) (6.870) (8.284)
lag ln real ev USA tot -0.612*** -0.612*** -0.613*** -0.613***
(0.0229) (0.0229) (0.0229) (0.0229)
Year FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
ATPDEA and MFN dummies No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 10765 10765 10765 10765 10765 10765 10765 10765
r2 o 0.0393 0.0393 0.0392 0.0392 0.201 0.201 0.201 0.201
N clust 875 875 875 875 875 875 875 875
Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters in firms.
*Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level;
***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
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Table B.5.2: Model 2 - Extensive Margin (Entry) - transactions greater than US$ 1,000
Dependent Variable Entry ijt
Estimation LPM
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
new USA 0.124*** 0.123*** 0.161*** 0.161*** 0.121*** 0.120*** 0.158*** 0.158***
(0.0288) (0.0289) (0.0322) (0.0322) (0.0286) (0.0288) (0.0321) (0.0321)
fta -0.521** -0.516** -0.788*** -0.787*** -0.400* -0.394* -0.663*** -0.663***
(0.210) (0.219) (0.242) (0.232) (0.211) (0.221) (0.244) (0.233)
fta*new USA 1.406*** 1.359*** 1.530*** 1.528*** 1.380*** 1.334*** 1.503*** 1.504***
(0.427) (0.439) (0.510) (0.504) (0.428) (0.440) (0.508) (0.502)
similar prod 0.279*** 0.279*** 0.395*** 0.395*** 0.275*** 0.274*** 0.389*** 0.389***
(0.0186) (0.0186) (0.0251) (0.0251) (0.0186) (0.0186) (0.0253) (0.0253)
ln lag n sec exp USA 0.0976*** 0.0975*** 0.0929*** 0.0929***
(0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0176) (0.0176)
gr ln real sector USA exports -0.0334* -0.0334* -0.0352** -0.0352**
(0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0178)
newUSA*lag1else 0.0404 0.0417 0.0652 0.0652 0.0404 0.0417 0.0649 0.0649
(0.0426) (0.0427) (0.0414) (0.0414) (0.0425) (0.0426) (0.0413) (0.0413)
core50 0.548*** 0.547*** 0.563*** 0.563*** 0.544*** 0.544*** 0.560*** 0.560***
(0.0216) (0.0222) (0.0208) (0.0202) (0.0217) (0.0223) (0.0209) (0.0202)
newUSA*core50 -0.0505 -0.0412 0.0666 0.0667 -0.0493 -0.0402 0.0668 0.0667
(0.0418) (0.0433) (0.0454) (0.0449) (0.0416) (0.0431) (0.0453) (0.0448)
fta*core50 -0.0699 0.0145 -0.0859 -0.00151
(0.483) (0.491) (0.483) (0.490)
ftanewUSA*core50 1.128 0.776 0.791 1.110 0.763 0.762
(1.498) (1.620) (1.548) (1.491) (1.612) (1.541)
core50*similar -0.308*** -0.308*** -0.306*** -0.306***
(0.0585) (0.0585) (0.0586) (0.0586)
newUSA*similar -0.237*** -0.237*** -0.233*** -0.233***
(0.0401) (0.0401) (0.0402) (0.0402)
fta*similar 1.804*** 1.804*** 1.793*** 1.793***
(0.421) (0.419) (0.421) (0.419)
ftanewUSA*similar -1.670** -1.670** -1.660** -1.660**
(0.675) (0.674) (0.675) (0.674)
N 16466 16466 16466 16466 16466 16466 16466 16466
r2 o 0.136 0.136 0.147 0.147 0.138 0.138 0.149 0.149
N clust 1054 1054 1054 1054 1054 1054 1054 1054
Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters in firms.
*Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level;
***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
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Table B.5.3: Model 3 - Exit (core competence in t) - transactions greater than US$ 1,000
Dependent Variable Exit ijt
Estimation LPM
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
new USA 0.0695*** 0.0715*** 0.0704*** 0.0660*** 0.0665*** 0.0663***
(0.0230) (0.0231) (0.0231) (0.0152) (0.0153) (0.0152)
fta 0.250 0.248 0.354 -0.00371 -0.00428 0.0122
(0.281) (0.281) (0.320) (0.180) (0.180) (0.199)
fta*new USA -0.0136 0.126 0.0157 0.170 0.204 0.187
(0.440) (0.480) (0.502) (0.272) (0.289) (0.301)
newUSA*lag1else 0.0292 0.0294 0.0295 -0.0469** -0.0469** -0.0469**
(0.0293) (0.0293) (0.0294) (0.0212) (0.0212) (0.0212)
core50 -0.567*** -0.567*** -0.571*** -0.380*** -0.380*** -0.381***
(0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0117)
newUSA*core50 0.0301 0.0201 0.0238 -0.0746*** -0.0769*** -0.0762***
(0.0276) (0.0282) (0.0281) (0.0216) (0.0222) (0.0221)
fta*core50 -0.641* -0.0992
(0.384) (0.330)
ftanewUSA*core50 -0.889 -0.247 -0.207 -0.107
(0.545) (0.661) (0.473) (0.575)
lag ln real ev 0.0496*** 0.0495*** 0.0495***
(0.00152) (0.00153) (0.00153)
Year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
ATPDEA and MFN dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes
N 17816 17816 17816 15368 15368 15368
r2 o 0.117 0.117 0.117 0.275 0.275 0.275
N clust 2160 2160 2160 2160 2160 2160
Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters in firms.
*Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level;
***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
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C Appendix to Chapter 5
C.1 Derivation: Moments of xA
The derivation of the moments of the random vector xA ≡ [xA1 , . . . , xAj , . . . , xAJ ] is based on
a previous work by Nguyen (2012). This vector is formed of an arbitrarily large number
J of possible shipments of product A, and is normally distributed:
xA ∼ (0J ,Ξ). (C.1a)
Ξ = σ20

1 ρ . . . ρ
ρ 1 . . . ρ
. . . . . . . . . . . .
ρ ρ . . . 1
 . (C.1b)
The vector xA can be partitioned, defining xA = [xA1 , x
A
I ], where x
A
I is a vector of J−1
elements and xA1 is a single element. As a result, matrix C.1b is partitioned as follows:
ΞI =

1 ρ . . . ρ
ρ 1 . . . ρ
. . . . . . . . . . . .
ρ ρ . . . 1
 =
 1 Ξ1I
ΞI1 ΞII
 . (C.2)
Since, from Equation 5.9a, at the initial stage of the decision-making process in market
d, E[xA] = E[xB] = 0, and the firm decides on B given its previous shipments of A, I can
take the single element xA1 as the perceived demand from the first shipment of product
B, xB1 . Then, following a theorem on Marginal and Conditional Normal Distributions,
explained at the Econometric Analysis textbook by Greene (2012), I can calculate the
conditional distribution of xB1 given x
A
I , which is normal with the following moments:
E[xB1 | xAI ] = Ξ1IΞ−1II xAI . (C.3a)
V ar[xB1 | xAI ] = σ20 − Ξ1IΞ−1II ΞI1. (C.3b)
Subsequently, I follow Nguyen (2011), guided by a previous work by Paltseva (2010),
in order to simplify the term Ξ1IΞ
−1
II . The challenge is to obtain the inverse matrix of
Ξ−1II . Paltseva (2010) achieved the following simplification:
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Ξ1IΞ
−1
II =
[ρ . . . . . . ρ]
(1− ρ)(1 + (I − 1)ρ)

1 + (I − 2)ρ −ρ . . . −ρ
−ρ 1 + (I − 2)ρ . . . −ρ
. . . . . . . . . . . .
−ρ −ρ . . . 1 + (I − 2)ρ

=
ρ
(1 + (I − 1)ρ) [1 . . . . . . 1].
(C.4)
By that simplification, I can rewrite the moments from Equations C.3a and C.3b:
E[xB1 | xAI ] = Ξ1IΞ−1II xAI =
ρΣi∈IAx
A
i
(1 + (I − 1)ρ) . (C.5a)
V ar[xB1 | xAI ] = σ20 − Ξ1IΞ−1II ΞI1 = σ20
(
1− Iρ
2
(1 + (I − 1)ρ)
)
. (C.5b)
Note that if I multiply both the numerator and denominator of Equation C.5a by IA, I
obtain the expected value of xB given IA of Equation 5.11a. Additionally, the denominator
(1 + (I − 1)ρ) is a rearrangement of IAρ+ (1− ρ) from Equations 5.11a and 5.11b.
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C.2 OLS Estimations: First and Second Experimentation Rounds
Table C.2.1: N◦ Shipments by Peruvian Firms to USA Before Second Experimentation
Round in That Market
Dependent Variable num shipments USA
Estimation OLS
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
postfta -0.119* 0.368 -0.139* -0.135 -0.119* 0.352 -0.130* -0.274
(0.0640) (0.284) (0.0741) (0.329) (0.0638) (0.284) (0.0739) (0.356)
mean export USA 0.0653** 0.0939*** 0.0653** 0.0250 0.0615** 0.0833** 0.0615** 0.00901
(0.0291) (0.0325) (0.0291) (0.0380) (0.0295) (0.0327) (0.0294) (0.0384)
postfta*export USA -0.0614* 0.0112 -0.0586* 0.0115
(0.0333) (0.0386) (0.0333) (0.0381)
new wmean tariff -0.824 0.896
(0.825) (1.098)
postfta*tariff 0.699 -1.040
(0.931) (1.170)
new wpref 0.243** 0.192 0.242** 0.188
(0.0966) (0.124) (0.0977) (0.149)
postfta*pref 0.0752 0.0843
(0.141) (0.165)
pre postfta -0.0401 -0.813** -0.0221 -1.123***
(0.0926) (0.365) (0.0934) (0.407)
pre postfta*export USA 0.117*** 0.128***
(0.0449) (0.0457)
pre postfta*tariff -2.967**
(1.351)
pre postfta*pref 0.0262
(0.202)
Sector FE / Other Regressors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes No No No Yes No Yes
N 1117 1108 1117 1108 1115 1115 1115 1115
r2 o 0.0470 0.0579 0.0472 0.0610 0.0535 0.0624 0.0535 0.0699
F 6.512 3.744 5.885 4.828 6.762 4.335 6.233 4.094
Robust standard errors controlling for heteroskedasticity.
*Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level;
***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
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Table C.2.2: N◦ Shipments by Peruvian Firms Abroad Before First Experimentation
Round in the USA Market
Dependent Variable num shipments total
Estimation OLS
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
postfta 0.0426 0.618 0.264** 1.428** 0.0294 0.523 0.240* 1.102*
(0.108) (0.608) (0.126) (0.710) (0.108) (0.589) (0.126) (0.640)
mean export total 0.0895* 0.140*** 0.0949** 0.0624 0.0973** 0.138** 0.102** 0.0609
(0.0473) (0.0536) (0.0478) (0.0682) (0.0477) (0.0541) (0.0481) (0.0681)
postfta*export total -0.0904 -0.0141 -0.0930 -0.0174
(0.0599) (0.0674) (0.0600) (0.0669)
new wmean tariff 3.205** 4.155**
(1.392) (1.813)
postfta*tariff -0.646 -1.546
(1.638) (2.035)
new wpref -0.453*** -0.514*** -0.434*** -0.542**
(0.148) (0.189) (0.146) (0.245)
postfta*pref 0.196 0.220
(0.220) (0.269)
pre postfta 0.397** 0.0602 0.377** -0.225
(0.155) (0.930) (0.154) (0.881)
pre postfta*export total 0.164* 0.160*
(0.0901) (0.0899)
pre postfta*tariff -1.802
(2.315)
pre postfta*pref 0.0796
(0.315)
Sector FE / Other Regressors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 813 807 813 807 809 809 809 809
r2 o 0.109 0.142 0.116 0.148 0.120 0.146 0.127 0.150
F 13.24 7.624 12.43 7.499 13.45 7.872 12.59 7.779
Robust standard errors controlling for heteroskedasticity.
*Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level;
***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
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Table C.2.3: N◦ Shipments by Peruvian Firms Abroad Before Second Experimentation
Round in the USA Market
Dependent Variable num shipments total
Estimation OLS
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
postfta -0.228*** 0.404 -0.0430 0.158 -0.228*** 0.375 -0.0318 0.0902
(0.0780) (0.368) (0.0887) (0.414) (0.0779) (0.375) (0.0883) (0.407)
mean export total 0.109*** 0.149*** 0.106*** 0.0650 0.104*** 0.138*** 0.101*** 0.0467
(0.0336) (0.0379) (0.0336) (0.0450) (0.0343) (0.0384) (0.0344) (0.0452)
postfta*export total -0.112*** -0.0204 -0.107*** -0.00845
(0.0412) (0.0478) (0.0413) (0.0472)
new wmean tariff -0.878 -0.309
(1.214) (1.339)
postfta*tariff 0.563 -0.125
(1.318) (1.438)
new wpref 0.247** 0.238* 0.268** 0.355**
(0.117) (0.144) (0.116) (0.176)
postfta*pref 0.0395 -0.0608
(0.170) (0.197)
pre postfta 0.370*** -0.897* 0.392*** -0.977*
(0.113) (0.499) (0.113) (0.507)
pre postfta*export total 0.156*** 0.170***
(0.0578) (0.0579)
pre postfta*tariff -1.058
(2.077)
pre postfta*pref -0.189
(0.243)
Sector FE / Other Regressors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes No No No Yes No No
N 1117 1108 1117 1108 1115 1115 1115 1115
r2 o 0.130 0.154 0.139 0.151 0.133 0.157 0.143 0.155
F 18.59 9.988 17.55 12.52 17.08 10.25 16.37 12.82
Robust standard errors controlling for heteroskedasticity.
*Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level;
***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
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C.3 Panel Data Regressions - Fixed Effects at Firm Level
Table C.3.1: N◦ Shipments by Peruvian Firms to USA Before Introduction of New
Export to That Market
Dependent Variable num shipments USA
Estimation Panel Fixed Effects
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
mean export USA 0.177*** 0.160*** 0.117*** 0.0632*** 0.175*** 0.158*** 0.118*** 0.117***
(0.0212) (0.0214) (0.0226) (0.0208) (0.0211) (0.0214) (0.0231) (0.0275)
postfta*export USA -0.0163 0.00359 0.0470* 0.00915 -0.0157 0.00462 0.0442 0.0454
(0.0255) (0.0253) (0.0267) (0.0209) (0.0255) (0.0253) (0.0272) (0.0301)
new wmean tariff 0.207 0.525 0.514 -0.158
(0.402) (0.417) (0.647) (0.614)
postfta*tariff -0.707 -0.833 -0.987 -0.685
(0.518) (0.524) (0.718) (0.660)
new wpref -0.0518 -0.0420 -0.0949 -0.0986
(0.0631) (0.0643) (0.0925) (0.0975)
postfta*pref 0.183** 0.159** 0.222** 0.216**
(0.0812) (0.0808) (0.104) (0.107)
pre postfta*export USA 0.0793*** 0.106*** 0.0732*** 0.0593**
(0.00891) (0.0222) (0.0102) (0.0266)
pre postfta*tariff -0.283 0.470
(0.693) (0.734)
pre postfta*pref 0.0741 0.0756
(0.0947) (0.0982)
Sector FE / Other Regressors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 5009 5009 5009 5009 5028 5028 5028 5028
r2 o 0.0491 0.0284 0.0523 0.0370 0.0436 0.0226 0.0457 0.0314
N clust 1115 1115 1115 1115 1117 1117 1117 1117
Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters in firms.
*Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level;
***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
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Table C.3.2: N◦ Shipments by Peruvian Firms Abroad Before Introduction of New
Exports to the USA Market
Dependent Variable num shipments total
Estimation Panel Fixed Effects
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
mean export total 0.232*** 0.194*** 0.147*** 0.134*** 0.233*** 0.193*** 0.153*** 0.130***
(0.0271) (0.0283) (0.0285) (0.0330) (0.0269) (0.0282) (0.0293) (0.0329)
postfta*export total -0.0281 0.00997 0.0566* 0.0692* -0.0289 0.0106 0.0496 0.0715**
(0.0318) (0.0329) (0.0328) (0.0360) (0.0318) (0.0328) (0.0338) (0.0359)
new wmean tariff 0.227 0.689 0.792 0.846
(0.443) (0.458) (0.726) (0.717)
postfta*tariff -0.675 -0.877 -1.210 -1.034
(0.575) (0.582) (0.807) (0.795)
new wpref -0.0665 -0.0348 -0.147 -0.147
(0.0699) (0.0695) (0.0964) (0.0994)
postfta*pref 0.149 0.117 0.227** 0.230**
(0.0958) (0.0934) (0.115) (0.116)
pre postfta*export total 0.0985*** 0.0892*** 0.0864*** 0.0911***
(0.00939) (0.0313) (0.0101) (0.0310)
pre postfta*tariff -0.579 -0.212
(0.768) (0.791)
pre postfta*pref 0.156 0.167
(0.100) (0.103)
Sector FE / Other Regressors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 5826 5826 5826 5826 5847 5847 5847 5847
r2 o 0.0447 0.0326 0.0580 0.0449 0.0422 0.0277 0.0530 0.0408
F 1563 1563 1563 1563 1564 1564 1564 1564
Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters in firms.
*Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level;
***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
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C.4 Cox Proportional Hazard Model - No Shared Frailty at Firm Level
Table C.4.1: Peruvian Firms’ Probability of Introducing New Exports to USA (Hazard
Ratios)
Excluding First Experimentation Rounds
Time Spell Days After Firm i’s Last Experimentation Round in USA
Estimation Cox Proportional Hazard Model
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
postfta 1.336*** 1.447* 0.851*** 0.340*** 1.335*** 1.673*** 0.850*** 0.383***
(0.0677) (0.289) (0.0458) (0.0763) (0.0677) (0.317) (0.0458) (0.0800)
mean export USA 0.898*** 0.908*** 0.899*** 0.911*** 0.898*** 0.909*** 0.899*** 0.913***
(0.0149) (0.0166) (0.0145) (0.0215) (0.0148) (0.0165) (0.0144) (0.0212)
postfta*export USA 1.022 1.019 1.020 1.015
(0.0206) (0.0247) (0.0205) (0.0243)
new wmean tariff 0.808 1.116
(0.309) (0.650)
postfta*tariff 3.156** 2.295
(1.567) (1.467)
new wpref 0.913** 0.964 0.902** 1.022
(0.0395) (0.0515) (0.0388) (0.0809)
postfta*pref 0.903 0.850*
(0.0685) (0.0776)
pre postfta 0.530*** 0.250*** 0.529*** 0.242***
(0.0327) (0.0627) (0.0327) (0.0573)
pre postfta*export USA 0.993 0.991
(0.0256) (0.0252)
pre postfta*tariff 0.596
(0.433)
pre postfta*pref 0.918
(0.0911)
FE 2009 0.383*** 1.867*** 0.372*** 1.854***
(0.0374) (0.125) (0.0369) (0.124)
FE 2010 0.295*** 1.428*** 0.288*** 1.433***
(0.0305) (0.0917) (0.0303) (0.0922)
FE 2011 0.236*** 1.148** 0.232*** 1.155***
(0.0246) (0.0626) (0.0244) (0.0627)
Sector FE / Other Regressors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 5052 5025 5052 5025 5044 5044 5044 5044
N clust 1118 1116 1118 1116 1118 1118 1118 1118
chi2 213.7 773.9 259.8 777.0 215.8 772.6 267.1 772.6
Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters in firms.
*Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level;
***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
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Table C.4.2: Peruvian Firms’ Probability of Introducing New Exports to USA (Hazard
Ratios)
Including First Experimentation Rounds
Time Spell Days After Firm i’s Last Experimentation Round in USA or Entry into Business (1st Round)
Estimation Cox Proportional Hazard Model
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
postfta 1.368*** 1.329 0.889** 0.265*** 1.366*** 1.540** 0.888** 0.308***
(0.0701) (0.273) (0.0460) (0.0579) (0.0700) (0.302) (0.0459) (0.0644)
mean export total 0.892*** 0.907*** 0.891*** 0.924*** 0.893*** 0.907*** 0.892*** 0.924***
(0.0136) (0.0167) (0.0135) (0.0208) (0.0135) (0.0167) (0.0134) (0.0208)
postfta*export total 1.048** 1.025 1.046** 1.023
(0.0216) (0.0244) (0.0215) (0.0244)
new wmean tariff 0.866 0.789
(0.318) (0.409)
postfta*tariff 3.374*** 3.597**
(1.582) (2.046)
new wpref 0.922** 0.985 0.909** 1.065
(0.0359) (0.0499) (0.0353) (0.0762)
postfta*pref 0.902 0.835**
(0.0626) (0.0679)
pre postfta 0.535*** 0.244*** 0.534*** 0.249***
(0.0329) (0.0599) (0.0328) (0.0575)
pre postfta*export total 0.960 0.960
(0.0238) (0.0237)
pre postfta*tariff 0.996
(0.652)
pre postfta*pref 0.875
(0.0801)
FE 2009 0.329*** 2.307*** 0.324*** 2.302***
(0.0297) (0.157) (0.0294) (0.157)
FE 2010 0.240*** 1.676*** 0.236*** 1.681***
(0.0236) (0.103) (0.0234) (0.104)
FE 2011 0.186*** 1.296*** 0.184*** 1.309***
(0.0185) (0.0694) (0.0185) (0.0698)
Sector FE / Other Regressors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 5865 5832 5865 5832 5853 5853 5853 5853
N clust 1566 1563 1566 1563 1564 1564 1564 1564
chi2 254.8 2355.4 298.0 2299.9 262.2 2309.2 310.8 2254.5
Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters in firms.
*Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level;
***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
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C.5 Cox Proportional Hazard Model - First and Second Experimenta-
tion Rounds
Table C.5.1: Peruvian Firms’ Probability of Introducing New Exports to USA - Second
Experimentation Round (Hazard Ratios)
Time Spell Days After Firm i’s First Experimentation Round in USA
Estimation Cox Proportional Hazard Model
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
postfta 1.451*** 1.905** 0.835** 0.226*** 1.448*** 2.333*** 0.831** 0.285***
(0.0893) (0.547) (0.0600) (0.0787) (0.0891) (0.644) (0.0606) (0.0947)
mean export USA 0.936** 0.917*** 0.927*** 0.921*** 0.938** 0.918*** 0.929*** 0.920***
(0.0240) (0.0229) (0.0234) (0.0293) (0.0238) (0.0229) (0.0233) (0.0293)
postfta*export USA 1.052* 1.047 1.046 1.043
(0.0322) (0.0367) (0.0318) (0.0369)
new wmean tariff 0.965 0.681
(0.750) (0.725)
postfta*tariff 5.260* 7.416*
(4.905) (8.635)
new wpref 0.851* 0.875 0.834** 0.954
(0.0705) (0.0866) (0.0702) (0.127)
postfta*pref 0.902 0.829
(0.118) (0.128)
pre postfta 0.379*** 0.119*** 0.377*** 0.130***
(0.0321) (0.0424) (0.0324) (0.0460)
pre postfta*export USA 0.992 0.994
(0.0363) (0.0367)
pre postfta*tariff 1.885
(2.495)
pre postfta*pref 0.850
(0.148)
FE 2009 0.396*** 3.354*** 0.387*** 3.312***
(0.0591) (0.434) (0.0585) (0.427)
FE 2010 0.230*** 1.958*** 0.230*** 1.981***
(0.0368) (0.236) (0.0372) (0.240)
FE 2011 0.163*** 1.381*** 0.161*** 1.385***
(0.0260) (0.163) (0.0261) (0.163)
Sector FE / Other Regressors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 1118 1109 1118 1109 1116 1116 1116 1116
R2 p 0.0107 0.0277 0.0190 0.0277 0.0110 0.0278 0.0194 0.0278
chi2 134.2 367.6 238.5 370.8 143.2 366.4 245.7 373.1
Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters in firms.
*Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level;
***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
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Table C.5.2: Peruvian Firms’ Probability of Introducing New Exports to USA - First
Experimentation Round (Hazard Ratios)
Time Spell Days After Firm i’s Entry into Business
Estimation Cox Proportional Hazard Model
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
postfta 2.291*** 10.73*** 0.654*** 0.0300*** 2.282*** 12.12*** 0.651*** 0.0394***
(0.169) (3.956) (0.0550) (0.0138) (0.169) (4.227) (0.0553) (0.0171)
mean export total 0.988 0.922** 0.970 0.940 0.987 0.925** 0.970 0.957
(0.0317) (0.0309) (0.0316) (0.0374) (0.0316) (0.0312) (0.0317) (0.0393)
postfta*export total 1.045 1.023 1.039 1.006
(0.0393) (0.0436) (0.0388) (0.0431)
new wmean tariff 7.108** 2.121
(6.271) (2.583)
postfta*tariff 2.773 9.111*
(2.928) (12.13)
new wpref 1.023 0.886 0.964 0.886
(0.0949) (0.109) (0.0998) (0.152)
postfta*pref 1.002 1.003
(0.147) (0.186)
pre postfta 0.133*** 0.00337*** 0.133*** 0.00464***
(0.0140) (0.00181) (0.0140) (0.00239)
pre postfta*export total 0.952 0.931
(0.0476) (0.0464)
pre postfta*tariff 8.207
(11.56)
pre postfta*pref 0.994
(0.191)
FE 2009 0.0549*** 21.30*** 0.0526*** 21.55***
(0.0107) (3.732) (0.00998) (3.747)
FE 2010 0.0195*** 7.580*** 0.0183*** 7.460***
(0.00395) (1.197) (0.00360) (1.173)
FE 2011 0.0117*** 4.511*** 0.0111*** 4.520***
(0.00245) (0.693) (0.00227) (0.694)
Sector FE / Other Regressors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 813 807 813 807 809 809 809 809
R2 p 0.0140 0.0849 0.0423 0.0852 0.0138 0.0836 0.0423 0.0838
chi2 138.6 934.1 411.5 938.8 136.7 904.4 409.5 908.0
Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters in firms.
*Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level;
***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
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Table C.5.3: Peruvian Firms’ Probability of Introducing New Exports to USA - Second
Experimentation Round (Hazard Ratios)
Time Spell Days After Firm i’s First Experimentation Round in USA
Estimation Cox Proportional Hazard Model
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
postfta 1.443*** 1.372 0.833** 0.160*** 1.440*** 1.732* 0.830** 0.205***
(0.0885) (0.429) (0.0596) (0.0599) (0.0883) (0.529) (0.0603) (0.0727)
mean export total 0.917*** 0.890*** 0.913*** 0.889*** 0.919*** 0.892*** 0.916*** 0.889***
(0.0241) (0.0231) (0.0243) (0.0289) (0.0240) (0.0231) (0.0242) (0.0289)
postfta*export total 1.090** 1.090** 1.082** 1.086**
(0.0365) (0.0420) (0.0360) (0.0418)
new wmean tariff 0.792 0.606
(0.613) (0.645)
postfta*tariff 6.086* 7.941*
(5.637) (9.232)
new wpref 0.854* 0.894 0.837** 0.974
(0.0713) (0.0888) (0.0708) (0.130)
postfta*pref 0.878 0.808
(0.114) (0.126)
pre postfta 0.382*** 0.113*** 0.380*** 0.121***
(0.0323) (0.0448) (0.0326) (0.0484)
pre postfta*export total 1.002 1.005
(0.0410) (0.0418)
pre postfta*tariff 1.674
(2.205)
pre postfta*pref 0.853
(0.149)
FE 2009 0.405*** 3.388*** 0.397*** 3.352***
(0.0612) (0.434) (0.0603) (0.427)
FE 2010 0.233*** 1.956*** 0.233*** 1.984***
(0.0376) (0.236) (0.0378) (0.240)
FE 2011 0.164*** 1.375*** 0.162*** 1.377***
(0.0266) (0.164) (0.0265) (0.163)
Sector FE / Other Regressors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 1118 1109 1118 1109 1116 1116 1116 1116
R2 p 0.0110 0.0282 0.0192 0.0282 0.0112 0.0283 0.0195 0.0283
chi2 136.0 370.9 241.1 375.4 143.5 371.2 248.5 380.9
Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters in firms.
*Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level;
***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
